



# ***Daily Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

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FBIS-SCV-96-110  
Thursday  
6 June 1996

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# Daily Report

## Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-96-110

### CONTENTS

6 June 1996

**NOTICE:** An \* indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.

#### PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ISSUES

|                                                                                            |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Russia: Yeltsin Meets With Pig Breeders in Tver Region [Moscow RTV]                        | 1  |
| Russia: Pro-Yeltsin Voronezh Officials Break Election Law Again [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 4 Jun] | 1  |
| Russia: Yeltsin Supporters on Communists, 'Civil War' Threat [PRAVDA 4 Jun]                | 2  |
| Russia: Shumeyko Interviewed on Yeltsin, Other Issues [SOBESEDNIK May]                     | 3  |
| Russia: Zyuganov Promises No Civil War After Presidential Election [ITAR-TASS]             | 8  |
| Russia: Zyuganov Says West Against Break-Up of Russia [ITAR-TASS]                          | 9  |
| Russia: Zyuganov's Economic Program Reviewed [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 23 May]                  | 9  |
| Russia: Grachev Remarks on Navy Vote Based on Seamen's 'Own Words' [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Jun] | 11 |
| Russia: Grachev's Disclosure of Navy Vote Criticized [IZVESTIYA 5 Jun]                     | 12 |
| Russia: Rural Voting Intentions, Factors Examined [IZVESTIYA 6 Jun]                        | 13 |
| Russia: Poll Shows 60 Percent of Chechens To Take Part in Elections [ITAR-TASS]            | 15 |
| Russia: Rebels Warning Chechens Not To Vote on 16 Jun [INTERFAX]                           | 15 |
| Russia: Communists Take Election Fraud Charges to TsIK [SEGODNYA 5 Jun]                    | 15 |
| Russia: Federation Council Appeals to Presidential Candidates [ITAR-TASS]                  | 16 |

#### INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

|                                               |    |
|-----------------------------------------------|----|
| CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 6 Jun | 17 |
|-----------------------------------------------|----|

#### RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

|                                                                                                 |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Russia: Primakov Maintains Stance on NATO Growth at Berlin Meeting [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 6 Jun]  | 18 |
| Russia: Primakov Winds Up Visit to Berlin, Departs for Moscow [ITAR-TASS]                       | 18 |
| Russia: Position on NATO Expansion 'Not Changed' [IZVESTIYA 6 Jun]                              | 18 |
| Russia: European Dimension 'Prop' for Russia's Line on NATO [IZVESTIYA 6 Jun]                   | 19 |
| Russia: NATO Responds to Moscow's Concerns Before Elections [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 5 Jun]            | 20 |
| Russia: Grachev Remarks at Lvov Peacekeeping Exercise [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Jun]                   | 21 |
| Russia: Poll Shows Russians Like West's Economy, Not Democracy [INTERFAX]                       | 22 |
| Russia: Seleznev Hails 'New Impetus' Following DPRK, Mongolia Trip [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 4 Jun]   | 22 |
| Russia: DPRK Denies Visas to 'Slandorous' Russian News Agencies [INTERFAX]                      | 22 |
| Russia: Amb. Pickering Seeks To Reassure Deputies About NATO [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 Jun]        | 23 |
| Russia: U.S.-Russian Crime Fighting Conference Held in Moscow [TRUD 5 Jun]                      | 24 |
| Russia: Leader of Chechen Information Center in Poland Interviewed [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 4 Jun] | 24 |
| Russia: NE Atlantic Fish Pact Has Political Nuances [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 May]                 | 25 |
| Russia: Fish Accord With Iran Irks Caspian Capitals [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 May]                 | 26 |



|                                                                                                         |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Russia: Government, Japan Disagree on Fishing in South Kurils Area [INTERFAX] .....                     | 28 |
| <b>RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS</b>                                                                          |    |
| <b>Political Issues</b>                                                                                 |    |
| Russia: State Body Takes Action on Pay Arrears [IZVESTIYA 25 May] .....                                 | 29 |
| <b>Media Issues</b>                                                                                     |    |
| Russia: Moscow NTV Director General on Political Bias Accusations [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Jun] .....         | 30 |
| <b>Military Issues</b>                                                                                  |    |
| Russia: 'Unsinkable' Grachev Continues To Take Liberties [SEGODNYA 5 Jun] .....                         | 31 |
| Russia: Gromov Supports Army Reform, Regrets Corruption [Moscow TV] .....                               | 32 |
| Russia: New Law Heralds 'More Coordinated' Defense System [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Jun] .....                 | 33 |
| <b>Federal Assembly</b>                                                                                 |    |
| Russia: Senate Approves Law on Inauguration of President-Elect [INTERFAX] .....                         | 34 |
| Russia: Federation Council Appeals to Voters To Use Common Sense [ITAR-TASS] .....                      | 34 |
| Russia: Assembly Endorses Russian-Belarusian Legislative Body [ITAR-TASS] .....                         | 34 |
| Russia: Zhirinovskiy Fails To Push Discussion on 'Genuine' Land [INTERFAX] .....                        | 34 |
| Russia: Federation Council Ratifies International Agreements [ITAR-TASS] .....                          | 35 |
| <b>Regional Affairs</b>                                                                                 |    |
| Russia: Yeltsin Tells Tver Residents War in Chechnya Over [ITAR-TASS] .....                             | 35 |
| Russia: Chechens Insist 'Ichkeria' Be Mentioned in Protocol [Moscow RTV] .....                          | 35 |
| Russia: Chechnya's Udugov Says Talks Moving 'With Great Difficulties' [ITAR-TASS] .....                 | 35 |
| Russia: Local Military, Aides Cited on Nazran Talks [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 5 Jun] .....                     | 36 |
| Russia: Progress of Nazran Peace Talks Viewed [IZVESTIYA 6 Jun] .....                                   | 36 |
| Russia: Basayev Still Insisting on Withdrawal of Russian Troops [OBSHCAYA GAZETA 6-12 Jun] .....        | 37 |
| Russia: Chechen Rebels Threaten Return To War if Terms Not Met [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 6 Jun] .....          | 38 |
| Russia: Directive on Commission for Talks on Chechen Settlement Issued [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 Jun] ..... | 38 |
| Russia: Federal Forces, Chechen Separatists Sign Protocol on POW's [ITAR-TASS] .....                    | 39 |
| Russia: OSCE Official: Democratic Elections Impossible in Chechnya [INTERFAX] .....                     | 39 |
| Russia: New St. Petersburg Governor Appoints Deputy Governor [INTERFAX] .....                           | 40 |
| <b>Economic Issues</b>                                                                                  |    |
| Russia: Livshits Sees Need for Increased State Role [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 1 Jun] .....                    | 40 |
| Russia: Pay Arrears May Affect Election Outcome [TRUD 29 May] .....                                     | 41 |
| Russia: Bank Statute Could Mean 'Additional Outflow' of Currency [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 1 Jun] .....       | 42 |
| Russia: Agriculture Ministry: 75-78 Million Tonnes of Grain in 1996 [ITAR-TASS] .....                   | 43 |
| <b>UKRAINE</b>                                                                                          |    |
| <b>International Affairs</b>                                                                            |    |
| Ukraine: Kuchma Seeks Further Integration Into Europe [INTERFAX] .....                                  | 44 |
| Ukraine: Kuchma Stresses Country Does Not Seek NATO Membership [UNIAN] .....                            | 44 |

|                                                                                            |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Ukraine: Kuchma Expresses Opposition to Nuclear Arms in Region [ITAR-TASS] .....           | 44 |
| Ukraine: Kuchma Reiterates Support for Yeltsin [INTERFAX] .....                            | 45 |
| Ukraine: Kuchma Says Ukraine, Russia Not Ready To Sign Treaty [UNIAN] .....                | 46 |
| Ukraine: Udovenko: CIS Integration Pressure To Grow After Elections [INTERFAX] .....       | 46 |
| Ukraine: Kuchma To Attend Central European Leaders' Meeting [UKRINFORM] .....              | 46 |
| Ukraine: Tabachnyk Discusses Trade, Economic Ties in Havana [URYADOVYY KURYER 1 Jun] ..... | 46 |

#### National Affairs

|                                                                                      |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Ukraine: Kuchma: Cabinet Reshuffle Certain [INTERFAX] .....                          | 47 |
| Ukraine: Article Views Situation of Local Press [URYADOVYY KURYER 28 May] .....      | 47 |
| Ukraine: Belarus Opposition Calls On Ukraine To Defend Human Rights [INTERFAX] ..... | 49 |
| Ukraine: Crimean Parliament Approves 1996 Economic Development Plan [UNIAN] .....    | 49 |
| Ukraine: Tatar Leader Views 'Tension' in Crimea [KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA 25 May] .....    | 49 |

#### Economic Issues

|                                                                                         |    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Ukraine: Kuchma Discusses Budget With Regional Administration Heads [UKRINFORM] ....    | 52 |
| Ukraine: Lazarenko Acts To Fulfill Presidential Edict on Wages [URYADOVYY KURYER 1 Jun] | 52 |
| Ukraine: Sevastopol Administration To Set Up Free Trade Zone [INFOBANK] .....           | 52 |
| Ukraine: Prospects for Establishing Free Trade Zone in Kharkov [VREMYA 23 May] .....    | 53 |

### WESTERN REGION

#### Belarus

|                                                                                        |    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Belarus: Sharetskiy Comments on Visit to U.S. [ZVYAZDA 31 May] .....                   | 54 |
| Belarus: Minsk Dismisses Moscow's Fears Over Missile Pullout [SEGODNYA 5 Jun] .....    | 55 |
| Belarus: Official Says Belarus Has Disrupted Nuclear Withdrawal [INTERFAX] .....       | 55 |
| Belarus: Russian Rocket Forces Delayed Withdrawal Causes 'Discord' [Minsk Radio] ..... | 56 |
| Belarus: President Views Closer Ties With Krasnodar Kray [Moscow RTV] .....            | 56 |
| Belarus: Official on Ties With Foreign Organizations [ZVYAZDA 29 May] .....            | 56 |

#### Moldova

|                                                                                                   |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Moldova: Snegur Interviewed on Ilascu, Romanian Relations [Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA 31 May] ..... | 60 |
| Moldova: Parliament Head Views Economic Reform Acceleration [INFOTAG] .....                       | 61 |

### CENTRAL ASIA

#### Tajikistan

|                                                                                                 |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Tajikistan: Uzbekistan Offers Aid After Recent Floods [Dushanbe Radio] .....                    | 63 |
| Tajikistan: Official Rejects Opposition Claims of Russia's Involvement [Moscow Radio] .....     | 63 |
| Tajikistan: Government Troops Repulse Opposition Near Tavil Dara [INTERFAX] .....               | 63 |
| Tajikistan: Most Police Chiefs Fired in Leninabad After Protests [Voice of Free Tajikistan] ... | 63 |

#### Uzbekistan

|                                                                                    |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Uzbekistan: President Meets Yeltsin's Envoy for Tajikistan [ITAR-TASS] .....       | 64 |
| Uzbekistan: OSCE Says Uzbek Parliamentarians Promoting Stability [ITAR-TASS] ..... | 64 |
| Uzbekistan: Uranium Mining Retooling Program Reported [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 Jun]  | 64 |

### CAUCASUS

#### Armenia

|                                                                             |    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Armenia: UN To Expand Aid to Armenia, Other CIS Countries [ITAR-TASS] ..... | 65 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|

|                                                                                      |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Armenia: Ararktsyan Sees Cooperation Whoever Wins Russian Elections [NOYAN TAPAN] .. | 65 |
| Armenia: President Leaves for Georgia on Official Visit [Yerevan Radio] .....        | 65 |

#### Azerbaijan

|                                                                                      |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Azerbaijan: OSCE Delegation Arrives for Visit to Region [Baku Radio] .....           | 65 |
| Azerbaijan: Aliyev Receives Visiting U.S. Energy Department Official [TURAN] .....   | 65 |
| Azerbaijan: Aliyev Receives Council of Europe Delegation [TURAN] .....               | 66 |
| Azerbaijan: Government Refuses To Sign Simultaneous Multiple Oil Deals [TURAN] ..... | 66 |
| Azerbaijan: Aliyev, Signatories View Importance of Caspian Project [TURAN] .....     | 66 |

#### Georgia

|                                                                                       |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Georgia: Deputy Foreign Minister Denies Border Conflict With Armenia [INTERFAX] ..... | 67 |
| Georgia: Tbilisi Refutes Armenian Troops Violated Territory [BGI] .....               | 67 |
| Georgia: Spokesman Says Abkhazian Government Reshuffle Not 'Abnormal' [ITAR-TASS] ... | 68 |

### BALTIC STATES

#### Estonia

|                                                                                               |    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Estonia: Meri Voices Concern Over CFE Changes, Baltic Security [BNS] .....                    | 69 |
| Estonia: Joint Estonian, Russian, Finnish Rescue Exercises 'Successful' [Tallinn Radio] ..... | 69 |
| Estonia: Chinese Deputy Premier Meets President, Other Officials [Tallinn Radio] .....        | 69 |
| Estonia: President Meri, Chinese Official Discuss Regional Issues [Tallinn Radio] .....       | 69 |
| Estonia: Latvian Fishermen Violate Border Despite Agreement [Tallinn Radio] .....             | 70 |

#### Latvia

|                                                                                     |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Latvia: Russian Build-Up on Northern Flank Counters NATO Expansion [INTERFAX] ..... | 70 |
| Latvia: Foreign Minister Worried Over Increase of Russian Forces [BNS] .....        | 70 |

**Russia: Yeltsin Meets With Pig Breeders in Tver Region**

*LJ0606110496 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Jun 96*

[From the "Vesti" news program; R. Babayan video report shows Yeltsin getting out of a helicopter and talking to pig breeders]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Aleksandr Gurnov] We have just received a report from our correspondent in Tver. To recall, the Russian president is in the Tver Region today on a working tour. Yeltsin is planning to meet peasants, entrepreneurs, workers, people of Tver, and of course local authorities during his trip. Here is the report:

[Begin recording] [Babayan] At 1200 Moscow time [0800 GMT] the Russian president's helicopter landed on the outskirts of the Zavolzhskiy settlement 10 km away from Tver. The Tver region is very rich in agricultural land.

In Zavolzhskiy, Boris Yeltsin met workers of the pig breeding farm. It appears that the Russian leader has himself decided to meet ordinary animal farmers, assuming that the only way to learn about peasants' problems is to meet them face to face. The first thing they discussed was the non-payment of wages. When the president asked why the wages had been unpaid, the head of the Tver Region administration Platov said it was because there was no agreement on the delimitation of powers between the federal center and the member of the federation.

[Yeltsin] If the agreement is the only cause, then let's sign it immediately.

[Babayan] However, it turned out that the document wasn't ready yet and will be finished in the next few days.

[Yeltsin] Let's determine that we will sign this agreement on the 11th [June, presumably] at 2100. I wonder, however, if the agreement alone is to blame. [end recording]

**Russia: Pro-Yeltsin Voronezh Officials Break Election Law Again**

*MM0506154096 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 2*

[Report by Aleksandr Ilin: "Every Law Has a Loop-hole"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Voronezh — In Borisoglebsk, which is in Voronezh Oblast, G. Makin, first deputy head of the oblast administration, and Russian Federa-

tion Presidential Representative B. Kuznetsov have been campaigning in support of B.N. Yeltsin. They invited the heads of rayon and settlement administrations, collective farm representatives, and leaders of enterprises — over 300 people in all — to a conference.

Only weeks earlier Voronezh Oblast Electoral Commission had considered an appeal from the Standing Commission for the Affairs of Public and Religious Organizations, Young People, and the Mass Media and material received from citizens and public and state organizations about violations of legal requirements (Article 38 of the Federal Law On the Election of the Russian Federation President). The commission declared that Presidential Representative Kuznetsov had violated the said article of the law. And the attention of A. Kovalev, head of the oblast administration, was drawn to the need to observe constitutional norms.

It would seem that laws are written to be respected and obeyed. But no! Dozens of people have again been torn away from their jobs in order to receive "valuable instructions" in work time!

The conference began with speeches by an entrepreneur, the editor of a rayon newspaper, and the head of a settlement administration. In the best traditions of the period of stagnation, tediously and on scraps of paper, and in the face of the audience's complete apathy, they urged it to vote for "the guarantor of reforms and democracy."

The fourth person to get up onto the podium was G. Kostin, chairman of the State Duma Committee for Conversion and Science-Intensive Technologies and member of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] Central Committee Presidium. The brief and clear analysis of the state of the Russian budget and production made by Kostin and the portrayal of the way in which the ruling regime is going down a blind alley found complete understanding among the audience.

The last sentences of the speech drew concerted applause.

"In the center of Voronezh," Georgiy Vasilyevich said, "the administration has hung up a huge placard: 'Peter I began the reforms, Boris Yeltsin will finish them!' I do not understand the administration, what reforms is it talking about? Peter I carved out a window to Europe and through Poltava [Battle of Poltava, 1709] forced it to treat Russia with respect. Yeltsin has lost the war in Chechnya and has lost Russia's main sea ports. Peter built cities, Yeltsin is destroying them. Peter opened up state plants throughout Russia, while Yeltsin has put the country's economy and production on the back burner. If Peter had seen the deeds of his "continuer" his staff



would not have come down on a single "reformer's" head but first and foremost on Yeltsin's head!...

The audience greeted another two speeches with applause — those of collective farm chairman A. Polnikov and a chemical plant worker.

The president's representative, who was last to speak, was forced to cut his speech short at the audience's request....

#### **Russia: Yeltsin Supporters on Communists, 'Civil War' Threat**

MM0506160196 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
4 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Feliks Bebel'yubskiy: "Well, So How Are the Communists Preparing Civil War?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The movie theater in Journalists' House was full to capacity. The news conference of the "All-Russia Movement of Public Support for B.N. Yeltsin at the Russian Federation Presidential Election" on the theme "How the Communists are preparing the country for Civil War" (the organizers' orthography) had provoked great interest. But those who attended were not given the smell of blood and powder. Instead they heard a banal account from the president's troops about their work and the creative insights that have enlightened them on their sad and weary path. That is why they had to dream up an "eye-catching gimmick" — otherwise no one would have come.

The organizers were concerned about the mood of the audience, which consisted mainly of foreigners, and were forced to produce some kind of news after all. But this news had nothing whatsoever to do with what purported to be the main theme — "civil war." On the other hand, it is useful for the purpose of assessing the state of mind of the government campaign staff.

They are particularly unhappy, of course, with the Communists' plans to set up a "parallel" vote-counting system. At the same time, they announced that they are setting up their own parallel system for recording the vote. Apparently, they tried to organize such a system in 15 cities during the 1993 elections. But there was not enough money at the time to pay the volunteers (?) who participated in the "public (?) monitoring." However, now they apparently do have the money.

From the foreigners' questions it emerged that parallel counting by all the rivals before the official results of a ballot are totaled is the norm for Western political culture. But the speakers lobbed all sorts of alarming ideas — what children call "shockers" — at the audience. One of these "shockers" was the suggestion that, on the basis of the unofficial, parallel count, Zyuganov

would take the presidential oath of office, but for some reason in Bryansk (!)

The second "shocker" proved not to be alarming but, instead, one of their own, homemade ones. The question "How can an alliance between Yeltsin and Zhirinovskiy be avoided?" was answered quick as a flash (they had done their "homework") — "There is nothing terrible about such an alliance."

The main theme was gabbled quickly: Not one legally proven fact or one record confirming any falsification of election results whatsoever by the Communists was presented. The complete absence of such documents was actually acknowledged (ingeniously and publicly). The president's team headquarters had to resort to "area fire."

The first cause for alarm is rural areas: "The higher the turnout in rural areas, the higher the share of votes for left-wing parties or slogans."

The second cause for alarm is the behavior of those groups of voters who have learned how to fill in their ballot papers correctly or who vote against all candidates. As the saying goes, "The pen is mightier than the sword": The 6.8 percent of voters who formerly filled in their ballot papers incorrectly or who voted against all parties now for some reason voted as a body for the Left" (from an article by Aleksandr Sobyenin and Valeriy Sukhovolskiy circulated in the hall). Indeed, why should this be? Readers of PRAVDA do not need to be told why these people have "come together" and now "vote as a body."

PRAVDA's correspondent put the following question to the Russian Federation president's aide, G. Saratov:

"How do you assess the condition of the people's-patriotic forces? What marks would you give us for civil war combat readiness? What are our shortcomings in preparing for civil war, and what would the Presidential Staff advise us to do in order to correct them?"

"Will there be a fee for my consultancy?" came the answer (the question was a "knockout blow" — there turned out to be no "rehearsed impromptu retort").

"No, of course not. For free," the correspondent assured him.

Nevertheless, Georgiy Aleksandrovich thought it awkward to issue recommendations to political opponents about the disposition of forces. In fact, the top brass of the president's troops does not believe in the threat of war from the Communists. They are only confusing the "terrors of democracy" with the terrors of civil war.



**Russia: Shumeyko Interviewed on Yeltsin, Other Issues**

964F2356A Moscow SOBESEDNİK in Russian  
May 96 No 20, pp 6-7

[Interview with Vladimir Shumeyko, former chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, by Mikhail Serdyukov; place and date not given: "Flying Over Boris Nikolayevich's Nest...: Vladimir Shumeyko: 'Yeltsin Has Zillions of Shortcomings, But Only He Can Ensure Freedom'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Shumeyko was born in 1945 in Rostov-na-Donu. An Aquarius. The decoration he is most proud of is his father's Alexander Nevskiy Order. For the Great Patriotic War. Graduated from a polytechnic institute. Most recent job—chairman of the Federation Council of Russia. In moments of sadness sings "Black Raven." Desktop authors: Ilf and Petrov. Favorite food—potatoes. Drinks—compote and cognac. The latest joke: "The strong party is the one with Nadezhda [Hope] on its side. Babkina, of course..." He promised to introduce me to his wife—next time around.

Why do people not fly like swallows? Vladimir Shumeyko envies this wondrous bird. As a politician, and as a man. Just look at its ability to instantly change its course, responding to any change in the environment?! Oh, how Vladimir Filippovich would like to learn to react to life's events precisely this way. And teach others to do the same. To this end he even created a social movement with a swallow on its logo and an unromantic name: "Reforms—New Course." Until recently the third person in the state hierarchy of Russia, he does not at all feel deprived after landing from all these "heavenly" posts. In his 50 years, the only jobs he probably has not yet held are those of prime minister and president. Astrologists, seconded by Gypsies, predict in unison: "All is yet to come!"

**Flight From the Past**

[Serdyukov] Are you capable of admitting your own mistakes?

[Shumeyko] What else can one do? I consider it a huge mistake of our reforms that Russia in a way was divided into three temporal pieces: tsarist, communist, and current—apparently democratic. This is all lies! National history cannot be written in a dotted line. It is continuous. By denying it, we got to the point of blanket rejection of the socialist period. When allegedly everything was bad!... When it is being hammered into you from morning to night that this other life was nothing but a nightmare, because everybody had this Soviet mentality and no spiritual values, it makes a person feel nothing except humiliation.

[Serdyukov] Yes, we—yourself included—did start quite a mess... Do you regret jumping into this thankless business—politics?

[Shumeyko] You know, a man asked a psychic to "get" him into politics. "Wave your hand," said the psychic. He did. "Congratulations," says the psychic, "you are now in politics. You waved your hand... Everybody who wants to get into politics starts with this movement..."

**Building a Nest**

[Serdyukov] Talking to you several days ago, I caught one of your favorite words—to "push through." What do you mean by this?

[Shumeyko] Reforms are currently underway in the country. But nobody nurtures a need for them, and proves their advantages compared to the old life. What are knowledgeable people to do? All they can do is push our reforms through.

[Serdyukov] On the principle: If you do not want to do it—we will force you? How much good do you expect from such, let us be honest, an ungodly method?

[Shumeyko] Do you know how to teach a cat to eat mustard?

[Serdyukov] Why would one want to?

[Shumeyko] That is not the point for now, it is irrelevant in this case. Well, there are three ways. The American way—you force him. You put some mustard in a saucer and stick the cat's nose into it until he begins to lick the mustard off the saucer... The European way is more gentle. You put some mustard in a saucer and put the cat in front of it. And begin to patiently explain to the cat why he has to eat this crap. Until the cat gets sick and tired of it and begins to lick the saucer. But the simplest method is the socialist one. The cat eats the mustard without any outside prodding. You simply smear the mustard under his tail, and he starts licking it off. Our reforms are being implemented the same way as the "socialist" method of dealing with the cat.

[Serdyukov] But is this good, Vladimir Filippovich?

[Shumeyko] This is by Chernomyrdin's definition: We wanted to do better, but it turned out as usual. Russia is a federative state of 89 components. But only 15 of them are capable of bringing revenue to the national budget. The rest can only conditionally be called federation components—they are not self-sufficient. Hence, all-out poverty.

[Serdyukov] So when can we expect prosperity?

[Shumeyko] One cannot count on implementing reforms in a year or two. It will take decades.

[Serdyukov] Are you saying that politicians are not to be trusted?

[Shumeyko] A politician is like a suitor. No politician has ever fulfilled all his promises. The interests of authority do not always coincide with the interests of the people. Sometimes they are directly the opposite.

[Serdyukov] So, what do we have here: Once every four years we are eagerly awaited at the ballot box. And once we cast these pieces of paper—goodbye! Do our authorities not need us in the interim?

[Shumeyko] Precisely. The interval between elections is the most dramatic time in the relationship between the authorities and the people. We need to learn to influence the authorities during this interval.

[Serdyukov] Wait a minute—do we not have enough rights to accomplish this?

[Shumeyko] A man comes to a law office and yells as he walks through the door: "Do I have the right?" "Of course!" he is told. He calms down and asks a follow-up question: "Can I?" And they very calmly say: "No." Having the right is not a problem. Exercising it is where we are not quite on the level.

[Serdyukov] Then what is the meaning of our democracy?

[Shumeyko] Who said we have democracy? Democracy in Russia is only going through labor pains.

[Serdyukov] All right, eventually it will be born. And then there will be no money to buy diapers. The country does not have enough money to pay honestly earned wages!...

[Shumeyko] There is money in the country. Which would be enough for everybody. Provided state regulation works. As it is, however, everybody is pulling the blanket onto his side... Why, for instance, does Gazprom need to build for itself a skyscraper in downtown Moscow at a cost of \$1.2 billion? With this money one could feed all pensioners in the country—ten times over!

[Serdyukov] It is strange to hear such indignation from you. You have access to all the "high" offices in Russia, and only recently were considered the third person in the state...

[Shumeyko] True. And I spoke up against building this New York-style palace. So what? Some rather influential people got angry at me. What can I do alone? Society must learn to influence its authorities. Otherwise we are worthless.

[Serdyukov] Is your Reforms—New Course movement intent on doing precisely this?

[Shumeyko] That's why we created it.

[Serdyukov] In your opinion, are there forces in Russia today capable of turning Russia back? Of bringing back the communist regime?

[Shumeyko] This would take another Stalin. Thank God, there is currently nobody like that on the horizon, because the only way to turn Russia back is through bloodshed. And this should not be allowed to happen.

### Spit From Heaven

[Serdyukov] Which job did you like most?

[Shumeyko] Plant director. I was elected by the collective in 1986. Apparently, because I am easy to get along with.

[Serdyukov] Do you think of your plant often?

[Shumeyko] Of course. These days—with a sigh. The enterprise is in decline. Of the 13,000 workers, only 4,000 still there.

[Serdyukov] And you, from your heights, could not do anything to help your own plant?

[Shumeyko] I did. I arranged for credits a couple of times. But this was not enough, and they are still mad at me. How can I explain that the government's general policy does not recognize such propping up?

[Serdyukov] Are you against protectionism?

[Shumeyko] In my heart, maybe I am for it. But by virtue of my job, I could not support it.

[Serdyukov] Would it be fair to say that your honesty is legendary?

[Shumeyko] Go ahead.

[Serdyukov] But how many times have you been accused of corruption?

[Shumeyko] Two or three. This is only counting serious charges. Otherwise—more.

[Serdyukov] Why did Rutskoy hate you so much?

[Shumeyko] He was my political opponent. But he was not the problem. It is much harder when your friends betray you.

[Serdyukov] Who specifically? Dmitriy Yakubovskiy? I heard that you were friends.

[Shumeyko] No. Yakubovskiy worked for me as a supernumerary aide. For three months. Someone asked me to take on a "sharp lad." He turned out to be a master chiseler. I think, however, that where it really counts,

Yakubovskiy did not betray me. Despite running some errands for Russian Minister of Security Barannikov.

[Serdyukov] So, Barannikov was your friend?

[Shumeyko] That is what I thought up to a certain point in time. He misjudged me, though. One day Barannikov invited me to his dacha. And introduced to a certain millionaire named Birshteyn. A shady character. Although quite well known at the time. I was first deputy prime minister of the government. I was invited by the minister of security. A normal level for having a cordial of tea... So, we had a drink, and Birshteyn tells me like an old friend: It would be good to set up sales of our industrial metal—rolled metal and such—abroad. I started asking about details, and the conversation became totally uninhibited. Birshteyn openly promised me he would immediately open an account in Switzerland, in which up to \$8 million a year could accrue.

[Serdyukov] For you personally?

[Shumeyko] Of course. I was shocked. I took Barannikov by the sleeve and pulled him aside. "What is he talking about?" I asked. "Well, you see," he began, "take it easy..." There is such a notion as nonbudget financing, he said. In intelligence it is the "three pillars" on which everything rests. A company is set up abroad and becomes a cover for our intelligence officers. Birshteyn is our man. Boris Nikolayevich (Yeltsin—M.S.) has been appraised. Besides, Birshteyn is a double agent of sorts. He is also a MOSSAD colonel. In short, he was going around me in circles, laying it out straight. I suggested that we end it right there. Said that do not intend to open any company. And expressed great doubt regarding the "cover."

[Serdyukov] Was the general drunk?

[Shumeyko] Not too much. But at this point he completely sobered up. He said: "Volodya, what is wrong with this? So maybe Birshteyn exaggerated about the millions. A few thousand probably will trickle in. Still, it will come handy in one's old age..."

[Serdyukov] Did you get scared when you heard this? After all, this was the minister of security tightening the noose.

[Shumeyko] I, as usual, decided to turn this into fun. And I warned Barannikov that I would tell this joke to Chernomyrdin.

[Serdyukov] I am sure he was overjoyed!

[Shumeyko] He just smiled wryly. And Viktor Stepanovich was adamant: "I do not believe this!" He had just become prime minister...

[Serdyukov] Did you report it to Yeltsin?

[Shumeyko] Me—no. Barannikov did hustle, though. He waved a pretty piece of paper with a red bow in front of the president. It turned out that it was my trust agreement, whereby I allegedly gave someone in Canada power of attorney to dispose of my foreign currency. Crazy! But here he was, the minister of security, waving a forged document and yelling at the top of his lungs in the president's residence: "We have cherished a snake in our bosom!"

[Serdyukov] The snake obviously was you, right?

[Shumeyko] I refused to build a "cover" for Barannikov and immediately became a snake. Yeltsin got upset, and ordered that it all be checked out. But Barannikov would not take "no" for an answer: "There is nothing to check out! Here is his signature!..." Chernomyrdin showed me the document later. I looked at it and nearly fainted: my signature! Although my mind was telling me that I had never in my life signed anything like this...

[Serdyukov] But it was nevertheless your hand that guided the pen?

[Shumeyko] This is precisely what saved me. The signature on the trust document was not done with a pen. It was a laser.

[Serdyukov] Who was the craftsman?

[Shumeyko] Who the hell knows?... Apparently, Yakubovskiy's brother Stanislav. He created a master forgery, of course. The same method was used to "sign" six more documents on Council of Ministers stationery. And with substantial amounts figuring in them: \$200 million, \$300 million. Which allegedly had been transferred to foreign banks with my blessing. It was in the procuracy that a special investigator asked me: "Could these signatures be forgeries?" "No," I said, barely audibly, "they are all mine." And the investigator chuckled: "Look closely!" I looked—oh, my goodness. It was indeed my signature, but it was the same on all the papers. This does not happen. It is physically impossible for a person to write even two signatures in an absolutely identical way... How did I not figure out right away that the signature had been scanned? It turned out later that the equipment on which this forgery was done in Switzerland costs \$1.6 million. Its power is so high that it literally hammers the signature into the paper.

[Serdyukov] All these figures of yours make my head spin!

[Shumeyko] I wish they were mine... But what do you think about these idiots? Could they not take different



signatures? I have been signing loads of different things!..

[Serdyukov] I am curious: What did Barannikov say to you when this situation was resolved?

[Shumeyko] I went over to him myself. In public. "Vitya," I said, "can you explain to me why you pulled such a cheap trick?" And mind you, he always hugged and kissed me in public, and emphasized his warm friendship. And he told me, absolutely calmly: "Don't get so upset, Volodya! I simply wanted to check out who are your friends and who are your enemies." I cannot speak ill of him—the man is dead. I think God Almighty has figured it all now.

[Serdyukov] I hear, however, that even God Almighty cannot put a stop to corruption "at the top."

[Shumeyko] For me personally, the mere thought that some of the highest state officials are corrupt is blasphemy. If this is so, why did we start this whole thing in the first place? Life loses its meaning, you know...

[Serdyukov] Well, for you maybe. But Ilyushenko, for instance, is behind bars. Is this not a paradox, considering that we are talking about the former general procurator?

[Shumeyko] We did not know each other very well. Ilyushenko has been accused of taking bribes and abuse of official position. It is difficult to prove bribe-taking. As to abuse of official position—I know it all too well.

[Serdyukov] You mean, you have abused yours?

[Shumeyko] Judge for yourself. I get a letter once from Anatoliy Tyazhlov, head of the Moscow Oblast administration. The baby food situation is grave. He is asking to help him to get foreign currency. And I am deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Not the executive branch, not the government—just a legislator, albeit not rank-and-file. But a man asked me. I know perfectly well how it is done—letters are sent out to all concerned. In the hopes that someone will respond! I see that Tyazhlov is right. I take the deputy chairman's stationery and write a petition to the Bank of Foreign Economic Relations asking it to allocate money. From a legal standpoint, one could use this letter of mine for toilet paper. Nevertheless, I have certain political weight: It is better to satisfy my request than refuse it. They allocated several million dollars. Then this happens: A million and some is spent to buy baby food. And the rest of the money seems to disappear. A commotion ensues. Who gets crucified? Me.

[Serdyukov] Does it hurt to be treated like this?

[Shumeyko] I usually laugh. It turns out that someone told Tyazhlov a piece of Oriental wisdom. In Shanghai,

it is believed that it is better to give a hungry man a fishing rod rather than fish. But the utmost wisdom is not to tell him where the fish bite best. Tyazhlov drew his conclusions, and spent the rest of the hard currency to buy a plant—to make baby food. The plant has already been assembled and is about to go on line... While for me—bang!—an outrageous charge: "abuse of official position."

[Serdyukov] Why not send the investigators to look at the plant?

[Shumeyko] I tried. They did not want to. "F... the plant," they said. "We need to put Shumeyko behind bars!"

[Serdyukov] They actually said that?

[Shumeyko] Why not? They had a directive. In such instances, nobody cares about the truth.

[Serdyukov] So, politics is a cruel game?

[Shumeyko] Especially our Russian politics. There are a lot of "well-wishers." They sleep and dream about eating a man alive.

[Serdyukov] Not a man. A politician!

[Shumeyko] I see the humor. I assure you—this is black humor. If there is one thing I learned in the upper echelons of power, it is that you can trust absolutely nobody!

[Serdyukov] A smiling face, a knife in the pocket?

[Shumeyko] More or less. These days I am no longer at the helm, but still for many I am like a bone in the throat. So—strike him. Outright. The best way to strike is to accuse someone of corruption. The easiest route in politics to get someone out of the way.

[Serdyukov] Are you saying that there are no corrupt people in Russian "big" politics?

[Shumeyko] This is technically impossible! A "high" official is always in the public eye. I, for instance, cannot meet with anyone without it becoming public knowledge. Every word. It is difficult to run a dirty business in such conditions.

[Serdyukov] But possible nevertheless?

[Shumeyko] Nevertheless, most often, if something surfaces, it is an attempt at discreditation. I recently ran into former general procurator Stepankov. He is now a deputy. We reminisced about old times. He confessed that he was getting telephone calls several times a day, alternately from Khasbulatov and Rutskoy: When will you put Shumeyko behind bars?



[Serdyukov] How can you live if you cannot trust anyone?

[Shumeyko] You just have to go on... There are good people around the president too. Soskovets, Yegorov, Ilyushin, Korzhakov and Barsukov... You could go behind enemy lines with any one of them. And how many "friends" have abandoned me during the investigation?... If your relationship depends on your job, watch out.

[Serdyukov] Like Karaulov?

[Shumeyko] I could figure out Barannikov. Rutskoy gave him this order. The Ministry of Security mounted a whole operation in that instance. But what does this crank, pardon the expression, Karaulov want to achieve? To come up with such a thing—telling the whole country that Shumeyko is hiding Vlastilina at his official dacha! I had no idea who she was, I never saw her. But no, he tells brazen lies straight in the face of millions of people. Funny.

[Serdyukov] Do such knocks get you down?

[Shumeyko] My wife does not sleep at night. I am too busy to get hysterical... An investigator told me after interrogations: "I have questioned many people. It is rare that one does not break down. With you—it just rolls right off!..."

[Serdyukov] You are just like Shirlits!

[Shumeyko] It is not a question of iron nerves. If a man is innocent, he has nothing to fear. Still, I am grateful to the procuracy. They have taught me a lesson in life. But still have not succeeded in weaning me off political jokes.

[Serdyukov] Do you like to learn?

[Shumeyko] That's my second love.

[Serdyukov] And the first?

[Shumeyko] Fishing.

#### Hatching Eggs

[Serdyukov] A funny question: Why do you love Yeltsin so much?

[Shumeyko] I will give you a serious answer: Yeltsin means freedom. Yes, he has zillions of shortcomings. But he is the only one today capable of continuing the reforms.

[Serdyukov] What about Yavlinskiy?

[Shumeyko] Yavlinskiy will bring unrest. And Zyuganov—civil war. I know him very well. He is well educated and intelligent. But when a man says that we will come into power under one constitution

and then replace it with Soviet power—excuse me... Zhirinovskiy will bring about an imperialist war. But I am certain that our people are not bad enough to elect him president...

[Serdyukov] Which means Yeltsin. A perfect time to illustrate your attitude toward Boris Nikolayevich with a joke.

[Shumeyko] First—a real-life illustration. Do you know, for instance, that I was the reason Yeltsin began to play big tennis so avidly? He looked at me closely one day and noticed a belly protruding out of my shirt. And so he ordered all his entourage—including himself—to immediately start exercising. I played doubles with Kozyrev, and we always lost to everybody. I much prefer volleyball to tennis.

[Serdyukov] What is so funny about that? Regular fatherly concern.

[Shumeyko] Here is a joke for you. I once told it at the plant, and was immediately summoned on the carpet by the kray party committee. They upbraided me for silly humor. But what is so bad about it? Well, anyway, a bakery has baked a bun. Fresh, golden-brown. She goes out on the street, and exudes such an aroma!... Suddenly, a pack of pies zips out from around the corner. They surround her and say: "Hey, bun, come with us." "No," she says, "I am afraid. There are so many of you..." And one pie steps out from the crowd and says: "Do not be afraid, bun. I am the only one with eggs [Russian word for "eggs" also means "balls"]. The rest are cabbage pies..."

[Serdyukov] What are you hinting at?

[Shumeyko] At the potential capabilities of a certain candidate.

[Serdyukov] B.N.?

[Shumeyko] Of course. The rest, trust me, are cabbage pies.

[Serdyukov] Do you know a lot of political jokes about our president?

[Shumeyko] Quite a few. Unfortunately, most of them involve other people as well. It would be improper on my part to have them exposed in a newspaper.

[Serdyukov] Does Yeltsin get angry at jokes about himself?

[Shumeyko] Not that I have noticed. All right. Let me tell you one. Remember the time Burbulis and the president parted ways? Then Armenian Radio got this question: Did Lenin have syphilis? The radio replied: We do not know whether Lenin had syphilis, but we do

know for a fact that Yeltsin had Burbulis... By the way, Gennadiy was very upset over this joke. But I told him: "Rejoice. You have become part of folklore. People will never forget you." He cheered up right away.

### Chicks Become Fully Fledged

[Serdyukov] Of course, our authority is young. Mistakes are inevitable. But you cannot stumble every step of the way. People are becoming impoverished and justifiably cursing those who put them in this position...

[Shumeyko] What is authority? A chairman is appointed to a kolkhoz. He is told: Tomorrow people will elect you, and you will become the authority. But remember: You will have many responsibilities. And went on for two hours enumerating them: plow, sow, report... The guy gets tired of listening: I get you, he says. And goes toward the door. At the door he turns around and asks: "What rights will I have?" You will have a lot of rights, he is told. You walk into a cowshed, for instance. You see cows in manure up to their tits, the roof falling down, and milkmaids cursing you with every unprintable word. You tell them: "Girls, let us best the targets we have been given and increase the milk yield per cow!" Naturally, they tell you where to go. In four-letter words. This is where you can exercise your rights: Your can go where these four-letter words direct you, or you can stay.

[Serdyukov] A joke from times past?

[Shumeyko] Unfortunately we have not moved far enough away from this cowshed. Seriously speaking, however, authority means a complete balance between responsibilities and rights. If it is your responsibility to keep a city fed, warm, and clean, you should have enough money to accomplish this. Some federation components, on the other hand, spend up to 89 percent of total local budget on maintaining the apparatus of authority. But they have a limousine, a flag, an anthem—this seems to be the main thing. Except that this authority is not really real. Since it does not have enough money to pay people their wages.

[Serdyukov] Some have already stuffed their pockets, while others are about to go begging on the street. What are the latter to do? They will not vote for Yeltsin. The Communists at least promise equality...

[Shumeyko] Communism is a lot of good things. But it destroys the main thing in a society—free thinking. It enslaves people, dooms them to spiritual bondage. That is why it is so much disliked around the world. As to brotherhood and equality, this is possible only in the Bible. We are all born different, which means—unequal. Of course, modern society has an obligation to help the disabled, indigent, and elderly. And we do

so to the extent possible. But the rest had better try to "stuff their pockets."

[Serdyukov] So when, in your opinion, will justice establish itself in Russia?

[Shumeyko] A beggar says to Yeltsin: "Give me alms, please!..." [the word "alms" means both "to give alms" and "to serve the ball"] Boris Nikolayevich is at a loss: "How can I serve? I have neither a racket nor a ball with me..."

[Serdyukov] What is this about?

[Shumeyko] There is no justice on earth. And never will be.

[Serdyukov] Thank you, that is some consolation!...

[Shumeyko] I just do not want to lie. Enough rosy dreams. It is time to become fully fledged. The most important thing today is at least to learn how to listen to each other. Everybody is tired of political battles. It is time to start living, for goodness sake!...

### Russia: Zyuganov Promises No Civil War After Presidential Election

LD0606095296 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 0913 GMT 6 Jun 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Khots]

[FBIS Translated Text] Krasnoyarsk, 6 Jun (ITAR-TASS) — Gennadiy Zyuganov, presidential candidate from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, who delivered his election speech to Krasnoyarsk intellectuals today, was asked by the audience what his supporters will do if an attempt is made to stop them coming to power. He answered: "We will try to resolve this issue in a peaceful way, by ballot alone." However, "if 35-40 million people have voted [for communists], they may simply take to the streets the next morning and say: We voted and we demand that our wish be met.

"This will be peaceful, lawful, and in line with European standards," he continued.

"The people are the supreme sovereign, and elections are sacred," he said backing his stand. He described himself as "the most peaceful man on the planet" and promised the audience that there will "be no civil war after the presidential election."

**Russia: Zyuganov Says West Against Break-Up of Russia**

LD0606112096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1042 GMT 6 Jun 96

[By Yuriy Khots]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KRASNOYARSK, June 6 (Itar-Tass) — The KPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] leader, Gennadiy Zyuganov, who is on his campaign trail in Siberia now, told local intellectuals in Krasnoyarsk that the West is categorically opposed to a break-up of Russia into small states.

"There are influential forces in the West that are categorically against the break-down of Russia into small states," Zyuganov said today.

He explained that in the eyes of the influential forces in the West "the break-up of Russia will spell out trouble not only for Russia but also for the entire planet."

The politicians he referred to were "looking much farther ahead than those who favour the disintegration of Russia," Zyuganov continued to say. "They smell fire in all continents if this (disintegration of Russia) comes to pass," he said.

Zyuganov recounted an episode from his trip to Paris when French Gaullists visited him in his hotel room to try and convince him that "it is necessary to do all in order to revive a strong Russia, because the country must play a role of balance beam between the West and the East, which is extremely important for the planet."

Zyuganov said that when and if he comes to power, he would think it absolutely necessary to cooperate first of all with forces of that kind.

**Russia: Zyuganov's Economic Program Reviewed**

964F2348A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 23 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Sergey Markov under the general heading: "Zyuganov's Economic Program Has Yet To Be Made Public: The Uncertainty Is Making Society Nervous and Giving Rise to Rumor and Conjecture"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The election claims of the communist presidential candidate have nothing definite to say about economic problems. His propositions are abstract in the extreme and represent pious wishes and an attempt to give the sharp edges a wide berth. This is evidently being done to win the support of constituents with opposite views. And such a position makes political sense inasmuch as it is well known that the contradictory nature of the program of a political force in a phase of upturn does not weaken but strengthens its positions.

But in view of this contradictory aspect, it is very hard to understand what Zyuganov's actual policy would be.

**Let us take the attitude toward two key problems: property and the results of privatization.** The Communists maintain that the Russian economy should be multistructural and that each structure should prove its efficiency. But the state share of property may be both 10 and 90 percent, and the criteria of efficiency could be both economic (profit) and political (the public good).

In regard to privatization the CPRF declares the following: The results of privatization conducted without a violation of the law will undoubtedly be respected. But what does this mean? After all, privatization was to a large extent accomplished not according to the laws but in accordance with presidential edicts, which could be interpreted by the victorious Communists as 1) not laws but legally binding enactments; 2) illegal in and of themselves in view of the fact that in September 1993 President Yeltsin "perpetrated a coup d'etat," which automatically renders all his subsequent actions illegal; 3) illegal inasmuch as the privatization program was not approved by the State Duma. In addition, it is well known that under the conditions of the chaotic legal system of modern Russia a tremendous number of actions of an economic nature is in violation of this law or the other, frequently because these laws are mutually contradictory or are patently out of date and do not reflect the new reality of the market economy.

Another reason for the considerable uncertainty of the communists' economic views is the fact that problems of this kind are not at the present stage a priority for him and his team. There has as yet been practically no debate on economic problems between members of the CPRF—all their forces are united for victory at the elections. This does not mean that Zyuganov and the CPRF do not have any views on the economy. But this testifies that these views have to be reconstructed on the basis of a special analysis, with regard to the opinion of the most prominent experts on the economy close to the CPRF and the main support structures of its policy.

**So the CPRF truly recognizes the multistructural nature of the economy. Belonging to the state will be:**

1) power engineering, primarily gas and oil industry; 2) enterprises of the military-industrial complex; 3) nuclear industry, that is, nuclear power plants and their construction; 4) transport and communications. We refer to railroad and air traffic; 5) land, both the interior and surface areas. It is contemplated retaining as public property also enterprises which are important from the viewpoint of development. It is evidently a question of the most promising research-intensive works.



**And this will be not 100 percent public property but stock companies,** in which the controlling block will be guaranteed the state, but private individuals, foreign citizens included, will have an opportunity to purchase the stock of these enterprises and to obtain their share of the profits. But the shareholders will have no opportunity to interfere in the management of these enterprises.

**Another part of the economy will be privately owned.** This applies mainly to services and trade, retail particularly. The state will try to secure reduced taxes for this small and mid-sized business. The state will not intervene in their economic activity, regulating as a whole here the prices of basic commodities of social significance.

**The third part of the economy will be within the jurisdiction of municipal authorities:** these are small enterprises whose market is limited geographically. The local authorities themselves will determine the conditions of their activity. Various options are possible—from full control and conversion into municipal property to almost complete freedom. This would lead in practice to different economic models taking shape in different regions depending on the development strategy of local leaders.

**In agriculture** the CPRF would preserve public ownership of the land with its transfer for utilization to the producers. This would actually signify appreciable restrictions on land transactions, but not its complete withdrawal from commercial transactions. The subject of the transactions here would be not so much the land itself as this right or the other to its use. The CPRF would not restore the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system of, in fact, public agriculture but would bank on agricultural cooperatives, ranging from small to large. And the producers would play a big part in the choice not so much of the form of ownership as of the composition of the proprietors and the direction of the development of production.

**The CPRF would attempt to create the conditions for the concentration of financial and production engineering resources.** The organizational form of this concentration would be financial and industrial groups (FPG's), on which leaders of the CPRF have repeatedly commented with approval. Different forms of ownership would be interwoven within these FPG's, but agents of the state would always have the decisive say. These FPG's would be a form of concentration of the resources not only for technological breakthroughs but also for the state's control over the economy.

**The privatization-nationalization problem.** The leaders of the CPRF undoubtedly do not deem lawful the privatization that has been undertaken as a whole and

regard it as plunder of the people by a handful of rogues: corrupt bureaucrats, criminal elements, agents of the West. But they would refrain from general re-nationalization for two reasons. First, from a fear that a new redivision of property could lead to civil war. Second, the majority of leaders of the CPRF do not reject the idea of private property in principle. They believe that the market has a right to exist, but that it should be regulated by the state. And the more complex and large-scale the pending task is, the more active the role of the state should be.

There will, therefore, be partial nationalization of, first, the oil and gas companies (this would not, it would seem, fundamentally change their position inasmuch as even now Russia's oil and gas companies are unduly dependent on government structures, for that matter); second, enterprises that are obviously attractive and were privatized very cheaply as a result of deals which had extensive repercussions (Norilskiy Nikel may be considered an example); third, some enterprises may be nationalized at their request (we refer to large-scale enterprises interested in shifting onto the state the burden of expenditure on retooling).

Some commercial banks will evidently be nationalized inasmuch as, in the Communists' opinion, many of them are of a parasitical nature. Some will be nationalized on a charge of connections with criminal outfits. Others—like the MOST-bank, for example—as political enemies. On the recommendations of the local authorities many enterprises in various regions could be re-nationalized on a charge of having disorganized production, that is, of having dismissed employees, reduced the manufacture of the specialized product, and engaged in speculative transactions.

Not judicial but administrative decisions for the purpose of speeding up the process will be the mode of nationalization, evidently.

**Banks, financial system.** Some banks will be nationalized, others brought under state control. They will be forced not only to play by the rules of the game proposed by the state but will also be forced to participate in all projects important from the viewpoint of the government. Roosevelt's program of the recovery of the banking system and also the control over the banking system of the governments of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore in the period of economic modernization are the ideal model for the CPRF.

The CPRF recognizes the need for combating inflation, simultaneously promising to sharply increase social payments. Its leaders believe that in the event of their pursuing a patriotic economic policy, there will be an appreciable reduction in the outflow of capital



overseas and that the ruble will be strong inasmuch as it will acquire a firm foundation in the form of public ownership of natural resources. When President Zyuganov encounters the real need to choose between social programs and large-scale investments, it is the social programs, evidently, that will suffer, for all that, for the main idea of the CPRF is not the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor but the creation of a great Russia and the Russian economy's technological breakthrough to a new level of production.

**Where the money will be spent.** Initially these will be social payments, but they will travel not so much by the path of an increase in the minimum wage as by the path of the formation of a special segment of the market for the needy under the slogan of targeted social assistance. Special stores will be created, evidently, for the poor and for retirees, and it is possible that food stamps will be introduced. Subsequently and very quickly these social payments will stabilize at a low level. Investments will be channeled into the sphere of education and health care.

Big resources will be channeled into agriculture, and their purpose will be to secure not only a growth of agricultural production but also the "food security of Russia," that is, a sharp reduction in the presence on the domestic market of imported foods.

Big investments will be channeled into the military-industrial complex, but not so much into military production proper (although into this also) as into the development of new technology by our own corporations, without close collaboration with Western corporations.

**Where Zyuganov Hopes To Get the Money From.** The Communists see several sources of financial receipts: 1) revenue from exports of natural resources, primarily energy resources, which are now, they are convinced, going mainly into private hands and accumulating in other countries; 2) an end to the outflow of sums of capital from Russia inasmuch as the new government will create the conditions for native capitalists for investments in the Russian economy; 3) the imposition of financial discipline, that is, a transition to noncash settlements and the de-dollarization of the economy; 4) the Communists are convinced that they will not have to wait long for Western investments either after stable rules of the game for business have been established. China is an example in this respect.

Overseas investments will be welcomed by a communist government if investors meet certain conditions: state control over large investments, the reinvestment of a large part of profits in the Russian economy, limitation of investment targets—not real estate and not the

banking sphere but various types of production and participation in major government projects.

**Foreign trade.** The imposition of a monopoly on foreign trade in natural resources is contemplated. All large-scale export-import transactions will be under state control. Import duty will be raised considerably to ensure preferential conditions for national commodity producers.

**Economic model for Russia.** The CPRF does not see the economy of the USSR as a model for emulation, although it commends much that was good in it. The Communists frequently cite as models Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. But there is a serious contradiction in the fact that the actual proposals of the CPRF in the economy are oriented toward the building more of an import-substituting than an export-oriented economy, which is what the above-mentioned models are. Which path will Russia take? Initially this will obviously be the course, already set, of import substitution and partial autarkization, and the future will depend on political realities—what sort of relations Russia has with the West, how far Russia's political and economic establishment is integrated in the world establishment.

The concept of stable development is important for the CPRF. It was developed in reports of the Club of Rome and is oriented toward the search for a third way, preservation of the habitat, and consideration of environmental problems and the problems of poverty in developing countries. The CPRF is adopting this concept via the mediation of the works of Academician Valentin Koptug.

On the whole, the economic views of the CPRF are not so much aimed against capital in general as represent an attempt to establish an alliance with nationally oriented capital against the so-called "comprador bourgeoisie."

**Russia: Grachev Remarks on Navy Vote Based on Seamen's 'Own Words'**

MM0506185396 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "The Russian Federation Defense Minister, in Speaking About the Preliminary Results of Voting on Ships Departing on Voyages, Draws on the 'General Mood of the Seamen Themselves'" — quotation marks as published throughout]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 5 June — Voting in the Russian Federation presidential election has been taking place since the beginning of June on combat ships and submarines setting off on voyages, Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev told INTERFAX. It is clear from summarizing the

preliminary data on the basis of the seamen's own words that the majority of crew members have voted for Boris Yeltsin," he said.

"I have given no interviews to the mass media on this subject," the minister went on to say. "As for comments on the legitimacy of such conclusions, they can be based on the statements of members of the ships' crews, something that every voter has the right to do. In their confined compartments and quarters, naval seamen, going far from their native shores, feel like members of one big family; they are open in what they say, even on election matters."

P. Grachev added that he begins every working day by studying reports received from the commanders of districts and fleets. "Naturally," the minister said, "in briefing me on every issue, they also report on the seamen's mood."

Naturally, we will have the precise figures on the results of the voting only after the opening of the ballot boxes, which remain on shore in a sealed condition. That will be done, as it will all over the country, on the night of 16-17 June. However, I believe that the general mood of the naval seamen who have already voted is as they themselves say it is," P. Grachev said.

#### **Russia: Grachev's Disclosure of Navy Vote Criticized**

MM0506135996 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
5 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Albert Plutnik: "Make the Minister Idolize the President..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] INTERFAX has carried an interesting report. According to its information, our "best" minister of defense has once again distinguished himself. During a conversation in Lvov with Gyorgy Keleti, Hungary's military minister, he stated that the naval seamen who voted early because they are on ships and submarines at great distances from Russia cast their votes unanimously for Boris Yeltsin.

Thus, by making public in advance the results of a secret and free election that were already known to him, Pavel Grachev has essentially made it clear that it is not secret or free at all. The so-called democratic expression of will has been replaced by rigid military discipline, which presupposes unconditional fulfillment of the senior commander's orders. We see here a flagrant violation of the law.

A public revelation by an official on such a scale, which betrays his utter legal incompetence, is no less striking. It is one more aspect of the character of the person who long ago seemingly did everything in his power to get himself removed from his post. But it is precisely the general's unprecedented unsinkability that attests most

convincingly to the president's profound and unconditional disposition toward him, reckoning, not without reason, on a sense of reciprocity. Why, then, suddenly such black ingratitude in reply? The communist opposition endlessly reiterates that the party of power intends to falsify the election results. Representatives of the president's team find its fears painfully suspicious. Then someone very close to the president pops up with the plainspoken revelations of a soldier....

Let us not weigh in the scales what is more reprehensible in this instance — to dispose personnel toward a certain choice or to announce to the whole world what has been done. The purport of the first action is, at any rate, far more understandable than the second, which, in my opinion, ought in the interests of Grachev himself to be regarded, rather, not as refined foolishness but as a deliberate provocation. To be more exact, as an overt act of ingratiating himself with the supreme commander in chief.

Should the Central Electoral Commission take the minister's words closely to heart, so to speak? According to our data, in making the sensational admission he was relying on information provided to him by Lieutenant General S. Zdorikov, who heads the Defense Ministry's Main Educational Work Directorate, the worthy successor to the chiefs of the unforgettable Main Military-Political Directorate. I recall that this directorate has already provided substantial grounds to doubt the veracity of the information being supplied when on the night of 17-18 December last year, when the State Duma elections were barely over, it served up from Defense Ministry offices an obliging report — which bore little resemblance to reality — on their triumphant outcome in the Armed Forces for the authorities.

General Grachev cannot fail to feel the increasing shakiness of his position. He is becoming increasingly nervous, feeling at his back the breath of some colonel general whom quite recently he took it into his head to berate at an authoritative conference. He feels that his services might be scorned any day now in the camp which he has served faithfully for an entire five-year period, consenting to carry out even the dirtiest deeds under the saving cover that he is a soldier under orders. In his unenviable position, maybe at the end of his career, the minister decides to make a statement which the opposing camp might regard as highly useful information — essentially as divulging a kind of military secret of great political significance in the election struggle....

This intentional or unintentional "own goal" seems to be becoming an inalienable part of the election campaign. Various mass media have criticized the pro-presidential newspaper NE DAY BOG, which is so zealous in its support of Yeltsin that it has the directly opposite effect on the electorate to the one intended. The televised reports by coaches and players for the country's leading soccer teams, concerning whom they

have decided unanimously to cast their votes for — reports which have clearly been sanctioned by Russia's sports leadership, who include people very close to the president — constitute a phenomenon of the same order. Just like the insistent singing recommendations of variety stars: Vote or you will lose. You can hardly fail to notice here that representatives of the most "fashionably dressed" — as the saying goes — social strata, who naturally want everything to carry on the way it is going, predominate among the most active propagandists of the incumbent president's reelection for a second term. The election motif, which sounds monotonous the way they perform it, boils down to the assertion that the end of the world is inevitable if their idol's political opponents win. In this they are very similar to those who totally reject the present power and who try their utmost, with the same importunity, to convince the voters that Russia will perish once and for all precisely in the other instance — if they are not made its sovereigns. But, however distressing this might be for both groups, Russia will survive whatever the election outcome.

Since we have started speaking of the harm that results from excessive zeal, how can we not say a few words about the election of the governor in our northern capital, which ended in the expulsion from the city's Olympus of Anatoliy Sobchak, a veteran of our young democratic movement? The methods freely employed by the contestants in the election fight made it clear that that confrontation with each other was nothing compared to the clash of representatives of a single political force who have taken it into their heads to dispute power.

**Russia: Rural Voting Intentions, Factors Examined**  
MM0606104496 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
6 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Golov of the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion under "The Provinces: 10 Days to the Election" rubric: "Whom the Countryside Will Vote for"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Investigators of the public mood frequently lack reliable information concerning the situation in the rural "backwoods" of our society. Yet over one-fourth (26 percent) of voters live in rural localities, and their behavior will have a considerable effect on the presidential election results.

In the first half of May the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion conducted a special mass poll which embraced a representative selection of approximately 2,000 rural inhabitants in various parts of Russia.

As can be seen from the data obtained, the rural population is interested in and concerned about the same problems as other inhabitants of the country. Many

general assessments of the situation in the countryside seem even more calm and less acute.

Here, for example, is how rural inhabitants and the population as a whole rated their own situation in May 1996:

|                                                  | Whole population | Countryside |
|--------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Things are not so bad and it is possible to live | 11               | 10          |
| Life is hard but bearable                        | 45               | 55          |
| Things are no longer bearable                    | 36               | 30          |
| Hard to say                                      | 8                | 5           |

(In percentages of the numbers polled. All-Russia monitoring data of the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion were used).

Let us also compare views on the state of the political situation in the country:

|             | Whole population | Countryside |
|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| Calm        | 3                | 5           |
| Tense       | 67               | 61          |
| Critical    | 24               | 28          |
| Hard to say | 6                | 6           |

A certain tendency toward sharper assessments is noticeable here. The list of problems that are now of most concern to rural inhabitants differs little from the analogous all-Russia list: prices (mentioned by 71 percent of those polled), wage arrears (63 percent), Chechnya (46 percent), and unemployment (39 percent). Crime, the production slump, and environmental pollution appear less acute in the countryside.

It seems to us that this study makes it possible to approach an explanation of the countryside's greater conservatism. Only a small proportion of its inhabitants have gained new opportunities to show initiative and to improve their own standard of living. Only 22 percent of those polled in the countryside pointed out that people such as themselves have been able to improve their life. Precisely 34 percent agree (38 percent disagree)



that people have gotten more opportunities to show initiative in their work.

The president's recent edict "On the Realization of Citizens' Constitutional Rights to Land" elicited a direct positive reaction from 20 percent of rural inhabitants (4 percent had decided to take their share from the kolkhoz and to register it as private property, and 16 percent had decided to privatize their private plot). Approximately half (44 percent) of those polled do not intend to do anything or are not interested in this problem. Just over one-third (36 percent) either know nothing or find it hard to answer the question about their intentions.

Considerations of an ideological nature are named quite seldom among the factors preventing land privatization: 12 percent are opposed to private ownership of land, while 11 percent fear that the land they have obtained will "later be taken away just the same." The biggest obstacles are the high prices of equipment, fuel, and fertilizers (29 percent) and the complexities of registering land ownership (17 percent).

Rural inhabitants display noticeably more conservative sociopolitical positions than urban residents. Whereas 39 percent of Russia's whole population prefers the

Soviet system, 58 percent of the rural population does; 10 percent prefer the present political system (6 percent in the countryside); and 29 percent prefer Western democracy (16 percent).

The authorities are trusted or mistrusted to roughly the same extent as in the cities, regional and local power institutions are respected more than central ones, and there is greater trust in the church. People trust the mass media to approximately the same extent as other citizens do, but they mostly read the local press.

Rural expectations of the next president hardly differ from national expectations: to end the war in Chechnya (57 percent), to strengthen legality and order (45 percent), to return to people the assets lost in the course of the reforms (44 percent), to ensure the fair distribution of incomes (43 percent), to restore Russia's status as a "great and respected power" (38 percent). Other desires each collect less than one-third of the votes.

Let us compare the figures for the rural population's trust in leading politicians with voting intentions and the "reserve" of potential support under certain conditions. (In percentages of those intending to vote. Let us remind you that the data refer to the first half of May).

|              | Trust him | Intend to vote for him | "Reserve" of support |
|--------------|-----------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Yeltsin      | 14        | 17                     | 6                    |
| Zhirinovskiy | 13        | 9                      | 6                    |
| Zyuganov     | 31        | 38                     | 9                    |
| Lebed        | 20        | 7                      | 13                   |
| Fedorov      | 12        | 2                      | 10                   |
| Yavlinskiy   | 12        | 6                      | 9                    |

[Footnote to "Reserve" of support" column in table states: "Might support this candidate under certain conditions"]

It can be seen from the table that people in the countryside, just as throughout the country, regard only Zyuganov and Yeltsin as real contenders for the presidency, while the other candidates remain in reserve, as it were. Practically everyone who trusts either Zyuganov or Yeltsin intends to vote for him. The level of support for Zyuganov virtually corresponds to the share of the votes cast for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its present allies (approximately 28 percent) in the countryside at the time of the 1995 Duma elections. Under favorable conditions

support for Yeltsin could also increase by the size of his "reserve" and thus reach 20 percent, with Zyuganov attaining 39 percent. Under unfavorable conditions the level of support for a candidate could end up even below the declared level. But at present approximately 90 percent of people in each of the main electorates are certain that they will support precisely their own candidate.

The correlation of the rural population's declared intentions in the second round remains as before — 22 percent intend to support Yeltsin, and twice as many Zyuganov (43 percent). Nevertheless, evidently mindful of the tone being set by the press, 30 percent of rural inhabitants believe that B. Yeltsin will none-the-



less remain president, while 29 percent believe that G. Zyuganov will become president.

**Russia: Poll Shows 60 Percent of Chechens To Take Part in Elections**

LD0506144296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1403 GMT 5 Jun 96

[By Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — A total of 62 percent of Chechnya's residents intend to take part in Russia's June 16 presidential polls and in the republic's parliamentary elections, according to a local analytical center under the Russian government.

Chechnya is poised to complete final preparations for the presidential and local elections, the Grozny-based press office for the Russian government told Itar-Tass on Wednesday.

At present, there are 21 district and 42 regional election commissions functioning in Chechnya, a government spokesman said. They are expected to involve practically all the 480,000-strong electorate in the republic with a population of over 1 million.

Recent polls indicate that the bulk of the population intends to use their voting rights on June 16.

Meanwhile, many residents believe that attempts to cancel elections, as was the case last December, will generate an adverse response, according to pollsters.

An elder from the Kurchaloyevsky district said on the Vainakh television that "the elections are pleasing to God, whereas a ban to hold elections is God-repulsive."

"It is only through the elections that the legitimate power, recognized by the people, can be formed, because this is one of prophet Mahomet's major precepts," he said.

**Russia: Rebels Warning Chechens Not To Vote on 16 Jun**

LD0606093996 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0853 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 6 (Interfax) — Chechen separatists are calling on their countrymen to boycott the June 16 Russian presidential elections, threatening those who vote with violence, a federal command spokesman told Interfax.

"The rebels are threatening physical harm to those who dare come to the voting booths," he said. Up to 30 rebels from field commander Akhmed Zakayev's unit are in the Stavropromyslov neighborhood in Grozny, putting up flyers and preaching a boycott of the elections, he

said. There are currently over 300 rebel fighters in Grozny, according to federal figures.

Rebels continue to fire on federal command posts, block posts, and temporary dislocation points.

The separatists are using cars in attacks on federal positions. "After shooting, they drive to another part of town," the spokesman said.

The rebels are also continuing their "mine war," with six mines discovered and defused in the past day on the western outskirts of Grozny. The rebels have also mined the Gudermes-Dzhalka railroad. "Two anti-tank mines were found and defused beneath the rails," he said.

**Russia: Communists Take Election Fraud Charges to TsIK**

MK0506143196 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
5 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Viktor Khamrayev: "Now Gennadiy Zyuganov's Supporters Will Believe Only District Electoral Commission Protocols. Earlier, Communists Were 'Not Interested' in Upholding Fair Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Communists will recognize only the protocols of the district electoral commissions as "the sole document" objectively testifying to the presidential election results, Valentin Kuptsov (Zyuganov's first deputy in the party) said yesterday during a press conference at the Central Journalists' Club.

The [Communist Party] candidate's supporters do not trust the "GAS-Elections" electronic system because they fear that "the will of the people will be defrauded by an evil hand." Thus, the Zyuganovites are preparing to take a parallel tally at 97,000 polling stations, which they will manage to do "within two days," according to [Duma] deputy Viktor Ilyukhin, who took part in the press conference. Communist observers are going to report each instance of "fraud" to judicial agencies.

"Organized falsification," according to Mr. Kuptsov, should above all be expected in reporting the actual number of voters, which in the 1995 elections, the CPRF contends, was deliberately overstated by 2.7 million. He said that ballot box stuffing is possible in the process of early voting (which has, incidentally, already begun), and in using the absentee ballot and "movable ballot boxes." Neither does Mr. Kuptsov rule out the direct buying of votes at polling stations on election day.

Communists attribute their suspicions about the presence of the "evil hand" in the electoral commission system to the fact that the Central Electoral Commission (TsIK) has to date not reacted to the "gross violation of

election campaign procedures" on the part of the presidential side: "60 percent of the air time is given to the incumbent head of state, while many administration chiefs in Russia's oblasts have become chiefs of Boris Yeltsin election campaign offices." On this issue, the national-patriotic bloc has sent an open letter to TsIK Chairman Nikolay Ryabov, listing specific violations of the law and hoping for an objective response from the TsIK. [passage omitted]

**Russia: Federation Council Appeals to Presidential Candidates**

*LD0506233896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1448 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Igor Zhukov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 5 Jun (Itar-Tass)  
— The Federation Council today adopted an appeal

to the Russian presidential candidates and voters. In particular, the document points out that free elections of the head of state are a true expression of people's power as laid down in the Russian Constitution and are one of the most important stages in the development of Russia's democratic statehood. [passage omitted noting the document says the presidential elections should not aggravate the situation in the country and split society]

The voting for this document which was adopted this evening by the upper house of parliament was 125 in favor, one against, and one abstention.

**CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 6 Jun**  
*LD0606055796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English*  
*0542 GMT 6 Jun 96*

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 6 (Itar-Tass) — Follows a review of Thursday's Moscow-based Russian newspapers dated June 6. The press highlights Russia's forthcoming presidential elections, due to be held on June 16.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI reports that more than 700 foreign observers have already applied for accreditation at the Central Electoral Commission to monitor the election of a President of the Russian Federation.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on the state of affairs in academic research sector.

The newspaper carries an article by Academician Aleksandr Prokhorov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of General Physics.

"It is difficult to describe the present-day state of affairs in the academic research sector simply. Federal financing of research activities has dwindled during reforms. But, on the other hand, the possibility of contacts with the Western world has arisen and enabled the sector to establish cooperation in joint applied development efforts.

"Along with numerous grants, the joint efforts and development studies became the main source of our income. But it is impossible to develop basic research on the basis of these efforts alone," Prokhorov writes.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on Russia's recent history periods.

The newspaper runs subjective notes by Anatoliy Yurkov. He maintains that "we are living through the third period of disillusionment in Russia's recent history. The first one was brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev and his perestroika. People rushed headlong into it en masse in the absolute belief that the bright future, which had been promised for so long by Communist chiefs, is about to set in.

"The second period of disillusionment was brought about by the misapprehension that once the Communists are driven away and the property appropriated by them is returned to the people, we shall be able to shake the pear-tree to get an endless amount of pears to eat.

"The ruin of illusions does not pass without leaving a trace, either to the people or to the illusionists themselves, however talented they are and whatever their

titles — General Secretaries, Chairmen or Presidents," Yurkov writes.

IZVESTIYA carries an interview with Georgiy Satarov, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation.

In the interview published under the rubric "Politics in Personages", the Presidential aide stated that, irrespective of whether the Communists would institute proceedings against him, he has available enough materials which confirm that the Communists are really prepared to resort to a strongarm "refutation" of the results of June elections if electoral results are not in their favour.

IZVESTIYA on responsibility for the laundering of criminally gained incomes.

In the run-up to the publication of a Law to this effect, the newspaper maintains that "Russia is not to become a place for the laundering of illegally obtained money".

TRUD on the causes of railway accidents.

The newspaper frontpages an article analysing the causes of railway accidents. According to the newspaper, in 1995 alone, specialists of the Ministry for Emergency Situations recorded 55 railway breakdowns and accidents, in which 24 people were killed and 80 injured.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an interview with Ibragim Deniyev, Military Commissioner of the Chechen Republic.

"I am not a soothsayer. I am an officer and practitioner. I shall not rely on anyone but I shall help people to gain an understanding of the situation. I believe in people's kindness and intellect".

PRAVDA on President's promises.

The newspaper carries notes by Sergey Glazyev, Dr of Science (Economics), about the President's unstinted promises made during the election campaign.

"The promises come to the following: The country's economy has stabilised. Therefore, for people to live better tomorrow, they should re-elect the President for the second term," Glazyev writes.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on Zyuganov's economic platform.

Under the headline "This can be done today", the newspaper summarises the economic platform of Gennadiy Zyuganov, Chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The platform is subtitled "Eleven questions I put to myself".



**Russia: Primakov Maintains Stance on NATO Growth at Berlin Meeting**

*MK0606103996 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 2*

[Commentary by Dmitriy Gornostayev: "Primakov Did Not Soften RF's Stance. Russia Has Reasons To Toughen its Attitude Toward NATO Expansion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of the just ended meeting of the heads of NATO countries' diplomatic departments and their Russian counterpart Yevgeniy Primakov have been commented on as having provided an occasion to speak of Moscow's softer stand on the issue of expanding the North Atlantic alliance. Such conclusions, however, appear absolutely wrong.

Indeed, Yevgeniy Primakov was not in a confrontation mood in Berlin. Indeed, his counterparts noted an "amazingly positive tone and validity of words" of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry head. FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel even alleged, making a reference to Primakov, that Russia does not speak against including into NATO countries of Eastern Europe and that it only speaks about the unacceptability of deploying new military bases near its borders.

All this, however, does not amount to any softening in Russia's positions. As for Kinkel's words, this must be an incorrectly translated idea that Russia cannot veto the process of NATO's expansion.

One of the main reasons Primakov would not soften the stand lies in tough recommendations of Russia's Security Council, which regulate Moscow's long-known stance. Incidentally, their free interpretation cost the previous Russian foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, his position of head of the Russian Federation foreign policy department. Very well aware of that, Primakov would hardly want to travel the road of his predecessor.

What is more, Russia has its own reasons for reverting to tougher assessments of NATO's expansion. After all, despite statements of readiness to look for solutions being made by both sides in the dispute over the alliance's expansion, the West continues the tactic of rejecting all compromise variants proposed by Moscow.

For example, no answers have been heard to the proposals on creating a nuclear-free zone from the Baltic to the Black Sea, on mutual guarantees of NATO and Russia to countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and many other Russian initiatives.

At the same time, the meeting held in Berlin proved that the North Atlantic alliance is changing: NATO is being Europeanized. This can be the beginning of a genuine transformation of the bloc. Furthermore, it

was stated that the alliance is not going to expand at least before December, when NATO's winter session at the foreign-minister level will take place. Before that, NATO-member countries will have to consider financial consequences of the expansion and other difficulties which would arise after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's membership increases.

**Russia: Primakov Winds Up Visit to Berlin, Departs for Moscow**

*LD0506184696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1840 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[By Aleksey Korinenko and Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BERLIN, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov wound up his visit to Berlin and left for Moscow on Wednesday.

During the visit, Primakov attended a session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, a meeting of the NATO Council held by the "16 plus one" formula and a meeting of the Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia.

He also had several bilateral meetings and talks.

**Russia: Position on NATO Expansion 'Not Changed'**

*MM0506162296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 3*

[Article by Konstantin Eggert: "Russia Has Waived Its Principles in Exchange for Possible Guarantees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels and Moscow — Is it really true that Russia has finally become reconciled to NATO's eastward expansion? That question arose immediately after the results of Yevgeniy Primakov's Berlin meeting with the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance and its Secretary General Javier Solana became known.

"We are not against expansion in principle" — the head of Russian diplomacy reportedly made that statement at a conference with colleagues from the 16 NATO countries. FRG Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told journalists that Primakov said that Russia understands the desire of certain states to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but will not accept NATO's military structures approaching its borders.

The reaction of Western politicians to the remarks by the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry is contradictory: On the one hand, Solana and the U.S. and French representatives believe that there has been no substantial shift in Moscow's position, and that only the tone of the

official rhetoric has changed. But other participants in the Berlin consultations, including Hungarian and Polish Foreign Ministers Laszlo Kovacs and Dariusz Rosati, believe that the Kremlin is gradually changing not only the tone of the debate, but also its view of the problem.

According to one member of the Russian delegation whom IZVESTIYA contacted by telephone, Moscow's position has not changed, and those who say otherwise are "doing so in their own interests." Without going into detail, our interlocutor expressed the opinion that it is rather NATO's approach that has altered somewhat. He also made it clear that in Berlin our delegation once again raised the question of guarantees of not siting foreign troops and nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries of Central Europe.

Primakov's remarks in the former capital of the Cold War contain nothing new in themselves: Moscow has long since realized that it is impossible in practice to prevent NATO's eastward expansion. Back in April, when receiving Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Boris Yeltsin suggested that it would take him three years to convince Russian public opinion to accept the idea of the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Do the Berlin talks herald the start of the corresponding process of persuading the public? The cautious Primakov is hardly likely to do anything without being confident of the support of the head of state. After all, back in March, at the time of Javier Solana's visit to Moscow, he received a public reprimand from the president for excessive mildness in talking with the NATO secretary general. It may be assumed that as 16 June approaches Yeltsin has realized that foreign policy problems play practically no role in the election campaign and has decided to make an unhurried start on breaking the deadlock that Russia's relations with the West have been in as a result of Moscow's inflexible policy on the question of NATO expansion.

Foreign Ministry representatives are talking insistently about written guarantees of not siting military bases and nuclear weapons on the territory of the future members of the alliance. In response they hear from the bloc's representatives: "We have no such plans"; and they immediately object: "But you might in future."

The crux of the problem is that NATO is not in a position to give permanent guarantees. That would be contrary to Article 5 of the 1949 Washington treaty which laid the foundations of the alliance. It states explicitly that assistance to a party to the treaty which has been attacked shall take whatever form the alliance members deem necessary. To rule out beforehand the possibility of sending missiles with nuclear warheads or a foreign military contingent into the territory of, say, the Czech Republic, in terms of the letter and spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes discrimination against one of the signatory states. So it will not be easy, to put it mildly, for Moscow to obtain such guarantees from NATO.

People in Brussels are not particularly afraid of the threats from the Kremlin and Smolenskaya Square [Russian Foreign Ministry] to change the tone of the dialogue with the West. "On the basis of sober calculations, it is certainly not to your advantage to find yourselves in the company of Iraq, Libya, and North Korea," one expert from the NATO political planning department observed in this connection. "As for attempts to make friends with Beijing, they are doomed to failure. China is the only power that could represent a military danger to Russia."

The Kremlin finds itself in an unenviable situation: Two years of persistent propaganda fighting against the bloc's expansion, not supported by the real potential to resist that process, have only accelerated the alignment of Central Europe with the alliance while at the same time putting the brakes on constructive dialogue with the West. Furthermore, now, after psychological indoctrination on a massive scale, any normal compromise with NATO will be perceived by a significant proportion of Russian society as capitulation. That has already emerged in the initial responses in the Moscow press to Primakov's statements in Berlin.

Everyone in NATO, from the secretary general down, is persistently affirming the desire to conclude a solid treaty with Moscow going substantially beyond the bounds of the "Partnership for Peace" program. Under pressure from the defense minister, the Kremlin has effectively frozen work on this document and is stubbornly refusing to send a representative to the headquarters of NATO allied armed forces in Europe, where Czechs, Ukrainians, and Estonians are already firmly entrenched.

Russia's only chance to take part in the formulation of a new blueprint for European security would be to "unfreeze" not only political but also military dialogue. In that case in a few years' time our country could once again ponder applying for admission to the alliance, which President Yeltsin mentioned back in 1991. Such a step would put Brussels in a situation of having to think hard to find a convincing official pretext for refusing.

#### **Russia: European Dimension 'Prop' for Russia's Line on NATO**

MM0506165696 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
6 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov and Boris Lysenko; headline is continuation of headline of Konstantin Egert article carried on same page, "Russia Has Waived Its Principles in Exchange for Possible Guarantees": "...But Moscow Likes NATO's European Profile"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Berlin — The people driving about Berlin this week in black Mercedes cars are not Germans or even new Russians, but foreign ministers and top diplomats from nearly 40 countries. Under the

vigilant eye of a multinational protection service and German police of the male and female sex, a kind of NATO festival has been held here.

The NATO ministers and secretary general were joined by Russian Foreign Ministry head Yevgeniy Primakov, who personifies the biggest conundrum for what is now the sole military-political bloc in Europe: how to expand to Central and Eastern Europe without annoying Russia. But today NATO has to resolve not only the 16+1 enigma (NATO plus Russia), but also 16+1+22. For five years now that formula has designated the NACC — the North Atlantic Alliance [Cooperation] Council, which includes the states of Eastern Europe and 14 former Soviet republics which have become NATO's "partners" under the "Partnership for Peace."

However, it was neither the new figures in NATO's formulas, nor Bosnia — which was cited in Berlin as graphic evidence of the bloc's changed nature — that were this time the main illustration of the "new NATO"; it was the alliance's so-called "European dimension." Thus far it is concealed rather enigmatically beneath the term "combined allied special forces." This allows the Europeans within the North Atlantic Alliance to carry out military operations on the continent without the Americans necessarily being involved. True, it is still stressed unanimously that the military and political role of the United States, which is fundamental to NATO, is in no way called into question.

Through Primakov's lips, Russian diplomacy was not slow to interpret the Berlin debut of the "European dimension" as a symptom of a wider post-confrontational shift — from a unipolar world to a multipolar world. Translated into newspaper language, this academic formula means that in a world where there are many poles or centers of power, there is ever less room for the nostalgia for unipolar dominance that persists in the United States.

Moscow is inclined to see the newborn "European dimension" as a kind of prop for its own policy with regard to NATO. The change within NATO is apparently prompted by the same logic of opposing the vestiges of confrontational thinking as is Russia's resistance to the bloc's outward expansion. In any case, there is hope that, being occupied with internal transformations, NATO will more easily and rapidly lose interest in outward expansion.

In Berlin, the Russia-NATO contacts were constructive and marked by goodwill. Apparently there were no ill omens. In expectation of presidential elections very soon in Russia and in November in the United States, a real decision on the explosive question of new NATO members was postponed at least until December.

After the conference under the 16+1 formula, Solana and Primakov faced the press on the green lawn of the Intercontinental Hotel. They joked and were pleased with each other. Solana spoke of a "frank and constructive" discussion in a cordial atmosphere. It was Primakov's impression that NATO had shown "unanimity" that Russia plays a "very big role" in European security. He hopes that NATO will place the emphasis not on the question of expansion as a foregone conclusion, but on dialogue with Russia.

Later, in a longer talk with Russian journalists, the minister expressed satisfaction mingled with a fear of euphoria. First, there is no retreat from our position of rejection of NATO expansion, he stressed. Second, "new elements" have appeared, and NATO, albeit little by little, is evolving in the direction of the paramountcy of dialogue with Russia.

#### **Russia: NATO Responds to Moscow's Concerns Before Elections**

*MK0506121396 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 4*

[Report by Andrey Smirnov: "The Threat of NATO Expansion Has Subsided in Run-up to Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The relations between Russia and NATO, which for a long time were marred by the sides' intransigence over the issue of alliance expansion plans, are apparently entering a new stage. The sides are moving away from recriminations to a search for a reasonable compromise. This is evident from the results of a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and his counterparts from the NATO member states that took place yesterday on the fringes of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) session. [passage omitted]

At the same time NATO member states have recently demonstrated unprecedented responsiveness, accommodating Russia's aspiration to get reliable security guarantees in the event of the alliance's expansion.

How else could you perceive the NACC session's Monday decision to create multinational tactical forces (MTF) operations that will be open to non-NATO countries, including — as NATO General Secretary Javier Solana stressed — Russia. It not as yet clear what the political command mechanism for these forces is going to be. Yet it will apparently recall the command procedure for the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, where the role of Russia certainly cannot be described as minor. Nor should the creation of the MTF be seen as a kind of alternative to NATO expansion. The new structure is devised as a purely European one.



The U.S. role in it is limited to technical assistance. The MTF is conceived as a tool for averting regional conflicts in Europe. The latter is welcomed by Russia, which has often come out in favor of an all-European security system, that, unlike NATO, would not be aimed exclusively at preventing a global threat. The MTF can become a haven for those East European countries whose accession to NATO is unacceptable to Russia because it involves the proximity of the alliance's military structures to Russia's borders. This primarily involves the Baltic states. On this issue NATO is ready to make substantial concessions. The statements by the Western diplomats who took part in the Berlin meeting point to the following scheme for settling disagreements between Russia and NATO. The question of admitting countries bordering Russia to the alliance is postponed indefinitely. In the foreseeable future, only some Central European states can be admitted to NATO. It is especially stressed that not only no nuclear weapons or NATO military bases will be located on the territory of the newly admitted members, but that no large war games will be held there. These countries will have a status identical to that of Norway and Denmark which, although they are part of the NATO military structure, do not station foreign troops on their territory.

NATO's aspiration to compromise helped alleviate Moscow's position. Yevgeniy Primakov, describing the Berlin meeting as "frank, useful, and constructive," said that Russia "understands the importance of NATO" and welcomes the alliance's aspiration to "adapt to new realities."

**Russia: Grachev Remarks at Lvov Peacekeeping Exercise**

MM0506183796 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Pelts: "Creation of Russian Peacekeeping Forces Is Another Component of Army Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, multinational peacekeeping force exercises are being held in Ukraine (at the Lvov training ground) 1 through 10 June. Servicemen from nine states (12 platoons in all) are taking part. A multinational battalion has been created consisting of four companies commanded respectively by officers from Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and Poland. Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev observed the course of the exercise and the Russian servicemen's actions.

The most active and intensive phase of the exercises is still to come. Nonetheless, even the initial phase of the

exercise showed the Russian servicemen's high level of professional training and their effective collaboration with other countries' subunits, as Army General Pavel Grachev noted at the press conference that was held.

There is no doubt that the holding of the first such exercises is of tremendous public interest. After all, it is no secret, as has been stressed more than once, that in the not too distant past some of those currently taking part in the exercises considered themselves enemies. Now the time has come to turn over a new leaf in our mutual relations and train our soldiers for the sake of a great and sacred goal — preserving and maintaining peace.

Let us make no bones about it, this is no easy task. And it is not only a matter of language barriers or different methods of training the peacekeeping forces. Those difficulties can be overcome. It is far more difficult to master a new logic of mutual relations, establish efficient collaboration, and identify unified objectives and tasks for the peacekeeping forces.

During the press conference Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev devoted great attention to the problem of the development of Russia's peacekeeping forces. He noted that their potential is very great. In accordance with the edict of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, supreme commander in chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, we must, the defense minister said, form 21 peacekeeping battalions with a total strength of 12,000 servicemen. As of today there are 17 battalions on permanent readiness to carry out missions, formed on the basis of subunits of two motorized infantry divisions and units of the Airborne Troops. In addition, the defense minister stressed, 11,000 Russian servicemen are already involved today in fulfilling peacekeeping operations. These people have been able to demonstrate their high level of professionalism and have won the trust and respect of the peaceful population in those regions where they are carrying out their mission — a mission which is difficult and often mortally dangerous, but very honorable and necessary.

The present exercises by the multinational peacekeeping forces, Army General Pavel Grachev went on to note, will help us to establish closer collaboration, to get to know each other better, and to test ourselves in real action. And although their scale is not so very great and the number of forces and resources involved is still small, their significance can hardly be overestimated.

The next day of Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev's stay in Ukraine was connected with an event which Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov and U.S. Defense Secretary Dr. William Perry described, without exaggeration, as

historic. Exactly five months ago, in January this year, they, the defense ministers of Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, by simultaneously turning keys, blew up a missile launch silo which was being destroyed under international treaties. And now the day has come when in its place, after labor-intensive land-reclamation work, only an open field remains. Some 15 hectares of fertile land has been returned to the working people. For this to become possible, 15,000 cubic meters of earth and more than 1,000 tonnes of concrete structures were removed from the former site of the launcher, and 4,000 cubic meters of chernozem were brought in. The only reminder now of the danger that once lay in this place is the bench-mark [reper] of a strategic missile, buried a meter deep.

During a short briefing, Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev stressed that a similar technique for the destruction of launch silos has also been developed in Russia. This makes it possible to speak of the total ecological safety and reliability of the process of the destruction of nuclear weapons in accordance with the international commitments made. The defense minister also noted that Ukraine has completely fulfilled its commitments and from 31 May 1996 can be considered a nuclear-free state.

During a trip to Pervomaysk the defense ministers of Russia, Ukraine, and the United States inspected a camp specially built for the Ukrainian missile men.

#### **Russia: Poll Shows Russians Like West's Economy, Not Democracy**

*LD0506145296 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1423 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 5 (Interfax) — As many as 55 percent of Russians would like to live like people in the West but at the same time do not want Russia to follow the western democratic path, according to a poll by the Public Opinion Foundation among 1,500 residents of 40 regions of Russia in early June, Igor Klyamkin, head of the foundation's analytical center, told a news conference in Moscow Wednesday.

He said 71 percent of those polled believe that laws are better observed in the West than in Russia and 60 percent said that Western society is more just.

The majority of those polled insisted that Russia has "a special path of development," whatever that may mean, Klyamkin said.

He described the "special path" as an ambiguous irrational term which sociologists cannot define. The Russians polled, however, were united in pointing out two of its aspects, collectivism and spirituality.

The poll's margin of error is -3.8 percent.

#### **Russia: Seleznev Hails 'New Impetus' Following DPRK, Mongolia Trip**

*MM0506132496 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 2*

[ITAR-TASS report: "Parliamentary Ties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 3 Jun — The recent visits by Russian parliamentarians to the DPRK and Mongolia "will undoubtedly give a new impetus to Russia's relations with these states," State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev believes. Speaking today at a press conference on the results of the State Duma delegations' official visits to the DPRK and Mongolia 27-30 May, he stressed that both countries are "our strategic partners and this makes us committed to actively developing comprehensive ties."

At the same time the State Duma speaker pointed out that the Russian legislative base cannot lag behind the changing realities of the international situation. In particular, it must provide the necessary legal foundation for the conclusion of a new treaty between Russia and the DPRK, a draft of which is currently being elaborated.

Seleznev noted that the Russian-North Korean intergovernmental commission, whose first session took place in Pyongyang in April, "is actively seeking approaches toward the restoration of former ties between the two countries, and this is encouraging." According to the chamber's chairman long-term contacts are being forged between Russia's border regions and the adjacent areas in the DPRK and Mongolia.

#### **Russia: DPRK Denies Visas to 'Slandorous' Russian News Agencies**

*LD0506114896 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1057 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 5 (Interfax) — The North Korean authorities have explained their refusal to give entrance visas to correspondents from Russia's leading news agencies Interfax, Itar-Tass and RIA-Novosti by saying that these news agencies wire slanderous and incorrect reports about North Korea, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov told Interfax Wednesday.

Correspondents from the three news agencies, who were to accompany Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev during his recent visit to Pyongyang, were denied entrance to North Korea. The North Korean authorities gave no public explanation. Only the correspondent from the pro-communist Pravda newspaper was given a visa.

This is not the first case of the kind, said Panov. "They have become regular. Naturally, the Russian Foreign Ministry does not agree with the reasons given by North Korea and has expressed its concern and bewilderment to the North Korean embassy in Moscow," he said.

"We tell the North Koreans: if you don't like articles by Russian correspondents you should invite them to your country and show them it instead of refusing visas," added Panov.

Asked whether Russia will give humanitarian aid to North Korea which, according to press reports, is on the verge of starvation, Panov said: "Pyongyang has not made such requests. As far as we know, North Korea requested aid from several international organizations and the United States."

**Russia: Amb. Pickering Seeks To Reassure Deputies About NATO**

*MK0506140496 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 4*

[Report by Sergey Modestov: "Three Criteria of Thomas Pickering. The U.S. Ambassador Claims That Washington Is Looking Forward to the Ratification of Some Documents That Are Now at the State Duma"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering recently had a meeting with activists of the Russian Federation Interparliamentary Group, where he gave the views of the U.S. diplomatic establishment on some fundamental military and political issues.

Mr. Pickering said that his country was interested in furthering the process of limiting and reducing armaments. He emphasized that the U.S. side is striving to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and spoke of the need for stricter oversight of the arms trade.

He mentioned our countries' joint efforts in the settlement of the Bosnian conflict as a positive example of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the interest of ensuring peace and international security. Having made a few more complimentary comments on some aspects of policy and having tactfully passed over others that could hardly be regarded as fully successful, Mr. Pickering proceeded to the less pleasant, critical part of his presentation.

In particular, he delicately hinted that his country is looking forward to the ratification of some documents by the State Duma. In the ambassador's opinion, any "negative linkages," suggesting package solutions to highly important strategic stability issues, need to be avoided.

The head of the U.S. diplomatic mission probably feels very anxious about those conditions and terms that could accompany the ratification of START II. Washington might be worried about the possibility of linking this document with the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The United States will hardly rejoice at Russia's proposals that (1) the scale of combat patrols by fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) be limited on a reciprocal basis (including patrol zones in the immediate vicinity of the coasts of the other side and the number of submarines on combat patrol at one time), that (2) notification be given when an SSBN goes on combat duty, and (3) that the deployment of antisubmarine warfare systems near SSBN permanent basing areas be stopped, etc.

Nonetheless, the vitally important interests of any country in the modern world can only be secured by using a systemic approach to the solution of such a complex problem. The existence of quite naturally differing interests necessitates a balance: Any advantage of one side should be offset by an advantage of the other side in some other respect. The idea of the parity of forces, an evening-up, and the equating of the structure of strategic forces is faulty in view of the significant differences between our countries.

Having urged the parliamentarians to effect ratification, Thomas Pickering went over to the still more intricate task of lobbying Russian legislators for NATO's eastward expansion. In his opinion, NATO is the most reliable guarantor of peace and security in Europe. In this capacity, the ambassador believes, it cannot be rivaled by either the OSCE or any other international organization.

The ambassador formulated three criteria that could help determine the readiness of this or that country to join NATO:

- the availability of a democratic government;
- public control of the military;
- openness of the military budget.

State Duma Deputy Igor Malkov — who proved unconvinced by the soothing assurances of the U.S. diplomat about the absence of any threat to Russia on the part of NATO — asked Mr. Pickering two questions:

1) Can the argument about the West not planning to deploy its armed forces in East European countries after they join NATO be convincing once armies of these countries, bordering on Russia and allied Belarus, themselves become a part of the united armed forces of this bloc?



2) Does Russia qualify to join NATO in accordance with the above three criteria?

Regarding the first question, it was explained that "NATO armaments could possibly not approach Russia." It needs only to be specified, then, what armaments will be in service with the national forces confronting us on the other side the border. Will they be of our own make, i.e., former Soviet, or made in Israel? Or else are some of the neutral countries — like Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Finland, or Switzerland — ready to rearm Eastern Europe?

As for the second question, Mr. Pickering found it so interesting that he promised to give his special consideration to the matter.

**Russia: U.S.-Russian Crime Fighting Conference Held in Moscow**

MM0506111796 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Danilkin: "Two Heads Are Also Better Than One in the Struggle Against the Mafia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The international conference entitled "problems of the struggle against organized crime in Russia and the United States" is continuing work for the third day in Moscow. The subject of the conference is topical if only because according to the MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry] right now 110 powerful groupings from Russia operating in 44 countries are continuing to commit serious crimes. This list is far from a full one.

A year ago what is so far only an agreement on cooperation on criminal issues — a treaty is in the future — was signed between Russia and the United States. But already the two countries can, on the basis of this agreement, ask each other for information about criminals and for documents, identify an individual and his whereabouts, and also instruct each other to carry out a search or even destrain property. The most famous example of cooperation was in the case of Vyacheslav Ivankov — Yaponchik. Despite the fact that our press had published a mass of items claiming that the godfather's guilt would not be successfully established, Mrs. Cynthia Young, deputy chief of the U.S. Department of Justice Organized Crime Section, believes that the prosecution has collected substantial proof, including with the aid of electronic means.

And just one detail relating to the Americans' expenditure on law enforcement matters: The state earmarks at least \$100,000 to protect one witness who may be in danger. Alas, in our country it is still no rarity for representatives of a grouping to be put on trial and for not a single witness to be left alive at the end of the trial....

**Russia: Leader of Chechen Information Center in Poland Interviewed**

MM0506125096 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 7

[Interview with Ali Ramazan Ampukayev, leader of the Chechen Information Center, by Anatoliy Anisimov; date, place not given: "Polish Persons of Caucasus Nationality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite official protests by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Chechen Information Center has been operating for several years now in the ancient Polish city of Krakow. In his time, Dzhokhar Dudayev disowned the Chechen Information Center, calling the Krakow Chechens impostors. Nevertheless the Chechen Information Center is continuing to exist and work, and its leader, Ali Ramazan Ampukayev, who our correspondent in Poland talked to, is building great plans for the future.

[Anisimov] Can you tell me what the Chechen Information Center has been doing for the past 18 months?

[Ampukayev] We have organized demonstrations, rallies, and a collection of signatures in support of Chechnya in major cities in Poland. A number of Polish right-wing parties have adopted statements in support of Chechnya at their congresses, as has the Seventh Congress of "Solidarity." The work of the Chechen Information Center has been the target of several protest notes from the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, as well as statements by Kozyrev and Rybkin.

[Anisimov] What made you take up political activity?

[Ampukayev] My first document was the address to the Polish Sejm and the people, appealing for solidarity with the Chechen people, which the Polish parliamentarians and the Polish public responded to. The Chechen Information Center was formed with the support of the Krakow authorities and the "Solidarity" trade union. Its founders include the famous politicians and Polish Sejm Deputies Leszek Moczulski and Krzysztof Krol. A great deal of work has been done in opening up the "Free Caucasus" radio station. One leading Polish private radio company has provided the Chechens with radio station equipment which had previously belonged to the underground "Solidarity" movement.

[Anisimov] What funds have been provided for the existence of the Chechen Information Center?

[Ampukayev] Initial expenditure was covered by our own personal funds. Subsequently Chechens who were worried about their motherland responded. At first the Krakow authorities granted us premises free of charge, but bills have been coming in for a while now.

[Anisimov] What money was used to hold the international conference "International Rights and the Chechen Republic" in December last year?

[Ampukayev] The conference cost \$60,000. Usman Imayev, who arrived in Krakow, was involved in organizing it. I do not know the source of this money.

[Anisimov] Has the Chechen Information Center had any contact with diplomats in the Polish Republic?

[Ampukayev] Yes, we have been in touch with representatives of many embassies and consulates, except for Russian ones. Diplomats from the United States and France have been to the Chechen Information Center, and we have met with diplomats from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Sweden, and other countries.

[Anisimov] But after all, we know that 23 February 1995 you announced that you were giving up Russian citizenship and you publicly gave back your passport.

[Ampukayev] At that time there had already been two protest notes from the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry demanding that the Polish leadership ban the activity of the Chechen Information Center. At the same time, the Russian side was noting that the leaders of the Chechen Information Center are Russian citizens. At that time the activity of the Chechen Information Center was more important to us, Chechens, than the question of citizenship. At the same time, we did not accept the Polish authorities' proposal that we could be granted Polish citizenship. We remain citizens of Chechnya.

[Anisimov] You have met with many Polish politicians. With whom were the meetings most memorable?

[Ampukayev] With Polish President Lech Walesa at the Seventh Congress of "Solidarity" in Gdansk in summer 1995. He said then "I know all about Chechnya, my beloved Chechens. We will do more for Chechnya." True, when he convened the conference on the question of opening the "Free Caucasus" radio, he forgot that the creation of such a radio station is impossible under Polish legislation.

**Russia: NE Atlantic Fish Pact Has Political Nuances**  
MM0506134396 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 25 May 96 p 11

[Article by Aleksey Chichkin: "Does Integration in the North 'Impede' the European Union?" Russia Participates in Regional Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recommendations of the forum of heads of government of North European and Baltic countries, recently held in Sweden, are already being put into practice: A regional agreement was signed on 7 May on fishing in the northeast

Atlantic and on the protection of fish resources in the region against illegal fishing by EU countries. Russia, Norway, Iceland, and the Faeroe Islands, autonomous from Denmark, are party to the agreement. Greenland (a Danish protectorate) and Sweden are expected to endorse the document.

The agreement envisages fishing for herring — the main "resource" of the northeast Atlantic — on the basis of quotas for each of the countries party to this "pact." Russia's quota for 1996 is 166,000 tonnes, Norway's is 695,000 tonnes, and Iceland and the Faeroes each get 128,000 tonnes. It is worth noting that formerly Iceland and the Faeroes had larger quotas, but they were established on the basis of bilateral agreements, and also of accords which Reykjavik and Torshavn had with Norway and Greenland. But now these countries, which are still not seeking EU membership, have entered into collaboration with neighboring countries and, according to A. Alsen [name as transliterated], Faeroese economy and trade minister, "by making concessions on quota sizes, have strengthened ties with neighbors.... And, most important, all interested parties have worked out an agreed stance on the joint protection of their economic sovereignty in matters of fishing — a major industry in the region."

According to H. Asgrimsson, Icelandic minister of foreign affairs and foreign trade, "Iceland accepts the terms of the signed agreement in order to strengthen cooperation among all countries in the region." Norway is of the same opinion.

Norway and Russia originally devised a regional treaty on herring fishing. But in view of the intention of the EU, above all Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, to increase fishing operations in the northeast Atlantic without consulting the region's countries, Moscow and Oslo decided to bring Iceland and the Faeroes into the elaboration of a regional protectionist document. By May this document had been agreed by all the northeast Atlantic countries.

In 1995 the EU established its own herring fishing quota in that part of the Atlantic at 150,000 tonnes, despite the fact that approximately 80 percent of the water area is in the economic zone belonging to Russia, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faeroes. The governments of these countries elaborated a coordinated stance on this question, stating on the threshold of the signing of the document that the EU's total herring fishing quota for that area cannot exceed 50,000 tonnes. Iceland and the Faeroes propose developing the agreement by intensifying joint — regionwide — monitoring of fishing activities by the EU, in particular Germany and Britain. Talks on this question have already begun.

[Anisimov] What money was used to hold the international conference "International Rights and the Chechen Republic" in December last year?

[Ampukayev] The conference cost \$60,000. Usman Imaev, who arrived in Krakow, was involved in organizing it. I do not know the source of this money.

[Anisimov] Has the Chechen Information Center had any contact with diplomats in the Polish Republic?

[Ampukayev] Yes, we have been in touch with representatives of many embassies and consulates, except for Russian ones. Diplomats from the United States and France have been to the Chechen Information Center, and we have met with diplomats from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Sweden, and other countries.

[Anisimov] But after all, we know that 23 February 1995 you announced that you were giving up Russian citizenship and you publicly gave back your passport.

[Ampukayev] At that time there had already been two protest notes from the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry demanding that the Polish leadership ban the activity of the Chechen Information Center. At the same time, the Russian side was noting that the leaders of the Chechen Information Center are Russian citizens. At that time the activity of the Chechen Information Center was more important to us, Chechens, than the question of citizenship. At the same time, we did not accept the Polish authorities' proposal that we could be granted Polish citizenship. We remain citizens of Chechnya.

[Anisimov] You have met with many Polish politicians. With whom were the meetings most memorable?

[Ampukayev] With Polish President Lech Walesa at the Seventh Congress of "Solidarity" in Gdansk in summer 1995. He said then "I know all about Chechnya, my beloved Chechens. We will do more for Chechnya." True, when he convened the conference on the question of opening the "Free Caucasus" radio, he forgot that the creation of such a radio station is impossible under Polish legislation.

**Russia: NE Atlantic Fish Pact Has Political Nuances**  
MM0506134396 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 25 May 96 p 11

[Article by Aleksey Chichkin: "Does Integration in the North 'Impede' the European Union?" Russia Participates in Regional Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recommendations of the forum of heads of government of North European and Baltic countries, recently held in Sweden, are already being put into practice: A regional agreement was signed on 7 May on fishing in the northeast

Atlantic and on the protection of fish resources in the region against illegal fishing by EU countries. Russia, Norway, Iceland, and the Faeroe Islands, autonomous from Denmark, are party to the agreement. Greenland (a Danish protectorate) and Sweden are expected to endorse the document.

The agreement envisages fishing for herring — the main "resource" of the northeast Atlantic — on the basis of quotas for each of the countries party to this "pact." Russia's quota for 1996 is 166,000 tonnes, Norway's is 695,000 tonnes, and Iceland and the Faeroes each get 128,000 tonnes. It is worth noting that formerly Iceland and the Faeroes had larger quotas, but they were established on the basis of bilateral agreements, and also of accords which Reykjavik and Torshavn had with Norway and Greenland. But now these countries, which are still not seeking EU membership, have entered into collaboration with neighboring countries and, according to A. Alsen [name as transliterated], Faeroese economy and trade minister, "by making concessions on quota sizes, have strengthened ties with neighbors.... And, most important, all interested parties have worked out an agreed stance on the joint protection of their economic sovereignty in matters of fishing — a major industry in the region."

According to H. Asgrimsson, Icelandic minister of foreign affairs and foreign trade, "Iceland accepts the terms of the signed agreement in order to strengthen cooperation among all countries in the region." Norway is of the same opinion.

Norway and Russia originally devised a regional treaty on herring fishing. But in view of the intention of the EU, above all Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, to increase fishing operations in the northeast Atlantic without consulting the region's countries, Moscow and Oslo decided to bring Iceland and the Faeroes into the elaboration of a regional protectionist document. By May this document had been agreed by all the northeast Atlantic countries.

In 1995 the EU established its own herring fishing quota in that part of the Atlantic at 150,000 tonnes, despite the fact that approximately 80 percent of the water area is in the economic zone belonging to Russia, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faeroes. The governments of these countries elaborated a coordinated stance on this question, stating on the threshold of the signing of the document that the EU's total herring fishing quota for that area cannot exceed 50,000 tonnes. Iceland and the Faeroes propose developing the agreement by intensifying joint — regionwide — monitoring of fishing activities by the EU, in particular Germany and Britain. Talks on this question have already begun.



The significance of the signed document for Russia consists primarily in the fact that the Russian Federation is participating for the first time in an essentially integrational measure in the North European region. And the initiators of this regional approach to the protection of the economic interests of the region's state were countries that are refusing to join the EU — Norway and Iceland. Compared with North European integration in the fishing sphere, the participants in which are mindful of Russian interests, you have an entirely different situation in the Caspian, and Black Seas, the Sea of Azov, the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan.

Illegal, including contraband fishing, is on the increase in other seas washing the Russian Federation's shores, actually in the Russian economic zone of these seas. It is doing significant damage to fish resources and is violating Russian Federation sovereignty. So cooperation among the northeast Atlantic countries in the joint protection of their "fishing" interests and distribution of fishing quotas is highly instructive to Russia's other "maritime" neighbors.

The Russian Federation's interests in the northeast Atlantic are taken into account by its neighbors there because they regard Russia as a regional economic and political partner (which, in particular, was confirmed by the results of the Russian Federation president's visit to Norway and the conference of premiers of North European and Baltic countries in Sweden at the beginning of May). You do not find a similar attitude toward the Russian Federation in other stretches of water. Moreover, the northeast Atlantic countries that are not members of the EU clash with it in essentially the same way as Russia: "excessive" state protectionism, according to the "Europoliticians," and the intention to protect the domestic market from imports of consumer goods, including food, from the EEC countries. The latter fact is beginning to cause a deterioration in Sweden's and Finland's relations with the EEC (they joined the bloc in 1995).

As for the Faeroes and Greenland, their administrations declared back in the year Denmark joined the EU (1973), that any agreement between Copenhagen and the European organizations causing domestic or foreign economic damage to the economies of the Danish autonomous entities would not be ratified by their administrations. The Faeroes and Greenland have not yet joined the EU, unlike the mother country (Denmark). Moreover, according to articles in the Danish press and statements by Faeroese and Greenland politicians, EU expansion in the north Atlantic and Copenhagen's refusal to give the Danish autonomous entities "economic

patronage" will contribute to their secession from Denmark.

And the fact that the Faeroes signed a regional agreement on herring fishing quotas and obtained their own quotas as an independent state confirms the evident exacerbation of the Danish protectorates' economic conflicts not so much with Denmark as with "Maastricht" Europe (what is also characteristic is that Copenhagen did not sign this agreement on herring fishing quotas in the northeast Atlantic and did not support the quota of 50,000 tonnes, recommended by its participants for the EU).

Moreover, the Danish protectorates, Iceland, and Norway have long favored collaboration with Russia on questions of fishing in the region and exploitation of various resources in the Norwegian, Barents, and Greenland Seas.

The agreement on herring fishing in the region envisages that the redistribution of fishing quotas and implementation of measures to protect the "fishing interests" of the countries of the northeast Atlantic will take place on the basis of accords among the countries that are party to the present agreement. A similar document is currently being devised on cod fishing in the northeast Atlantic (talks are being held in Iceland).

That is, we are talking about interstate protectionism in the fishing sphere. In this connection, the opinion of many Scandinavian politicians that North European integration involving Russia is already under way is valid.

#### **Russia: Fish Accord With Iran Irks Caspian Capitals**

*MM0506140296 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 96 p 7*

[Article by Aleksey Alekseyev and Yuriy Isatov: "Caspian 'Sturgeon Alliance': Will It Lead To Regional Integration?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Problems connected with the current uncertain status of the Caspian are affecting not only the exploration of its oil and gas resources. As is known, for many centuries the region has been a "center" for the production and export of a variety of caviar and cured fish products, sturgeon, and so on. It is the focus of the world's main facilities for the processing of very valuable fish resources, and the reproduction of the latter also takes place near fishing centers in the Caspian area.

Following the breakup of the USSR around 70 percent of the caviar and cured sturgeon sector's capacities

ended up outside Russia, around 35 percent of them in the Caspian areas of Kazakhstan. But because the current status of the Caspian Sea and its resources and the principles governing their exploitation is unresolved, the CIS countries have not yet succeeded in coordinating their interests in this sphere: The Russian Federation's neighbors in nearby foreign parts believe that the "Caspian inland waterway" is not everyone's property, but the property of each republic in the Caspian region. Accordingly, the delimitation of sea areas (but Russia and Iran do not do not regard the Caspian as a sea) should be carried out on the basis of demarcation of borders in the Caspian water area. So the fish resources of the Caspian Sea's "national sectors" are the property of the sovereign states.

But Russia and Iran are adherents of the old indefinite-duration documents determining the status of the Caspian and the principles governing the exploitation of its resources: the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian treaties on the Caspian Sea. Under these treaties, the sea is an "inland waterway" and its resources, which are regarded as the property of all the Caspian republics, cannot be exploited on a "national basis" or with the involvement of foreign companies.

These positions are diametrically opposed, and so the status of the Caspian and of Caspian resources taking into account the current frontiers in the region has not yet been elaborated and agreed (in particular, the holding of an "inter-Caspian" conference in Ashgabat, the idea being to agree on legal and economic questions relating to the status of the Caspian and its resources, has been repeatedly postponed).

Meanwhile the Russian Federation and Iran, as Caspian countries, are guided by the unique and nonrenewable nature of Caspian resources and their significance for all the countries of the region. This is confirmed by the agreement between Russia and Iran on cooperation in the fishing sphere. The basic principles of this document are a mutual interest in the preservation, reproduction, and optimal utilization of Caspian bioresources, and also the need for cooperation in the world market for caviar and cured sturgeon products.

The agreement stresses that the Caspian is a "unified ecological complex." This description of the Caspian Sea has no support at the moment in the Caspian republics of the CIS, and the Russian-Iranian agreement could be disputed, of course, in Baku, Almaty, and Ashgabat to the effect that Moscow and Tehran are allegedly "usurping" the rights and interests of the other Caspian countries, for which the caviar and cured sturgeon sector is also of strategic significance.

The Russian-Iranian document provides for cooperation in many spheres of fishing in the Caspian — in the development of fishing and fish processing, reproduction and protection of fish resources, and transportation of fish products. The construction of joint processing ventures and a modern fishing fleet in the Caspian is also part of Russian-Iranian cooperation.

There are plans for the creation of joint subcommittees in practically all areas of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Iran in the sphere of "Caspian" fishing. These subcommittees will come under the Russian-Iranian Commission on Fishing, to be instituted under the agreement.

The Russian-Iranian document also envisages "devising and instituting a program for the certification of sturgeon products." This provision is particularly relevant today, what with substandard or contraband caviar and cured sturgeon products with standard labels finding their way onto markets in the Russian Federation and other Caspian republics. There are figures that suggest that the number of goods of this kind arriving in Russia in 1996 is 100 percent up on 1992 (in Iran all caviar and cured sturgeon production sectors are entirely state-run, and the state also controls exports of sturgeon products)....

So the Russian Federation and Iran will have unified certification of caviar and cured sturgeon commodities. But according to Iranian experts the implementation of this measure is connected with the fact Moscow has to take decisive action to protect the Russian border in the Caspian (in legal terms it does not exist) and against illegal sturgeon fishing operations actually on Russian Federation territory. There is concern in Tehran at the increasing amount of illegal production and sale of caviar and cured sturgeon commodities in Russia. Therefore, many Russian and Iranian specialists deem it necessary to introduce in the Russian Federation state quotas and licenses for catching, processing, and marketing sturgeon (as happens, for example, in Turkmenistan) — these measures have to be taken to make certification of caviar and cured sturgeon commodities more effect.

In principle Russian-Iranian certification of Caspian fish products could be disputed by other Caspian countries. But one very important point in the agreement between the Russian Federation and Iran is that the "sides will coordinate their efforts to preserve the bioresources of the Caspian Sea and manage them with all the other Caspian states." Consequently, this agreement lays the foundation for collaboration among all countries in the region. At least when it comes to fishing in the Caspian in general.

**Russia: Government, Japan Disagree on Fishing in South Kurils Area**

*LD0506152996 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1436 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 5 (Interfax) — Russia and Japan have failed to bridge the gap between their stands on some key issues at the current round of talks on fishing in the area of the South Kuril Islands, Vyacheslav Zilanov, deputy head of the Russian State Committee for Fishing, told Interfax Wednesday.

He said Moscow proceeds from the assumption that Russia should exercise control over the activities of Japanese fishermen in its economic zone in the South Kurils area. "It is one of the three main goals pursued by the Russian delegation at the talks," he said.

Zilanov said the Japanese side disagrees and says it should control its fishermen, including issuing them licenses for fishing.

Zilanov said Russia wants both sides to share all the expenses, including those for research and environmental protection, if they jointly use sea resources.

Sources in the Russian Federal Border Service told Interfax that Japanese ships violated Russian territorial waters near the South Kurils over 7,600 times in 1993, 227 times in 1994 and 31 times in 1995.

They said the drop in the number of border violations is due to measures taken by Russian border guards to prevent illegal fishing.



### Political Issues

#### Russia: State Body Takes Action on Pay Arrears

MM0606092196 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
25 May 96 p 2

[Report by Georgiy Stepanov and Yuliya Ulyanova: "'I Order You Not To Pay Wages...' Twenty-Four Thousand Enterprises Have Committed 25,000 Infringements of Pay Legislation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russia-wide problem of the failure to pay the employees of budget-financed enterprises their salaries is, as we know, one of the CPRF's [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] main trump cards in its election campaigning. Gennadiy Zyuganov's supporters entice people over to their side with the simple conversational ploy: "Have you been paid?" "No." "Well, you won't be if you vote for Yeltsin."

IZVESTIYA's editors are in possession of a document that throws light on certain little-known circumstances of the problem. This is the report of the Federal Inspectorate of Labor "...on Work to Monitor and Supervise Compliance With Pay Legislation in the Period From the Beginning of January Through 6 May 1996."

Not being able to publish this long document in its entirety, we cite the most significant information. Thus, according to the document, 24,000 enterprises were inspected, and around 25,000 infringements of pay legislation were found. The total sum of wages paid in response to the state inspectorate's demands was approximately 1.85 trillion rubles [R]. We cite further: "...Withholding pay has become a highly profitable business for a whole number of leaders of state, semistate, and private organizations, and even a means of unlawful personal enrichment. Meanwhile, the system of disciplinary and penal sanctions is virtually defunct...the risk of being called to account is negligible in comparison with the profits received."

One enterprise in Kaliningrad Oblast, the "Tralflot" Open-Type Joint-Stock Company, owes its personnel more than R10 billion. Between January 1995 and March 1996 R2.014 billion were paid to its account from the federal budget, but only R326 million were used to pay wages. A sum equivalent to R25.6 billion from the sale of output, which supplemented "Tralflot's" hard currency account during this time, was used to settle accounts with foreign partners. State Inspector of Labor Grigoriy Kalinovskiy told IZVESTIYA from Kaliningrad that many employees of "Tralflot," in which the average pay is R1 million, had not been paid since 1993 (!). "We fined General Director Anichkin

and instituted criminal proceedings on the basis of the investigation. Pay arrears are being reduced, albeit extremely slowly. However, we are receiving a weekly report from 'Tralflot' about the progress of the payment of wages."

One story about why people are not being paid in Amur Oblast is worthy of a satirical classic. An open-type joint-stock company that goes by the original name of "Svobodnyy vodokanal" ["Free Canal"] owed its employees R322 million. At the same time, R373.5 million were spent in an extremely unexpected way. Bytsura, the director of "Svobodnyy vodokanal," transferred money to the "A-Market" limited partnership, of which he is a founder, and purchased a large quantity of fuels and lubricants for subsequent resale. On the remaining funds V. Bytsura arranged a vacation in Thailand for his entire family, and to cap it all, sold to his long-suffering enterprise with the proud name his own second-hand "Moskvich" for...R20 million. Immediately after the conclusion of the State Inspectorate's inspection Bytsura was fined...R3 million. True, there is every chance that the material resulting from the investigation, which has been referred to the public prosecutor's office, will lead to a decision to institute criminal proceedings.

Employees of the Gorkiy Plant in the Republic of Tatarstan were far luckier with the actions of their leadership. Of the R9 billion allocated from the federal budget for the remittance of wage arrears Ye. Vinogradov, the plant's director, spent "only" R1.6 billion on "other" purposes — travel expenses, for example. Today Vinogradov is no longer the plant's director. IZVESTIYA's own correspondent Boris Bronshteyn was informed at the factory that wage arrears remain unpaid since mid-February.

But the investigation showed that scandals similar to the "Svobodnyy vodokanal" scenario happen in Tatarstan too. Thus at the "Glinporoshok" state enterprise Director A. Khusainov, instead of paying off wage arrears totaling R510 million, was busy issuing himself with interest-free loans. Criminal proceedings have already been instituted against Khusainov.

Municipal authorities have rather frequently taken it upon themselves to dispose of targeted budgetary resources without any grounds for so doing. For example, it turned out that in 1994-1995 in the city of Snezhinsk in Chelyabinsk Oblast the local administration transferred around R720 million from the city budget into an extrabudgetary fund; this money was then dispersed among various commercial structures — and moreover, the requisite documentation was not even drawn up. As a result, almost all the budget funds were used for pur-

poses for which they were not intended. Under a directive from the administration the funding of construction work in Snezhinsk was effected precisely at the expense of withholding the pay of employees of budget-funded organizations.

The majority of these scandals end in criminal proceedings, or at least in fines and dismissals. In connection with the most blatant violations state labor inspectors have since the beginning of the year forwarded 325 documents to the public prosecutor for the filing of criminal charges. The public prosecutor has already instituted criminal proceedings in 70 cases.

But the State Labor Inspectorate's efforts by no means always produce tangible results. Thus, on the basis of the results of the latest investigations A. Savchenko, general director of the "Dmitrovgradskiy agregatnyy zavod" ["Dmitrovgrad Machine Unit Plant"] Joint-Stock Company, and his two deputies were fined: In the opinion of the local tax police and public prosecutor's office, who took part in the investigation, the issuing of pay was delayed because of the poor standard of financial control. An example of this "standard" leaves few doubts that this is the result of deliberate design: At a time when pay arrears amounted to R28 billion, the plant's leadership deemed it necessary to buy the building of the AvtoVaz Bank, allegedly for subsequent resale. In addition, while the plant's middlemen owe R202 billion, loans continue to be issued to these middlemen, and the return of old loans is not insisted on. The leaders of "Dmitrovgradskiy agregatnyy zavod" are trying to wriggle out of paying the fine — R3.5 million each — that has been imposed on them. The State Labor Inspectorate sent documents to the Dmitrovgrad Public Prosecutor's Office for the institution of criminal proceedings, but proceedings were not instituted on the pretext of a lack of evidence.

In the opinion of Vladimir Varov, the Russian Federation chief state inspector of labor, if the State Labor Inspectorate assesses the actions of leaders of Russian enterprises as infringing Article 138 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, which obliges them to pay their employees on time, it is very difficult to find any justification for their failure to do so. Therefore, Varov believes, the sources of the impunity of the leaders of budget-funded enterprises should be sought in the working of the judicial system.

## Media Issues

### Russia: Moscow NTV Director General on Political Bias Accusations

LD0506170796 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian

No. 23, Jun 96 (Signed to Press 4 Jun 96) p 3

[Interview with Igor Malashenko, director general of Moscow NTV television, by unidentified correspondent entitled: "For Whom Is NTV Voting?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Many people today have heard about Independent Television (NTV), which broadcasts on the fourth television channel in the evenings. However, far from all those who wish to be watching it: a number of regions do not receive their programs. Moreover, not everyone knows that quite a young (a 41 year old) man — from the new echelon of managers — headed the project to set up and develop it. He is one of those who, by dint of their intellect and business ability, have been able to organize extremely complex matters and are the dominant influence on millions of television viewers.

Igor Malashenko certainly has secrets to keep — the secrets of NTV's success and the secrets of its financial relations with the legendary "MOST-Bank," and the political secrets of state importance which he not only knows but now partially creates as well. For some time, Malashenko has been a member of the council for Boris Yeltsin's election campaign. For this reason, our conversation began with a request for him to be as frank as possible.

[Malashenko] Three things were needed to set up NTV: a team, money, and access to the airwaves. The team was selected on one main principle: so that there was someone heading each sector who would not ask every day what to do now. So, Dobrodeyev and Kiselev took it in turns to cover news and Vladilen Arsenyev films. Then not only correspondents but also camera crew and editors were chosen — people whose importance is not well understood by the viewers but who determine the form which information will take.

[Correspondent] And where did these people come from?

[Malashenko] Some came from the Russia TV news program "Vesti," some from Ostankino under Yegor Yakovlev, when it was possible to try to report different news. And then a very great number of young people came along. These were completely new people with a different understanding of news; no one had ever tried to force them to substitute their propaganda and they simply do not know what this is.

[Correspondent] Okay, let us now dwell in more detail on another point — money.

[Malashenko] Originally we got it from "MOST-Bank" and Mr. Gusinskiy, and without him NTV would not exist in its current form. The main source of our financing today is income from advertizements, which at times unfortunately irritate our viewers so much. Gusinskiy has kept financial control, which I can only welcome, since we understand less about money than bankers do.

[Correspondent] But you will agree that the man who pays calls the tune.

[Malashenko] Advertisers pay us and they "order" popular programs.

[Correspondent] And NTV is already a lucrative enterprise?

[Malashenko] Of course it is lucrative, but I would not call it profitable until it pays off all its debts. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Igor Yevgenyevich, your inclusion in the council for Yeltsin's election campaign was a sensation of sorts. What encouraged you to accept the offer?

[Malashenko] It was quite a difficult choice. And if I was offered a job ... I won't say with whom, I would, of course, have refused. But as a result, a very good team of people was selected, whom I like, and the personal aspect plays an important role. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Tell us honestly, were you offered the fourth channel as recompense?

[Malashenko] I will tell you honestly: No. Moreover, people who know Yeltsin understand very well that there can be no talk of this, by definition. Do I hope to receive the channel? Yes, I do. Are my chances of this now higher than they were a year ago? I am not sure. My fears are that after Boris Nikolayevich is elected — which I hope for very much — the same people will come along who have run the show for the past four years. And the refrain will start again: Kiselev is the enemy, "Kukly" is ideological sabotage... Yes, and I sometimes hear this from these same people now. There are documents where the word "antipresidential" with regard to NTV is the mildest...

[Correspondent] And what do you say in response?

[Malashenko] Well, in response I deliver reports on the role of television and I try to explain that the person who controls television will lose the election. Because he loses his sense of proportion and begins to substitute

propaganda for information. The voter senses this and in a subconscious protest votes against him.

[Correspondent] And what about Boris Nikolayevich?

[Malashenko] At a sitting of our council he said he would not allow himself to be made into a second Brezhnev, about whom you said good things or nothing at all.

[Correspondent] It is strange to hear that you are now being reproached for being against Yeltsin as well. Very many people are noting the opposite: NTV has become emphatically loyal toward Yeltsin.

[Malashenko] It is strange that a great many people have begun to notice this only now. The NTV television company has always been loyal toward Boris Yeltsin, simply because he is president of Russia. However, I would like to stress that in 1991 the electorate voted not for the ministers or the aides, but for Yeltsin. [passage omitted] We are not obliged to show the respect which we owe to the president of Russia to anyone else.

Yes, I foresee all kinds of difficulties in Yeltsin's victory, but they are all already customary and predictable. And if Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov wins... I got to know him in 1992 during the famous Ostankino siege. While Anpilov was on the rampage down there with his people, Zyuganov, Aksyuchits, and Baburin were haggling over it all up above. And it is difficult for me to trust people who were allies with Anpilov and his band. [passage omitted]

## Military Issues

### Russia: 'Unsinkable' Grachev Continues To Take Liberties

MK0606070896 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
5 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Tatyana Malkina: "Pavel Grachev Knows Something That He Should Not Know. This Is Possibly Why the Defense Minister Is Unsinkable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pavel Grachev, having been "buried alive" by his ill-wishers more than once, seems to know something of which numerous experts — who have been prophesying his prompt dismissal for over a year now — are not aware. For the time being, the defense minister is denying himself nothing. A couple of weeks ago, he made a canvassing quick march to visit army units in the Urals, Siberia, and the Transbaykal region, although, as is known, the law bans any election canvassing in the army. After this, the most obstinate prophets of Mr. Grachev's prompt fall supposed joyfully that by so doing the faithful minister wants to give his beloved president a good pretext to part with him.



The next public feat of Mr. Grachev was the scandalous exposure of intrigues of a treacherous "colonel general." The defense minister chose not to mention his name, but artfully portrayed him as resembling Boris Gromov. Mr. Grachev exposed Mr. Gromov on Thursday [30 May] at the All-Army Conference of Armed Forces' Senior Officers, where the minister said that some "dishonest" generals are "intriguing" against him and are deliberately spreading rumor about staff changes at the ministry. Pavel Grachev told the senior officers that, while he was on his trip to the Urals, Siberia, and the Transbaykal region, this very colonel general went to Boris Yeltsin and offered him a program of reforms in the army and the fleet. Then, according to Pavel Grachev, the evil general expressed his readiness to implement these plans immediately after his appointment as defense minister to replace Pavel Grachev. The exposure did not end there: Mr. Grachev said that the very first glimpse at the proposals that had been handed over to the president revealed that they were, in fact, plans of reforms worked out by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The general in question procured them somehow and passed off as his own.

Mr. Grachev's optimistic antagonists, who used to believe that he had not been dismissed by Boris Yeltsin before by a sheer oversight, were rejoiced at this fact. Boris Yeltsin, they reasoned, cannot fail to punish the person who divulges the content of the president's tete-a-tetes with whomever. If the president himself had shared this information with the minister, the latter simply let his chief down by talking about this left and right. If, however, the president did not do so (as for Boris Gromov, there can be no doubt that he kept silent), it turns out that this news has been shared with Pavel Grachev by some people who enjoy the president's trust. People, who are believed to be Colonel General Gromov's friends, however, might do so too, but in that case the sequence of events would have been presented in a different way: First, the president offered him the post of [defense] minister, and only then did the general tell the president about his views on army reform. If, however, they too said nothing, we are left only with a fantastic supposition that the defense minister had a bug in the room of the Supreme Commander.

Today the situation is such that even if Pavel Grachev is dismissed from his post, his ill-wishers will, most probably, refuse to believe that this is true. For the time being, however, Mr. Grachev continues to take a good many liberties. The day before yesterday [3 June] in Lviv, for instance, the defense minister imparted on his Hungarian colleague the news about the successes of the early voting among the military: "I have been informed today that crews of our ships and submarines that are now away from Russia have voted unanimously for Boris Yeltsin." Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Legislation (faction of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation), was the first to react on his openness: Having noted that the

law does allow to hold an early vote, Mr. Lukyanov emphasized that its results cannot be disclosed until 2200 of 16 June, the time when ballot boxes are to be opened. The deputy supposed, not without grounds, that Pavel Grachev's statement is underlain by one of the following two violations of the law: Either the ballot boxes at the Navy vessels were opened before the established time, or the fleet command had ordered that the servicemen vote for Boris Yeltsin and reported to the minister about this fact. In any case, Mr. Lukyanov said, Pavel Grachev's statement provides grounds to recognize the results of the early vote at the Navy vessels as null and void, and "should the Central Electoral Commission [TsIK] fail to do so, the State Duma at its plenary session on Wednesday [5 June] will find a way to react in a proper fashion."

Nikolay Burbyga, representative of the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate on Educational Work, confirmed that 557 servicemen had already cast their votes, and 311 more were going to vote before 4 June, but he categorically denied the information that the ballot boxes had been opened by the military command. According to Mr. Burbyga, the information that the servicemen had voted for Boris Yeltsin "was obtained from the military people themselves when they were inquired about this by commanders in the presence of reporters and observers from various parties." "An overwhelming majority of the enlisted men and officers claimed that they voted for the present head of state," he said.

TsIK Chairman Nikolay Ryabov, attacked by journalists, said yesterday that, according to the preliminary inspection by the TsIK, there had been no breach of the secrecy of vote at Russian ships and submarines that are on a long voyage. In Mr. Ryabov's words, if Mr. Grachev believes that his personnel will vote for this or that candidate, this is his personal business, but "as an official, he should refrain from making such statements." Nikolay Ryabov has emphasized that the TsIK will draw its conclusions after the inspection is over.

It is virtually impossible to predict, however, what other liberties and for what reason will be taken by the "undismissable" Defense Minister Pavel Grachev both before and after 2200 of 16 June.

#### **Russia: Gromov Supports Army Reform, Regrets Corruption**

*LD0506142296 Moscow MTK Television in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Jun 96*

[FBIS Summary] General Boris Gromov has a 15-minute interview with correspondent Kira Vladina in her prerecorded "Atelier" program on Moscow City Council MTK TV on 4 June.

In the only direct reference to politics in the interview, Vladina asks: "What do you think of our president's

new edict, to the extent that there should not be universal military conscription and that there should be a professional, career army?"

Gromov replies that he has been a "firm, staunch supporter" of a professional army since 1989 when the issue had been raised by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

"Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and I met recently and spoke on this subject," he continues. "It was after he had signed the edict."

Vladina asks if it was a cordial meeting. Gromov replies that yes, it was a very good, cordial meeting. He says that they talked as scheduled for 30 minutes.

Gromov goes on to quote the example of France, which had also recently gone over to professional armed forces. Vladina asks about the moral issues connected with a military career, even asking Gromov if he had killed anyone. He replies that "luckily" he never had, remarking that had he done so, his character would have probably changed for the worse.

Gromov says that he had been brought up to have a strong sense of honor and that his military service had taught him "love and respect for people." Vladina asks about camaraderie, making the first and only reference to the Russian defense minister, Pavel Grachev, whom Gromov has been tipped to replace: "Military camaraderie, the camaraderie of soldiery — is it a myth? You, Grachev, [Ingush President] Ruslan Aushev, [politician Aleksandr] Rutskoy, and [presidential candidate Aleksandr] Lebed went through Afghanistan. To what extent have your paths separated since then?"

Gromov says: "Not all our paths have separated. I still have very good relations with Ruslan Aushev. We are very real friends."

Vladina asks: "You just parted company ideologically, yes?" Gromov says: "You know a man very well when you are beside him. But for me it was a revelation that you get to know a person well not only in war time, in a difficult military environment, but you also get to know him, his character, well in such situations as, well, a struggle for power."

There are no further references to actual persons in the interview although when Gromov is asked about the current state of the Armed Forces, he says, without mentioning names: "There is a sizeable group of senior officers and generals who are engaged in or who are wallowing in corruption." Gromov attributes this corruption to lack of upbringing and an absence of "internal culture."

Vladina asks Gromov about his family — his soldier father who was killed in the Second World War, his two sons and second wife [the first was killed in an air crash] and the mascot he kept during his Afghan war service.

**Russia: New Law Heralds 'More Coordinated' Defense System**

*MM0506150796 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 1*

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "Country's Main Defense Law Comes Into Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 1 June Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin signed the federal law "On Defense." It was adopted by the State Duma 24 April this year and approved by the Federation Council 15 May 1996. Let us recall that it is a question not of additions or amendments to the old law but of a new legal act which deals with the basic principles of national defense. The law emerged from very difficult debates, and both parliamentary defense committees — the previous one and the new committee — were able to work on it. With the active participation of specialists from various departments, primarily the Russian Defense Ministry.

The law "On Defense" defines the basic principles and organization of the defense of the Russian Federation, the powers of Russian Federation organs of state power, the functions of Russian Federation components' organs of state power, organizations, and their officials, and the rights and duties of Russian citizens in the sphere of defense along with other norms pertaining to defense.

One significant innovation is that the law clearly lays down for the first time that the various departments whose structure includes armed formations are subordinate to the unified plans for mobilization and combat training. The Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff receives the right not just in time of war but also in peacetime to monitor the implementation of these plans. A unified, more coordinated national defense system emerges.

The law that has been signed contains plenty of new provisions of fundamental importance dictated by the practice of military reform. KRSNAYA ZVEZDA readers will have a chance to study the text of the law in full. The newspaper will be publishing it in its next issue.

**Federal Assembly****Russia: Senate Approves Law on Inauguration of President-Elect***LD0506151896 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1451 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 5 (Interfax) — Russia's future president-elect will enter upon his duties on the 30th day after his election as such, according to a relevant law approved by the Federation Council Wednesday.

The document clearly defines the procedure for inauguration of the president-elect, the ceasing of powers of the outgoing president and the scope of their powers when during the handover of the post.

The law obliges the president-elect to cease his membership in political parties and associations for the entire term of his presidency.

The law outlines the procedure for the handover of the "red button," office property and documents.

The law states the imposition of martial law or a state of emergency before the president-elect is sworn in cannot cancel or postpone the inauguration.

Deliberately impeding the president-elect from fulfilling his duties implies criminal responsibility, the document stipulates.

**Russia: Federation Council Appeals to Voters To Use Common Sense***LD0506155396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1532 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[By Igor Zhukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian Federation Council urged presidential candidates, politicians and citizens of Russia to prevent the upcoming presidential elections from developing into a factor fraught with public tension and new divisions in society.

In its appeal, approved by a 125-1 vote with three abstentions on Wednesday, the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, said free elections of the head of state are a vivid example of genuine government by people enshrined in the Constitution and a landmark step in the development of Russia's democratic statehood.

The upper house urged Russians to make their choice with great responsibility. "We believe that every citizen will go to the polling station wishing well to his country and will be guided in his choice by lofty considerations and motives," the appeal said.

"People of Russia! Fellow citizens! Let us make a well-balanced decision, based on our life experience and common sense, on the election day of June 16, 1996, because the future of our nation, the future of our children and the future of each of us will depend on this decision," the appeal said.

**Russia: Assembly Endorses Russian-Belarusian Legislative Body***LD0506180496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1705 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[By Igor Zhukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — The Federation Council on Wednesday approved a Russian-Belarusian agreement on setting up a parliamentary assembly.

The document stipulates that the parliamentary assembly will consist of 25 MPs from each side. Its task will be to jointly draft legislative acts subject to further approval and implementation in both republics.

The Federation Council also set up its delegation which includes officials from all committees of the upper house.

The agreement was signed by Federation Council speaker Yegor Stroyev, State Duma speaker Gennadiy Seleznev and chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet Semyon Sharetzkiy in April.

The signing took place a few days after Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka signed a treaty forming a new tight-knit political and economic community within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

**Russia: Zhirinovskiy Fails To Push Discussion on 'Genuine' Land***LD0506180896 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1645 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 5 (Interfax) — Russian presidential candidate, head of the Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovskiy failed in his bid to force a Duma discussion of return of "genuine Russian lands" by Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Zhirinovskiy proposed to appeal to the governments and parliaments of Ukraine and Kazakhstan to call referenda in those countries on return of eastern Ukraine plus Crimea and some areas of Kazakhstan to Russia.

The proposal put forward in Duma on Wednesday was supported by 198 deputies (the quorum is 226).



**Russia: Federation Council Ratifies International Agreements**

LD0506124696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1220 GMT 5 Jun 96

[By Igor Zhukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — The Federation Council (Russian Parliament upper chamber) on Wednesday ratified a number of international agreements signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin. The chamber endorsed in particular the agreement on friendship and cooperation between Russia and Italy, an agreement between Russia and China on mutual extradition of persons accused of committing a crime (the agreement rules out extradition of persons persecuted on political grounds), an agreement with Kazakhstan on the legal status of Russian citizens residing in Kazakhstan and Kazakh citizens residing in Russia, an agreement between the Russian and Greek governments on encouraging and protecting investments and similar agreements with Cuba and Romania.

**Regional Affairs**

**Russia: Yeltsin Tells Tver Residents War in Chechnya Over**

LD0606124496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1220 GMT 6 Jun 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TVER, June 6 (Itar-Tass) — "The war in Chechnya is over," Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, talking with people in a street in Tver during his visit to the Tver region. "Only small gangs are now operating in Chechnya. This is no longer a war but the struggle to combat crime. And the effort to combat crime is on all over the country," the President said.

Yeltsin recalled that the accords with representatives of Chechen separatists were signed in Moscow on May 27. Peace agreements are also being signed in Chechen regions, so the state of things of Chechnya is improving." [quotation mark as received] the President said.

Asked by people to settle the Chechen conflict sooner, Yeltsin said: "I am striving for this myself and I feel pained. I am sure that it will soon be over."

**Russia: Chechens Insist 'Ichkeria' Be Mentioned in Protocol**

LD0606084096 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 0700 GMT 6 Jun 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Talks between representatives of the federal authorities and the Chechen armed opposition resumed this morning with discussion on the protocol on freeing forcibly detained persons. The Chechen representatives insist on having their posts and the name of the Chechen Republic — Ichkeria — mentioned in the protocol.

Let me remind you that today the talks entered their third day. [video cuts to show report by correspondent I. Koshelev and street scenes]

[Koshelev] Talks between the federal authorities and the Chechen separatists proceeded with difficulties. The Chechen delegation put forward new conditions for a peace agreement. First, the withdrawal of federal troops by 1 July — in which case the Chechen side promises to carry out demilitarization in the republic within two months;

Second, a free and democratic election to state power bodies at all levels, to be monitored by international observers;

Third, state authorities freely elected by the Chechen people should determine the form of relations between Chechnya and Russia. [passage omitted]

**Russia: Chechnya's Udugov Says Talks Moving 'With Great Difficulties'**

LD0606135596 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1302 GMT 6 Jun 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nazran, 6 Jun (Itar-Tass) — A half-hour technical interval was announced at the meeting between the delegations of the federal authorities and the Chechen separatists in Nazran at 1630 Moscow time (1230 GMT). Movladi Udugov, information minister of the "republic of Ichkeria" [agency punctuation], who came out to speak to journalists, said the talks were "proceeding with great difficulties." Asked by the ITAR-TASS correspondent how long the current round of talks would last, Udugov replied that it would end today, regardless of "whether any results are achieved or not."

**Russia: Local Military, Aides Cited on Nazran Talks***MM0506145496 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 1*

[Report by Pavel Anokhin: "The Released Draft Treaty on the Delimitation of Powers Between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic Is Leading the Solution of the Chechnya Problem From Battlefield to Juridical Field"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The talks between the delegations of the federal authorities and the Chechen separatists resumed behind closed doors in Nazran yesterday. [passage omitted]

In a conversation with your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent, Colonel Valeriy Zhuravel, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops press bureau, reported that the gunmen have stepped up the mining of roads on routes used by the military transport columns. For his part, Anatoliy Sobolev, the 205th Motorized-Rifle Brigade's deputy commander for armaments, which Boris Yeltsin recently visited, informed ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI that, judging by operational data, Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev intend to continue combat actions against the federal troops, using the discontinuance of combat actions to regroup their forces and replenish their weapons and ammunition stocks. The officer also expressed concern that well-armed gunmen are continuing to infiltrate the Chechen capital — there are now around 400 of them in Groznyy.

Judging by statements made by one of the field commanders, Akhmed Zakayev, they are aiming to wreck the elections to the Chechen parliament, which are scheduled for 16 June.

To the credit of the military, they are very distressed and worried about such a development of events. "We are in favor of the agreements being carried out strictly by all the sides, and questions relating to Chechnya's status being settled by the arguments of discussion rather than the arguments of automatic fire," Colonel General Anatoliy Kvashnin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, stressed in a conversation with your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent. "The draft treaty on the delimitation of powers between the federal center and Chechnya has been published. Now it must be discussed jointly, because we all have to live together and we must put an end to the bloodshed. To my mind, the proposed document is a serious step toward this."

Welcoming the positive changes in solving the Chechen conflict, Vladimir Zorin, chairman of the Duma Com-

mittee for Nationalities Affairs, noted that "It is not so much the status of the Chechen Republic as the mechanism for determining it" that must now be discussed. In the opinion of Nikolay Koshman, chairman of the Chechnya Government, this is the cornerstone of Chechen accord, because today nothing can be solved by force of arms. Ruslan Alikhadziyev, one of the field commanders, has also called for honest talks on the delimitation of powers, no matter how difficult they may be, and he stressed that this was a step toward life under a peaceful, cloudless sky. Evidently, that turn of events does not suit everyone in Chechnya.

However, each time they are finding it harder to maneuver. At the All-Caucasus Meeting of the Heads of State of Transcaucasia and the Leaders of the Components of North Caucasus Russia, the initiatives of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the settlement of the Chechnya conflict have met with unanimous support. For his part, summing up the forum, he emphasized in conversation with journalists: "Our policy toward the separatists will be peaceful but firm!"

**Russia: Progress of Nazran Peace Talks Viewed***MM0606085896 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 1*

[Report by Yuriy Snegirev: "Talks on War and Peace With a Break for Lunch"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Nazran — [passage omitted] It cannot be said that Movladi Udugov, the participant in the talks on the Chechen side, was in an optimistic mood before the new meeting. He announced that during the night the delegation had prepared a number of documents and if "today the Russia side summons the determination and signs them then there will be peace and if not there will be war." The Chechen side's demands concern primarily the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops and the creation of a demilitarized zone on Chechen territory.

Vladimir Zorin, deputy head of the federal delegation, who left the sessions hall for a minute, was more laconic: "We shall see." And not surprisingly: The participants in the meeting agreed to keep quiet about the course of the talks and not to comment in any form on what is happening. At the end, it is true, they promised to hold a press conference at which they will answer all the questions.

Despite the mutual caution, by the end of the first day of the talks the two sides met at the same table — the lunch table. Laughter occasionally rang out from the banqueting hall and the delegations emerged onto the street not separately, as they had entered, but in random order. Many observers saw this as a good sign.

Meanwhile a number of representatives of the federal side are expressing fears regarding the gunmen's ability to ensure the observance of the accords that have been reached.

Russian Federation Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Kulikov — an active participant in previous rounds of the dialogue with the separatists — expressed himself in this spirit 5 June. IZVESTIYA correspondent Aleksandr Dzyublo reports that the general said that he is very cautious but asked that his position not be interpreted as running counter to the peace talks. "I very much hope that what is happening in Nazran will end favorably," Anatoliy Kulikov stressed.

The head of the Internal Affairs Ministry also expressed the conviction that last year's picture, when the peace process was deadlocked, will not be repeated. "Whereas at the time the Chechen Republic authorities failed to back up stabilization with practical actions in the regions freed from the Dudayevites, now they are acting differently there," the minister explained. Now it is not guard detachments which are being formed, as the previous agreement stipulated, but proper territorial internal affairs organs, which are being helped by operational investigation groups from the Russian Federation Internal Affairs Ministry and the necessary federal forces, he noted.

At the talks themselves unpleasant things are sometimes happening. A small leaflet appeared calling for the murder of Aleksandr Shamanov, the Defense Ministry troops commander, and his entire family. If this is done by a Russian a reward of \$100,000 is promised. The leaflet is signed by Ivan Shishani, commander of the "Dzhokhar suicide battalion." [passage omitted]

**Russia: Basayev Still Insisting on Withdrawal of Russian Troops**

MR0606112696 Moscow OSHCHAYA GAZETA  
in Russian

No. 22, 6-12 Jun 96 (signed to press 5 Jun 1996) p 1

[Interview with Chechen separatist leader Shamil Basayev by Aleksandr Trushin: "In the Same House With Russia, But in Our Own Apartment. Shamil Basayev Answers OSHCHAYA GAZETA's Questions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The road turned out to be bumpy. The last Russian checkpoint could be reached by a regular bus, but further on we had to alternate walking with hitchhiking along mountain roads. Then we turned into a gorge and walked another three hours or so — first on stones, then in the water — up a mountain stream. Finally, our view opened on a wide valley up in the mountains. Another two hours of driving among

villages, inquiries, document checks, interrogations, explanations, references to acquaintances, refusals to help — and, finally, good luck: the opportunity to talk with a leader of the Chechen resistance.

[Trushin] How has Ichkeria reacted to the agreement signed in Moscow on 27 May?

[Basayev] The day after our delegation's return the State Defense Council of Ichkeria fully approved the document. You remember that the proposal for the meeting originated with Boris Yeltsin — of course, he needed the meeting more than we did. We accepted it because we wanted to show our readiness for a compromise. But we do not need peace at any price. For this reason the principled stance of our delegation was that it refused to discuss political matters at this stage. As for the immediate cessation of combat operations, this is undoubtedly in the interest of both Russia and Ichkeria.

[Trushin] Are you fully satisfied with the results of the Moscow meeting?

[Basayev] No. It was expected that Yeltsin and Yandarbiev would meet alone. I think that such a conversation would have produced much greater results. But the impression of our delegation was this: Yeltsin's entourage obstructed their one-on-one meeting. Shirvani (Shamil Basayev's brother — editorial board) has told me that Grachev, Mikhaylov, Lobov, and Zavgayev were opposed to the presidents' meeting. These are just the people who have an interest in seeing the war continue.

[Trushin] Why is it that talks were not held in Makhachkala on 1 June? It was said that differences had cropped up between members of your delegation.

[Basayev] No. The same meeting of the council drew up a package of proposals and approved the lineup of our delegation. As the saying goes, we do have something to put on the negotiating table. All members of the delegation assembled by the agreed time. Only Aslan Maskhadov could not come. He found himself trapped in the village of Shali, which was sealed off by General Shamanov's troops. You know that the blockade — under the pretext of "checking compliance with the passport regime" — continued for three days. So it is Shamanov — or those whose orders he was carrying out on that particular occasion — who should be held responsible for thwarting the Makhachkala meeting. I hope that nothing of the kind will recur in the Nazran talks.

[Trushin] And yet, what is the main thrust of your package of peace proposals?



[Basayev] The withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. We understand that this is not an easy task. For this reason we are ready to resolve it in a phased manner. At the first stage, until 10 June, troops should be withdrawn from mountain regions. I think that this will end an extra headache for the Russian command. As you understand, the Vedeno district is far from being a holiday center for the units that are deployed there. In addition, we are also ready to discuss questions of exchanging POW's and all details relating to the subsequent pullout of troops.

[Trushin] And what about the disarming of the rebels?

[Basayev] Let me make it clear from the outset: We will not talk about disarming any longer. Last year we agreed to that and you know where we ended: an attempt on Romanov's life; a resumption of combat operations; and yet more punitive actions against civilian villages. We have had enough of this experience.

[Trushin] That is, you want to keep the armed forces of Ichkeria intact?

[Basayev] What we want is peace, not lip service to peace. We understand that a war cannot be halted by a single edict. Much has yet to be done. Meanwhile, peaceful work is quite different from political electoral games. For this reason we have announced our main aim; that is, to create a demilitarized zone on the republic's territory. Only after that can we proceed with resolving political matters.

[Trushin] But then yet more discussions on secession from Russia will start, Moscow will defend the integrity of the state, and there you go again.

[Basayev] I do not think so. If we could carry our land on our shoulders to any other part of the world.... But we are destined to live here, next to Russia. If there are no troops in the republic, we will be able to conclude a definitive and mutually advantageous peace treaty with Russia.

[Trushin] Will it be different from the treaty that Moscow is planning to sign with Zavgayev?

[Basayev] I am familiar with that draft. Imagine that the master asks his dog this: How long a chain do you want to have, five or ten meters? At present they might make the chain a little longer. But tomorrow another master comes and shortens the chain once again. We want to live in the same house with Russia, but in our own apartment.

#### **Russia: Chechen Rebels Threaten Return To War If Terms Not Met**

*MM0606115096 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Separatists Put Forward Unrealizable Conditions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks between the delegations of the federal center and the Chechen separatists continued in Nazran yesterday.

The Moscow delegation proposed that concrete work on military issues and the release of individuals being held by force should start immediately. The separatists, however, as a member of the federal delegation told journalists, are trying to insist on holding a debate and to lead the talks away from the implementation of the agreements signed in the Kremlin.

Thus, in response to the proposals made by Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of the unified grouping of federal forces, on the sides' joint responsibility for implementing the cease-fire agreement, the Chechen side's representatives demanded the immediate withdrawal of federal forces from the republic's territory.

The separatists are emphasizing that only the withdrawal of the troops can guarantee implementation of the agreements signed in Moscow 27 May. Furthermore, they are linking the implementation of the agreement's point on a complete cease-fire with the cancellation of the Chechen People's Assembly elections scheduled for 16 June.

As Movladi Udugov, member of the Chechen delegation and "minister of information of the Republic of Ichkeria," told journalists, if the delegation from the center does not accept their terms, "a large-scale war will begin in Chechnya."

Commenting on the separatists' demands to postpone the date of the elections in Chechnya, Chechen Republic head Doku Zavgayev stressed that "that question is not in their domain." He also noted that there was absolutely no difference of opinion between Grozny and Moscow: "We are finding support and mutual understanding both on the part of President Boris Yeltsin and on the part of the Russian government."

#### **Russia: Directive on Commission for Talks on Chechen Settlement Issued**

*MM0506153796 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 6*

[Russian Federation Government Directive No. 857 signed by V. Chernomyrdin, Russian Federation Gov-

ernment chairman, in Moscow on 28 May 1996 — from the 'Documents' section]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. With a view to peacefully settling the crisis in the Chechen Republic and in line with the Accord on the Cease-Fire and Cessation of Combat Operations and Measures To Settle the Armed Conflict on Chechen Republic Territory, signed 27 May 1996, a negotiating commission is to be formed as follows:

V.A. Mikhaylov — Russian Federation minister for nationalities affairs and federal relations, member of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic (commission chairman);

V.Yu. Zorin — chairman of the State Duma Committee for Nationalities Affairs, member of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic (commission deputy chairman, coopted);

S.V. Stepashin — chief of the Russian Federation Government Apparatus Administrative Department, executive secretary of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic (commission deputy chairman);

N.M. Bezborodov — Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma deputy, member of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic (coopted);

Kh.A. Musalatov — deputy chairman of the Chechen Republic Government (coopted);

A.A. Piskunov — deputy chief of the Russian Federation Government Apparatus Administrative Department, leader of the working group of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic;

N.I. Semenov — adviser to the chairman of the Russian Federation Government, leader of the group of experts of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic;

V.P. Strashko — deputy Russian Federation presidential official representative in the Chechen Republic (coopted);

V.V. Tikhomirov — commander of the Interim Integrated Forces on Chechen Republic Territory;

N.Ya. Fedosov — Russian Federation Government official representative in the Chechen Republic, member of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic.

2. The following working groups are to be created under the negotiating Commission:

on military questions pertaining to the settlement of the crisis in the Chechen Republic (leader — V.V. Tikhomirov);

on questions pertaining to the release of all persons held by force (leader N.M. Bezborodov).

3. The leaders of the working groups are:

to form the working groups within two days;

to establish no later than 31 May 1996 working contacts with the relevant representatives of the armed opposition on Chechen Republic territory.

4. The chairman of the negotiating commission is to recruit experts to hold consultations and prepare the requisite documents.

5. The Russian Federation Government Apparatus Administrative Department is to be made responsible for providing organizational and technical support for the negotiating commission's work.

[signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

[dated] Moscow, 28 May 1996

#### **Russia: Federal Forces, Chechen Separatists Sign Protocol on POW's**

LD0506191896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1842 GMT 5 Jun 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nazran, 5 Jun (Itar-Tass) — The protocol on the procedure of the exchange of POW's and forcibly detained persons was signed this evening at the talks between the federal center and the Chechen separatists that are taking place in Nazran. In accordance with the protocol, lists of prisoners and forcibly detained persons will be exchanged no later than 9 June, Movladi Udugov, "information minister" in the separatist government, told ITAR-TASS. In the following two weeks, the exchange of POW's and forcibly detained persons will take place according to the lists, he added. The Nazran talks will resume on 6 June at 0900.

#### **Russia: OSCE Official: Democratic Elections Impossible in Chechnya**

LD0506153396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1518 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NAZRAN, June 5 (Interfax) — Tim Guldemann, head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] group in Chechnya, does not think that proper conditions exist in

Chechnya to hold democratic elections for the republic's People's Assembly.

The OSCE supports democratic processes in the framework of a peaceful settlement and is prepared to assist in holding elections to the local legislatures but elections now cannot possibly meet OSCE standards, Guldemann told Interfax on Wednesday in Nazran, the capital of the Russian internal republic of Ingushetia.

The OSCE does not think that the elections for the Chechen leader held on December 17, 1995, were democratic, he said. Guldemann said he had sent a memorandum on April 1 to Doku Zavgayev, who was elected leader of Chechnya, to the effect that democratic elections are out of the question in Chechnya now.

**Russia: New St. Petersburg Governor Appoints Deputy Governor**

LD0606093596 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0849 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ST.PETERSBURG, June 6 (Interfax) — Vladimir Yakovlev, who has won the office of St. Petersburg governor, has issued his first two instructions.

The first one reports on his "taking the office of governor."

The second instruction appoints Vyacheslav Scherbakov as first deputy governor of St. Petersburg.

Vyacheslav Scherbakov, born in 1940, is a Rear Admiral, professor, and general director of St. Petersburg mission of the state-run Rosvooruzhenie company.

He was elected deputy of the Leningrad city council in 1990 and was council deputy chairman. He was elected deputy mayor in 1991 and dismissed by Anatoliy Sobchak in 1994. Vyacheslav Scherbakov is a deputy of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly.

**Economic Issues**

**Russia: Livshits Sees Need for Increased State Role**

MM0506145396 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 1 Jun 96 p 6

[Article by Aleksey Viktorov: "Reforms Need Modification"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Russian economy today stands in front of the door leading from the room labeled inflation to the room labeled investment," presidential aide Aleksandr Livshits stated 23 May at a meeting with students of higher educational institutions specializing in economics. The government's task is not just to open that door but to nudge the economy toward it, as it were.

According to the available data, inflation of 1.5 percent is expected in May. Given the socially oriented budget and the substantial amounts of cash present in the economy in the course of clearing wage arrears, this is an undoubted achievement. The only thing the president's aide failed to mention to complete the picture was the signs of recovery in industrial output, which emerged in April.

According to Aleksandr Livshits, facts such as the shortened turnover of the money supply and the emerging growth in savings indicate that the economy is accepting the major transfusions of finance relatively painlessly. The well-known economist tried to discover positive signs even in such a phenomenon as the export of Russian capital, which generates well-grounded fears. "First, this process indirectly reduces inflationary pressure and, second, the exported resources create undoubted potential for future Russian foreign investment." And Aleksandr Livshits is convinced that it is impossible to win foreign markets without them.

The falling profitability of export and import transactions and the lack of opportunities to top up the budget by exceeding the planned level of inflation (a device which Livshits correctly calls the "Chubays effect") have now created totally new conditions for the launch of the second wave of reforms.

The economic mechanism, created literally as we went along, requires major transformations. The president's aide articulated the proposition that the state's role must be enhanced.

"A shift toward federal loan bonds while reducing the profitability of and restricting the market in short-term state bonds, and also a move toward placing Russian securities abroad must be the main principles of action in the financial market." According to Aleksandr Livshits, the government today has effective plans for placing securities in the United States and Europe. Moreover, the large-scale purchase of six-month securities in March demonstrated again the attractiveness of the Russian financial market. However, now, on the eve of the election, there is clear stagnation in the market.

Incidentally, it seems that exactly the same situation has now developed with both investments and tax payments — with 23 trillion rubles of deferments.

While citing the government's desire to switch to targeted privatization and supporting the need to adopt the law "On Nationalization," the presidential aide avoided criticizing the draft law submitted by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Duma faction. Livshits noted the sector ministries' ineffective management of state shareholdings. It is rather difficult to talk about



understanding the situation at those enterprises when 20 controlling blocks of shares are concentrated in the hands of a single deputy minister.

**Russia: Pay Arrears May Affect Election Outcome**

MM0506160296 Moscow TRUD in Russian  
29 May 96 p 2

[Article by Political Observer Vitaliy Golovachev incorporating interview with A. Smirnov, leader of the Russian Federal Treasury: "Ratings or Wages. Federal Treasury Versus Government Decree?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Letters talking about the non-payment of wages to budget-funded workers continue to reach the editorial office. How could it be otherwise when the debt to Russians from budgets at all levels (federal, regional, and local) was held at a level of 3.5 trillion rubles [R] in April but then began rising rapidly in May again, increasing by almost R1 trillion. Sergey Belyayev, leader of the "Russia Is Our Home" deputies' faction in the State Duma, returned from an official trip and stated ruefully on Russian television: "Wages are still not being paid out in Buryatia despite the triumphant reports in the center." The picture is the same in a number of other regions. [passage omitted]

So what is happening in our fatherland on the eve of the presidential elections? In some instances the authorities seem to be making special gestures, which could irritate Russians. After all, it is not just the elections at stake here. Do the state officials responsible for this matter really not understand that the failure to pay their own workers is the ultimate form of powerlessness and that there is nowhere else to go after that?...

But let us try to understand why it is, for example, that the Finance Ministry is not fulfilling Russian Federation Government decree No. 823 (24 August 1995) "On Increasing the Wage Rates (Salaries) of the Single Wage Scale for the Payment of Workers in the Budget-Funded Sphere." This document says, among other things: "In implementation of the Russian Federation President's directive, the government decrees:... 6. To intensify the role of wages as an incentive for skilled workers in health care, education, culture, science, and other sectors of the budget-funded sphere, wage rate coefficients are to be increased and the single wage scale for the payment of workers in the budget-funded sphere is to be approved as of 1 November 1995 in conformity with the appendix...." The decree is signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the government. However, as the letters to the editorial office show, money is being issued from the federal budget without taking this indexation into account. To clarify this bizarre situation I met with A. Smirnov, leader of the Federal Treasury.

My official duty, Aleksandr Vasilyevich said, is to act as custodian of the law, primarily with regard to the expenditure of state resources. I cannot take any actions which contravene the law. After all, that would result in legal action.... Now let us move on to wage problems. As you know, we have a Law on the Budget. I am bound to be guided by it above all. But this document provides no money for the indexation that you spoke of.

[Golovachev] But a special government decree was issued....

[Smirnov] Unfortunately it does not accord with the Law on the Budget. I cannot do anything about this. Budget expenditure is strictly defined and it is impossible to go outside this framework.

[Golovachev] How much federal budget money was spent on wages and the payment of debts in January-April this year?

[Smirnov] R30.7 trillion, including R8.2 trillion on clearing the wage arrears for 1995.

[Golovachev] What outstanding debts were there by 1 April?

[Smirnov] None from the federal budget.

[Golovachev] Are you leaving out the budget debts connected with the wage indexation here?

[Smirnov] That goes without saying.

[Golovachev] What is the situation regarding payments in the Army?

[Smirnov] A decision was adopted to increase soldiers' pay by 25 percent, but only for people serving in trouble spots. However, the Defense Ministry applied this decision to everyone. This is how the debts came about.

[Golovachev] As of 20 May the wage debt from budgets at all levels was nearly R4.5 trillion. How much does the federal budget account for here?

[Smirnov] I do not have the figures for that. In April we issued the full figure for pay allowed under the law (excluding the November indexation again) — R8.4 trillion. In addition we issued R2.7 trillion to the Pension Fund (out of the R4 trillion allocated for the whole year). In May, admittedly, there was some delay with funding. There were lots of public holidays in May, the treasury did not receive taxes, and there was a shortage of money — from 13 through 21 May funding was approximately 40 percent of the requisite figure. But in the very near future we will try to clear the shortfall. Our main concern now is to find the money for teachers' vacation pay. In May they should effectively

be receiving three months' pay. This will cost around R3 trillion extra. And we have to pay this.... [Smirnov ends]

Such is the situation, which was not entirely clarified after the conversation with A. Smirnov. It is difficult to understand why an apparently "unlawful" decree on wage indexation should be issued. And in general, how can a senior official of the Finance Ministry declare a government decree "unlawful" and not implement it? (Furthermore, it is a question of wages which for many budget-funded workers are far below the subsistence minimum.) It is also alarming that debts have begun to rise again. The most surprising thing is that no one really knows how much the federal budget arrears actually are or how much the regional and local budgets owe.

At the Finance Ministry and White House you hear the same thing: There is no money. You get the impression that the obsession with an extremely rigorous monetarist policy still exists today. Is it not unwise to leave a section of budget-funded workers without their pay indexation for the sake of that policy, especially on the eve of elections? If things continue this way the government monetarists will possibly be conducting their macroeconomic debates somewhere else after the elections... Or do the powers that be not understand this?

It is still possible to rectify the situation. In the next two weeks it will clearly be necessary to settle all — absolutely all — budget debts. And prevent them happening again. Otherwise popularity ratings will not count for anything in the elections.

#### **Russia: Bank Statute Could Mean 'Additional Outflow' of Currency**

MM0506135196 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Velichenkov: "Door to Foreign Countries Opened Slightly for Holders of Hard Currency" — from the "Business in Russia" section]

[FBIS Translated Text] Central Bank of Russia Statute 39 [on Changing the Procedure for Conducting Certain Kinds of Foreign Currency Operations] dated 24 April 1996 (published on page 10 of this issue) resolves many problems concerned with registering currency operations for both ordinary citizens and corporate bodies.

It will be recalled that the Law on Currency Regulation and Currency Controls contained a rather short list of "current hard currency operations" which residents could carry out without restrictions. Situations have constantly arisen in life which are not regulated by the law. For example, citizens often have problems

with transfers of funds abroad for children's education, medical treatment, alimony, and so forth. There have, of course, been "slightly criminal" ploys, but dashing abroad all the time with banknotes in your pocket is not a lot of fun.

Likewise the operations of our shuttle traders, who have become quite well organized of late (making use of charters, containers, group travel, and direct links with producers), require a different financial mechanism.

All sorts of structures, ranging from religious to scientific, have constantly experienced problems with transferring funds in order to take part in various symposiums, conferences, and so forth.

"Foreign" currency operations — whether current or capital — are now clearly registered, moreover this has been achieved by merely expanding and clarifying the law without affecting its main thrust. It is certainly no accident that Statute 39, which was signed more than a month ago and which has been undergoing expert examination in the Ministry of Justice, is entering into force only now. This is directly related to Russia's adhesion to Article 8 of the IMF Charter, which envisages the lifting of all restrictions on current operations.

It is noteworthy that the statute itself is couched in very "balanced" language, specifying what you can take "there" and what you can bring in "from there." This is clear evidence of a new standard in drafting such documents in the Central Bank of Russia. A whole number of points of the statute are written with an eye to the future. They have not yet entered into effect. It is clear that the question of acquiring real estate abroad will be resolved most quickly of all. There are no fundamental problems here. However, other points — 1.10, 1.14, and 2 — require very substantial clarification, and the interpretations could be rather varied.

It is obvious that smart financial operators could try to exploit the new "opportunities" for transferring money abroad, carrying out one operation under cover of another. In this regard they can be advised not to rush to carry out such "actions" since the forms of reporting for commercial banks worked out in the Central Bank of Russia (not published) give little scope for them. The Central Bank is setting up units in its clearing centers to monitor the banks on these questions. Of course, by its liberal approach the statute could lead to an additional outflow of hard currency from Russia, but only in the short term. In future it will become far simpler for citizens and enterprises to make a legal declaration of their currency earnings in Russia, to open accounts in authorized banks, and to manage their foreign currency

affairs in perfect serenity on a legal basis rather than opening and servicing offshore accounts.

**Russia: Agriculture Ministry: 75-78 Million Tonnes of Grain in 1996**

LD0606094396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0703 GMT 6 Jun 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Filatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, 6 May [date as received] — Taking into account remaining winter crops, Russia will yield 75 to 78m [million] tonnes of grain this year, specialists of the Russian Ministry for Agriculture and Food believe. Russia will again do without large imports and intends to buy grain in small quantities only for the Far East where suppling domestic grain is more expensive.

Russia will complete sowing spring crops soon, as the State Statistic Committee's data received by ITAR-TASS today shows.

As of 3 June spring crops were sown on 53m ha, including grain on 36.5m, sunflower — on 3.8m, sugar beet — on 1.1m ha and potatoes planted on 3.1m ha. The area sown with spring crops stands at 89 percent of last year's, and the area sown with sunflower - at 97 percent. The areas sown with sugar beet, potatoes and vegetables are close to those in 1995.

The areas sown to maize were 31 percent up on the same period last year, to millet — 64 percent, to rice — 9 percent and to grain — two percent. More spring grain was sown in Tver, Yaroslavl, Kemerovo, Irkutsk and Amur regions.



### International Affairs

#### Ukraine: Kuchma Seeks Further Integration Into Europe

LD0506124296 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1145 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, June 5 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukraine is ready to assume all the rights and obligations of an associated partner of the Western European Union (WEU) "already today," Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said.

Speaking at the Western European Union's Assembly in Paris on Wednesday, Kuchma said that "Ukraine, as a state, should have the right to join any military-political structure which tends to become an element of European and trans-Atlantic security."

While understanding the organizational difficulties facing the Union, Kuchma said Ukraine would be prepared to fulfil the obligations of a WEU associated member for "some jointly agreed upon period of time" on a unilateral basis.

He said Ukraine is interested in developing contact with the WEU satellite center in Spain and its space group.

According to the president, his country considers the development of comprehensive cooperation with the WEU as an "important element of the European security system" and "an integral element of the efforts to restore historical justice by allowing Ukraine to return to Europe as a full-fledged member."

"The strategic goal of our country is to pursue integration into European and trans-Atlantic structures" and "full membership in the European Union," Kuchma said.

Kuchma cited the Declaration of Independence that "Ukraine will seek to become, in the future, a nuclear-free, non-bloc and permanently neutral state."

"The Declaration determines not Ukraine's status, but its aspiration to acquire it," he added.

"Ukraine has fulfilled its aspirations to the extent of becoming nuclear- and bloc-free," Kuchma said.

He noted that the nuclear-free status provides a "unique opportunity for implementing the idea of nuclear-free status for Central and Eastern Europe."

The bloc-free status of Ukraine "is not an obstacle" to Ukraine's participation in international organizations and cooperation with them, including military and political structures.

Speaking about Ukraine's participation in the CIS, Kuchma noted that Ukraine "considers the CIS as a mechanism of peaceful and democratic resolution of

all problems associated with the disintegration of the USSR and as forum for multilateral negotiations and consultations."

Ukraine is against any supra-national structures in the CIS and "strongly opposes attempts to reanimate the former USSR in any form," he said.

On the domestic front, Kuchma stressed that "any serious deviation from the course of reform will destroy the nascent process of stabilization" and urged Europe to provide "international assistance" to Ukraine.

Recalling that many members of the European Union call Ukraine a key to European security, Kuchma said that "any serious changes on Ukrainian soil can radically destroy the situation in the entire European continent."

"Help to Ukraine at a critical time is a strategic investment in West European interests," he added.

"Ukraine can provide a model in the post-Soviet space, and perhaps even in the entire post-socialist space, of transition to European standards," Kuchma said and urged the Assembly to "pave the way to the East of Europe through Ukraine."

#### Ukraine: Kuchma Stresses Country Does Not Seek NATO Membership

LD0506134596 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian  
1310 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [no date or attribution as received] Paris — Kiev's position regarding NATO's eastward expansion remains unchanged and Ukraine does not seek entry to the organization, said Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in a question-and-answer session at the Western European Union Assembly. President Kuchma addressed the assembly on 5 June.

He said Ukraine's entry to the alliance "would not promote stabilization in Europe," but, on the contrary, would provoke "countless disputes on all sides." Kuchma called on European countries to prevent "a new division of Europe into two camps."

#### Ukraine: Kuchma Expresses Opposition to Nuclear Arms in Region

LD0506165896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1633 GMT 5 Jun 96

[By Igor Shchegolev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said his nation is not against NATO's gradual expansion, but "is categorically against a deployment of nuclear weapons in neighbouring countries, if they join" the alliance.

"We did not get rid of nuclear weapons to have new ones being deployed by our side," Kuchma told the Assembly of the Western European Union — the only European organisation which has the authority to adopt decisions in the area of defence — on Wednesday.

He stressed that Ukraine's nuclear-free status provides unique opportunities for the implementation of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

Speaking at a press conference after the Assembly's session, Kuchma noted that Ukraine's major goal is to prevent a new division of Europe into two camps.

Ukraine confirms its status as a non-aligned state and understands very well that its accession to NATO "would not lead to the strengthening of stability on the continent and would have the opposite effect," he said.

At the same time, Kuchma stressed that Ukraine's status as a non-aligned state does not prevent it from participating in international organisations, including military and political structures.

Ukraine should have a right to join "any military-political structure which seeks to become an element of European and trans-Atlantic security," he said.

Kuchma reaffirmed Ukraine's determination to seek associated membership in the Western European Union and to develop ties with the European Union.

"We do not set the rules of game, but we hope that in 1998 we will be able to begin negotiations on the establishment of a 'free trade zone' between Ukraine and the European Union," he said.

Speaking about relations with Russia, Kuchma pointed out that a Ukrainian-Russian summit meeting should be held after presidential elections in Russia scheduled for June 16.

He said that in choosing the date of the meeting, Kiev "thinks about what would be best for Moscow."

Ukraine understands the complexity of the situation where "any decision" connected with such meeting "will be criticised both in Russia and Ukraine," he said.

"Therefore we believe it would be best of all if it were held after elections in Russia," he added.

Kuchma noted that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's reelection "would confirm the irreversibility" of democratic reform in Russia, while a victory of Russian Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov would throw it into great doubts.

The Ukrainian leadership does not want to interfere in Russia's internal affairs, but uses the opportunity to express its attitude towards them, Kuchma noted.

Speaking about the talks on the disputed Black Sea fleet, Kuchma said that no progress has been made, which hampers the signing of a comprehensive treaty of friendship and cooperation between Ukraine and Russia.

The main disagreements centre around the status of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol and the terms, including economic ones, of its further presence there.

#### Ukraine: Kuchma Reiterates Support for Yeltsin

LD0506153296 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1335 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PARIS, June 5 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukraine intends to continue active cooperation with NATO, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma told a news conference in Paris Wednesday, visiting the Western European Union Parliamentary Assembly headquarters.

At the same time he said that Ukraine remains a neutral country and understands that should it state its intention to join NATO, it would not contribute to stability in Europe.

"Our principal aim is not to have Europe divided into two camps again," said Kuchma.

He did not rule out that Ukraine may change its neutral status in the future.

At the news conference Kuchma reiterated his support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the upcoming presidential elections in Russia. "Yeltsin personifies the continuation of the reforms," he said.

Kuchma believes that it would be better to resolve the dispute over the division and stationing of the Black Sea Fleet after the Russian elections. Otherwise, an agreement that was reached before the polls could come under criticism in both countries.

Answering the questions of WEU Parliamentary Assembly deputies, Kuchma said that no progress had been achieved at the talks on the Black Sea Fleet, which prevents Russia and Ukraine from signing a treaty on friendship and cooperation. The sides have not yet agreed on the status and terms of deployment of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, he said.

"But I am still confident that we will be able to reach agreement with Russia," said Kuchma, adding that "we understand the situation in Russia and that (Moscow) has strategic interests in the Black Sea."

Speaking about the political situation in Ukraine, Kuchma said he would like the government to be first of all an economic center, because "the situation requires constant concrete measures in the economic area." He promised to introduce changes in the government which must carry out a more sensible economic policy jointly with him.

He named the repayment of wage debts as the primary task of the Ukrainian government. "Then it is necessary to deal with the problems of the coal industry and the restructuring of the entire national economy," said Kuchma.

**Ukraine: Kuchma Says Ukraine, Russia Not Ready To Sign Treaty**

LD0506141696 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian  
1310 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris — "The state of Ukrainian-Russian negotiations so far does not allow the two countries to sign a broad political treaty," Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said in a question-and-answer session at the Western European Union Assembly on 5 June. He added, however, that Ukraine understood "the reasons behind Moscow's refusal to leave the Black Sea."

Kuchma said the remaining problems with regard to the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) were the status of the Russian BSF and terms of deployment in Sevastopol, and the conditions of leasing the city's naval infrastructure. He expressed confidence that solutions would be found. "I do not think there will be any unpredictable steps on the part of Ukraine regarding Russia," the president said.

**Ukraine: Udovenko: CIS Integration Pressure To Grow After Elections**

LD0606101796 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0934 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, June 6 (Interfax-Ukraine) — The pressure exerted on Ukraine to nudge it toward closer integration with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States will intensify no matter who wins the presidential elections in Russia, Foreign Minister Gennadiy Udovenko told Ukrainian journalists accompanying President Leonid Kuchma on his trip to Paris.

Udovenko said that during his meeting with his Belarusian counterpart in Berlin on Tuesday he told him that Ukraine respected Belarus' right to opt for deeper integration with Russia. "However they must also respect the right of other countries to refrain from joining any unions," he said.

Udovenko referred to what Kuchma said at the assembly held by the West European Union in Paris on Wednesday: he spoke about "many-sided cooperation with CIS countries," not about integration.

At the latest CIS summit Ukraine signed a plan for developing cooperation, Udovenko said, but expressed its intention to "be guided by its current legislation" and refrain from joining the Customs Union formed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

**Ukraine: Kuchma To Attend Central European Leaders' Meeting**

WS0506131596 Kiev UKRINFORM in English  
1345 GMT 5 Jun 96

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to reports by an UKRINFORM Kiev correspondent, Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma will participate in an informative meeting of heads of Central European nations which will take place in the Polish town of Lancut between 7 and 8 June. As senior Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials disclosed at a press briefing on June 4, issues to be discussed at the meeting include European countries' common responsibility for the future of united Europe. A number of bilateral meetings are also expected to be held within the framework of the summit. This is the first time President Kuchma will attend an informative summit of heads of Central European nations. The summit is the latest in a series of high-level bilateral and multilateral informative contacts. Mr. Kuchma will participate in the meeting as the leader of a Central European Initiative member-nation. Ukraine was admitted into the organization on June 1.

**Ukraine: Tabachnyk Discusses Trade, Economic Ties in Havana**

AU0506134396 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER  
in Ukrainian 1 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by the Press Center of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Ukraine and Cuba Need Each Other"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A broad range of issues of bilateral trade and economic cooperation was discussed during the meeting between Dmytro Tabachnyk, head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, who was in Havana as head of a Ukrainian delegation, and Cuban Foreign Trade Minister R. Cabrisas.

They spoke about the possibilities for renewing economic ties under new conditions, and analyzed factors that hamper the development of such ties. In particular, mutually advantageous cooperation is possible



in the sugar industry, where Cuba needs fertilizer and spare parts for agricultural machinery manufactured in Ukraine, while Ukraine has production capacities for processing Cuban raw sugar. The Cuban side expressed an interest in Ukrainian foodstuffs, products of mechanical engineering, and household equipment. At the same time Cuban experience in the treatment of children who were affected by the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant is extremely important for Ukraine.

Ukraine and Cuba need each other. This opinion of the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration was formulated in the protocol on the working meeting between the cochairmen of the intergovernmental commission for trade-economic and scientific-technological cooperation. The document was signed by Ihor Podolyev, first deputy minister of external economic ties, and J. Amado Blanco, Cuba's first deputy minister of foreign trade.

Within the framework of the Ukrainian delegation's visit to Havana, there was also a meeting between Andriy Serdyuk, Ukraine's first deputy minister of health, and D. Dotras, member of the State Council and health minister of the Republic of Cuba.

On 29 May, Dmytro Tabachnyk, head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, and members of the delegation have left Havana.

### National Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma: Cabinet Reshuffle Certain  
LD0606084596 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0818 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PARIS, June 6 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma would like to see in the Government above all "an economic center, rather than something else". Addressing a press-conference in Paris Wednesday, the Ukrainian President said that the situation in Ukraine calls for permanent specific actions in the economic field.

Kuchma noted that a Cabinet reshuffle is sure to be carried out. "I myself would like to see a more balanced economic policy that would be common for the whole Government", he said. The Ukrainian President described the resolution of the non-payment of wages problem to be the paramount objective of the Government. "Then it is necessary to resolve problems involved in the coal industry and restructuring of the whole national economy", he said.

Kuchma pointed out that until now the Government has almost not attended to those issues.

Ukraine: Article Views Situation of Local Press  
WS0506130496 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER  
in Ukrainian 28 May 96 p 6

[Article by Yevhen Lukyanenko, chief consultant at the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission for Legislative Provision of Freedom of Speech and Mass Media: "Rayon Press: Privatization or Ruin?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Who currently needs the rayon and city press?

Whenever I had a chance, I have asked leaders of city councils and state administrations about this. None of them has said that the councils and the executive branch do not need the rayon and city press. Just the opposite, they have emphasized that they support improving work conditions of the mass media and strengthening them, particularly those which represent local authorities and arrange contacts between these bodies and the population.

I have asked representatives of higher authorities about this. Their reaction has been the same.

In the Russian Federation, where a similar situation has developed with regard to the local press, a special law on economic assistance to rayon (city) newspapers has already been passed and implemented.

In our country, for example, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, special government measures have been taken aimed at maintaining rayon and city information and publishing complexes and their gradual strengthening. In particular, the talk is about the indispensability of their existence based on state ownership, increasing new economic, material, and technical capacities and capabilities with the use of shareholders' investments, and averting a change in their business activities.

Leaders of oblast committees for press and information (recently those from Ternopil, Lugansk, and Volyn Oblasts) have been addressing the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission virtually with one issue: Through joint efforts, we must maintain and strengthen the newspapers of rayon and city councils, improve journalists' social situation and work conditions, defend newspapers and publishing houses against wild privatization, and prevent changing their business activities, for example... production of sheets for army barracks, as occurred during the course of "operationally" and "successfully" conducted privatization in some places.

V. Melnyk, chairman of the Kiev Oblast Committee for Press and Information, notes that the local printing and press "are facing a direct threat of changing their mode of operations (after a year or two after a sale) and losing their printing bases," because "detached

entities are not interested in printing houses as such, but in their premises with finished infrastructure and communication lines," and "having purchased outdated printing equipment, the new owners can instantly launch any industrial production."

I have asked journalists, employees of printing companies, kiosk owners, and even certain subscribers and readers about the possible fate of the rayon and city press. Virtually all of them concur in the opinion that the state must not lose this important source of information. People are extremely concerned by the current impetuous wave of privatization — which, as a matter of fact, has been provoked and urged — as well as by the situation of the rayon and city media and their material and technical bases.

Although V. Melnyk admits that there exists a threat of ruinous privatization, unlike his colleagues he argues that "city and rayon printing houses are subject to denationalization and privatization," and that state-owned printing companies from Kiev Oblast, which still exist, "are to be subject to privatization by the end of the first half of this year." The man evidently believes that everything will be done in a proper manner, in favor of company staffs, the cause, and the state.

The leadership of the State Property Fund [FDM], overlooking the important precautionary remarks and proposals, is energetically using the imperative of "subjectiveness" to pursue its own line of privatization consistently and without corrections.

Employees of one of the rayon printing houses (I do not name them at their request) have told me how this is being done. The manager of a regional (oblast) FDM department is actually threatening the printing company director and staff: "If you do not want to privatize, I will fire the director and we will do what we have to do with a new individual." And it seemed that the fund was to dismiss those who sell out state property — which is essential for the state and — just the opposite, encourage those who want to maintain it for the state in its natural interests. Look at what is occurring: The fund is actually causing the state to have as little property as possible.

Here is another example confirming this trend: The staffs of a printing house and a rayon newspaper are not against privatization. They would even want to become the owners of the premises and property. However, they have enough money to purchase a mere seventh of the appraised premises and property. At the same time, the printing house staff and the editorial board are against privatization by a "detached entity" — an individual who is far from the interests of the information and publishing sector — who says "I need the second floor for other purposes, and not to accommodate the editorial

board" even before privatizing the company. What can they do? The printing company staff has unwarily joined the privatization process and the train has departed, as the saying goes. However, the people cannot pay on time, and they are facing an auction now. One can certainly predict in whose hands the information and publishing complex will end up as a result of the auction.

The FDM (Deputy Chairman O. Tymoshenko) has recently admitted that the use of state property by independent oblast newspapers, as a result of dividing the former property of the Ukrainian Communist Party's publications, and the fact that oblast councils of people's deputies did not receive anything, were illegal. Is this normal?

According to O. Tymoshenko, appropriate measures should currently be taken "to bring the use of state property by independent newspapers in line with the current legislation." But how can this be done? Nobody will return anything voluntarily, all the more so since the division was conducted at instructions from [former Ukrainian President] L. Kravchuk, [former Prime Minister] V. Fokin, V. Pyekhota, and V. Shamray [not further identified]. And it is the Ukrainian Ministry of Press and Information that has to correct everything now. Does it have enough power and competence to "remove the shortcomings?"

How can one return oblast councils their property? It will hardly be possible to do this by virtue of an instruction of the Ministry of Press and Information. Evidently, one will have to act through a court. But what will it decide? As everyone knows, the property ended up in the hands of the current owners not through appropriation, but because of shortsighted voluntary decisions of state institutions. And if everything proceeded without any fraud on the part of independent newspapers, even a court will probably be unable to return the property.

The situation is even worse with regard to the premises and property of rayon and city state printing houses and newspapers. After all, the property of former party organs, which the state has lost, belongs to the mass media anyway — independent oblast newspapers — and in rayons and cities, the possibility of ruining information and production capacities and losing newspapers and printing companies is quite real. Plus, local authorities and consumers need printing companies not only to publish newspapers (this often accounts for 6-8 percent of the total volume of production), but also to meet the very important demand for official forms (the main type of production) and information services for industrial and agricultural production, health care, and protection of citizens.

And there are possibilities to resolve this problem in a different manner! For example, let us take the experience of PRIAZOVSKIY RABOCHIY (SEA OF AZOV REGION WORKER) from Mariupol, where the city information and production complex is operating efficiently being based on state (communal) ownership. In Alushta, Ukrainian People's Deputy V. Ivanov and I have become familiar with the work of the ALUSHTINSKIY VESTNIK [ALUSHTA BULLETIN] city news agency. This is also an information and publishing complex (center), but is called differently — a news agency. In one structure, it has the ALUSHTINSKIY VESTNIK newspaper, its supplement KURYER [HERALD], and local radio and television. The complex does not have its own printing house: Unfortunately, it does not exist at all. They are reinforcing their material and technical basis (they are computerizing equipment and equipping studios and engineering rooms). They will also have a printing house one day.

To put it briefly, similar complexes are developing and they have prospects for people, authorities, local self-government, the state, and society as a whole. And what will we have as a result of the privatization of the rayon and city information and publishing branch? Will the rayon and city press remain at the disposal of local state institutions? Will it remain at all? This is a question about which we should think very seriously.

**Ukraine: Belarus Opposition Calls On Ukraine To Defend Human Rights**

LD0506172796 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1644 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, June 5 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Belarusian Popular Front leader Zenon Poznyak and head of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee Abroad Sergey Naumchik handed a statement addressed to the Ukrainian leaders to the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw.

The document expresses the hope that the Ukrainian leaders and political forces "will act to protect the international rights and human dignity that are ignored by the Belarussian authorities."

The Rukh-press agency reports that the statement, addressed to the Ukrainian president, Supreme Soviet chairman and leader of the Popular Rukh of Ukraine, calls the attention of the international community to the abuses of human rights by "the Lukashenka regime" in Belarus, referring to Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

The statement expresses concern over the continued illegal detention of Ukrainian citizens in Belarus. Seven Ukrainian citizens are currently held by law enforce-

ment agencies in Minsk on charges of organizing riots. They took part in unauthorized protest actions in Minsk on April 26 marking the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster.

"The world community and leaders of the neighboring countries should not ignore the fact that an anti-national pro-Moscow authoritarian regime in the center of Europe is threatening the calm and stability of the entire region," the statement says.

Human rights are not the internal affair of any country, the statement emphasizes.

**Ukraine: Crimean Parliament Approves 1996 Economic Development Plan**

LD0506125296 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian  
1050 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol — The Crimean parliament on 5 June approved the republic's economic and social development plan for 1996, proposed by the Crimean Government. The plan, approved in addition to the Crimean budget, envisages a 0.6 increase in GDP, including a 1.4 percent rise in industrial output. Individuals' cash incomes are to rise by 67.7 percent, with wages and salaries to increase by 56.2 percent and pensions and benefits to double.

The program proposes an increase in gas output to 660 million [m] cubic metres and oil output to 18,000 tonnes, with the development of two wells at the Shtormovoye [as received] gas condensate deposit and ten wells at the Semenovskoye [as received] deposit.

Agricultural output is to rise by 22.7 percent, despite an expected drop in grains yield by 80,000 tonnes.

According to Tetyana Shandra, Crimean first deputy minister of economics, the government's social policy objective this year is to halt the decline in living standards and cushion the impact of market reforms on the least protected sections of the public.

The government is hoping to benefit from a recovery in the tourist sector, with 3.2m visitors expected at Crimean resorts this year, compared with 2.5m in 1995.

**Ukraine: Tatar Leader Views 'Tension' in Crimea**

WS0606082096 Simferopol KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA in Ukrainian 25 May 96 p 2

[Interview with Refat Chubarov, Crimean Tatar Majlis deputy chairman and Crimean Supreme Council deputy chairman, by Volodymyr Prytula and Oleksandr Kozakevych from the Crimean Independent Center of Poli-



cal Studies; place and date not given: "Refat Chubarov: Tension Is Growing Among Crimean Tatars")

[FBIS Translated Text] When we were getting ready to interview Refat Chubarov, Crimean Tatar Majlis deputy chairman and Crimean Supreme Council deputy chairman, we planned to speak about the 52d anniversary of the criminal deportation of Tatars from Crimea, and preparations for the Third Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar People scheduled to take place in Simferopol by the end of June. However, on the eve the interview, the Crimean press published a number of openly provocative articles which impacted the course of our conversation with Mr. Chubarov. In particular, commenting on a publication by some "military analyst," Yu. Kozhukh from Sevastopol, who stated that the Crimean Tatars want to create a Muslim state — and this, so to say, may provoke a military conflict in Crimea as early as this June or July — R. Chubarov noted:

[Chubarov] Many unresolved questions related to the restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatars allows certain forces interested in some development of events in Crimea or another to speculate about the Crimean Tatar problem. This is why such articles appear with statements that the Crimean Tatars may establish their diktat in Crimea and, in order to achieve their goals, they may agree to cooperate with certain forces outside Ukraine, which are interested in destabilizing the situation in Crimea and Ukraine as a whole. In particular, these forces include NATO. The longer we delay the adoption of legal resolutions oriented toward the restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatar people, the more absurd assumptions of this kind will appear in the Crimean or other media. And they will have an effect on the population.

[KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA] However, is the development of events forecasted by that man Kozhukh ruled out? He says that armed clashes connected with Crimean Tatars are possible in June-July. This may be a suggestion, what do you think?

[Chubarov] In my opinion, this article clearly pursues one goal — to stave off, in advance, any suspicions from the side that is potentially capable of disturbing the tranquility in Crimea. All sober-minded politicians realize that there is practically no deep-rooted disagreements or essential contradictions in Crimea, which are so irreconcilable that they may spark clashes between different ethnic groups. They actually do not exist, but in the event of any external encroachment upon some processes in Crimea, such a situation may be created. A question follows: What can allow external forces to destabilize the situation in Crimea? In my opinion, a

pretext for this may be found in certain unresolved political and legal questions connected with Crimea in the relations between Ukraine and Russia. To my mind, if Ukraine and Russia had already signed a large-scale treaty that could suit the interests of both states and, first and foremost, seal the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of both states; if Ukraine had determined in relevant laws the status of foreign troops on its territory, including Crimea; and, finally, if Ukraine and Russia had resolved problems connected with the division of the Black Sea Fleet — then the possibility of a clash provoked by external factors between different ethnic groups would have been ruled out once and for all. As long as this is not done, there will always be forces — primarily in Russia, where opponents of this treaty are numerous — interested in destabilizing the situation in Crimea. Therefore, in my opinion, that article by Kozhukh is a beforehand attempt at justifying direct intervention by the Russian special services in processes that are taking place, or will take place, in our peninsula.

[KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA] You mentioned the problems that today, seven years after the beginning of the mass return of your people to their fatherland, are facing the Crimean Tatars. Which of them are the most urgent?

[Chubarov] The return of the Crimean Tatar people is taking place, to a considerable extent, due to efforts of the repatriates alone. State support for the resettlement is very insignificant. Of course, there are many objective reasons for this. The current situation in the state economy does not allow for earmarking large funds for the accommodation of repatriates. For this reason, a lot of economic problems have amassed over these seven years, primarily in those families which returned and settled in Crimea. When we say that 250,000 Crimean Tatars have returned, those knowing the situation realize that this only pertains to the fact of return. Over half of those 250,000 people are not accommodated, so there is growing tension among them. It may be possible to live with kids and old parents in unfinished houses, temporary shelters, or cellars for one, two, or three years, but it is extremely difficult to live there for five or six years.

Therefore, one cannot reduce the resolution of the Crimean Tatar problem only to its economic aspects and to a search for resources necessary for resettlement. There is a wide range of legal and political problems that also need immediate resolution. They do not require large outlays, but they do require a friendly attitude and goodwill on the part of the state to where Crimean Tatars are returning. In this sphere, Ukraine's leadership has done almost nothing. What do I have

in mind? First, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that this is not only a large number of people returning to Crimea, but an entire deported nation. It is understandable that this nation has a lot of particular problems. One cannot pretend that one does not know about this. There is a problem of restoring a national school system and culture; there is a general problem of determining the place of the nation in Ukraine's state and other structures. These problems may be resolved only at a legislative level. There is also a mass of other problems connected with the liquidation of consequences of the dreadful 1944 deportation. In the meantime, society is undergoing a transition to other principles of development, while the particular situation of the Crimean Tatars is not being taken into account. The division of state property is now being vigorously concluded. On the whole, however, the Crimean Tatars, due to a number of unresolved legal questions, are virtually excluded from this process. This also increases tension. Over 100,000 Crimean Tatars who returned to their fatherland do not have citizenship of Ukraine — the state to where they returned. This causes an additional, unjustified limitation of elementary human rights. People cannot obtain jobs in state institutions because Ukraine's law on state officials does not allow them to do this. The children who have grown up to adulthood in Crimea cannot obtain passports to be Ukrainian citizens, only residence permits, because their parents are not Ukrainian citizens. Our children try to enter higher educational institutions — which, for the time being, are sponsored from the state budget — but due to the fact that they are not Ukrainian citizens they may only join the faculties that require payment for education. In other words, even if people realize that the economic problems are of an objective nature, a delay in resolving political issues cannot provoke anything but irritation.

[KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA] This irritation and growing tension may objectively add to the strengthening of radical or even extremist moods. Are these moods widespread among the Crimean Tatars?

[Chubarov] As a rule, unresolved problems connected with the restoration of human rights or even an intentional evasion to resolve them cause a certain radicalization of the attitudes of people or political structures. However, there are no grounds to assert that this radicalization may lead to violent actions. The principle of violence has never been accepted by the Crimean Tatar national movement. And I am assured that it will not be accepted by the movement in the future, either. However, on the other side, recent years have testified to the fact that the Crimean Tatars are capable of certain actions that may be called violent, and this may take place

when violence is used against them. This was testified by the events in October 1992 and the summer of 1995. Therefore, I do not rule out that some interested forces, through violence against the Crimean Tatars, may provoke violent reactions.

[KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA] Everything said by you leads to the conclusion that today the Crimean Tatar problem is one of the most acute in Ukraine and needs immediate resolution at the highest state level.

[Chubarov] The Crimean Tatar problem is quite complex, indeed. Its resolution, from the viewpoint of its economic aspects, needs great efforts. However, I would not call this problem extraordinarily complex in order to avoid the impression that it is unresolvable, that it is a deadlock. To exclude the possibility of someone outside Ukraine's borders profiting from this problem in the near future, it is necessary to resolve several issues connected with the restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatars. It is not necessary in the immediate future to resolve problems that need rather large funding. It is necessary for the state to clearly declare approaches toward these problems and forms of their resolution, as well as to set time frames within which the Crimean Tatar problems will be resolved. If this would be enough to remove the ground and foundations for various provocations.

[KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA] Let us touch upon the subsequent Kurultay which will take place by the end of June. As far as we know, all the delegates have already been elected. Taking into account what you have said, might it not occur that Kurultay will be dominated by those forces intending to draw attention to the Crimean Tatars by more radical methods?

[Chubarov] Kurultay may adopt some resolutions reflecting people's moods. It is quite possible that these resolutions will be formulated in a more stern and pressing form. However, I am sure that Kurultay will not cross the line allowing our opponents to say that the Crimean Tatars are abandoning their basic positions. I know the spirits of the overwhelming majority of delegates to Kurultay — they will never adopt a resolution, toward which we are now being vigorously pushed by different forecasts and versions and which may oppose the idea of Ukrainian statehood. The fundamental position will be preserved. It lies in the premise that the problems of the Crimean Tatars can and should be resolved only within the Ukrainian State, including the desire to implement our right to self-determination. Proceeding from this, I rule out the possibility that Kurultay may adopt resolutions doing harm to the Ukrainian State. Our opponents realize this very well. Therefore, dissatisfaction on the part of anti-state forces with the

position of the Crimean Tatars was one of the reasons for the recent publications that try to frighten the Ukrainian leadership with the Crimean Tatars and to provoke still greater distrust toward them in official Kiev. We see and realize this. This must finally be realized by leaders of our state, as well....

### Economic Issues

#### Ukraine: Kuchma Discusses Budget With Regional Administration Heads

WS0506131696 Kiev UKRINFORM in English  
1345 GMT 5 Jun 96

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to reports from the press center of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration, Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma held a meeting with heads of regional administrations in Kiev on June 4. The meeting was also attended by Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. Discussions at the meeting focused on the implementation of the state budget in the regions. The implementation of the state budget in some regions of Ukraine was declared unsatisfactory. It was also disclosed at the meeting that facts of utilization of funds for purposes other than those for which they were allocated and artificial delay in payment of wages have been uncovered in some regions.

The Ukrainian president demanded appropriate implementation of the state budget in all regions. An analysis conducted at the meeting indicated that the wage payment crisis can be resolved as early as this month. The government is to develop a relevant mechanism for that purpose. Special working groups are also to be set up to resolve the problems of miners. The government will soon conduct a general review of implementation of the May 12 presidential decree "On Urgent Measures Aimed at Facilitating Timely Payment of Wages, Pensions, Stipends, and Other Social Payments."

#### Ukraine: Lazarenko Acts To Fulfill Presidential Edict on Wages

AU0506132096 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER  
in Ukrainian 1 Jun 96 p 2

[UKRINFORM report: "To Block Channels of Abuse of Budgetary Funds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We must establish strict order in spending budgetary funds, and block all channels for their use other than for specified objectives. That was the main concept in the speech by Prime Minister Lazarenko at the Cabinet of Ministers conference, where the course of fulfillment of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's edict on urgent measures for timely payment

of wages, pensions, or other social payments was discussed.

In the course of the conference, a profound analysis was offered of the information provided by those vice prime ministers who head working groups, created by the presidential edict, on the inspection of the situation in oblasts with the payment of taxes and spending of budgetary funds, mainly on the payment of wages and other social payments. It was pointed out that oblast state administrations had taken measures to replenish the revenue part of the budget and redeem wage arrears. However, the shortcomings in the current legislation enable the local authorities and heads of state enterprises to manipulate budgetary funds and channel them to objectives other than payment of wages as the presidential edict demands.

Pavlo Lazarenko paid special attention to the need of considerable improvement in the work of the State Tax Inspection and audit services of the Ministry of Finance and other departments in what concerns provision of timely receipts to budgets, especially at large enterprises. It is necessary to continue control over the use of the budgets of oblast centers and the largest cities, and strengthen control over the state sector of the economy. At the conference, heads of a number of ministries were sharply criticized for causing, by their departmental orders, budgetary funds' dissipation.

The prime minister gave specific commissions to heads of ministries and departments to establish strict control over the fulfillment of every item in the Ukrainian presidential edict, and underscored their personal accountability for the task.

#### Ukraine: Sevastopol Administration To Set Up Free Trade Zone

WS0606093896 Lvov INFOBANK in English  
0750 GMT 6 Jun 96

[From "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lvov, 5 June — The Sevastopol City Administration and Board of Directors of Fisheries are drawing up a project providing for the creation of a local free economic zone in the Kamysheva Bay in Sevastopol.

According to the Director of the Sevastopol State Administration, Victor Semenov, fishing is the priority branch in the city economy. The Atlantyka Fishery gave 46 percent of the entire profit tax received by the city budget in 1995. Another 958 billion karbovantsi was added to the budget by a joint-stock company Pivdenrefratretransflot (Southern Refrigerator's Transporta-



tion Fleet). This company is engaged in transporting the cargo by refrigerating ships.

**Ukraine: Prospects for Establishing Free Trade Zone in Kharkov**

WS0606141196 Kharkov VREMYA in Russian  
23 May 96 p 2

[Report by I. Kononenko: "Ukraine's Industrial Managers and Business Circles From the Far Abroad Have Begun To Speak in One Language"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An "Investment Projects for Ukraine" international forum was held in the Vienna-based UN Headquarters for Industrial Development [UNIDO]. Its purpose was to conduct negotiations between managers of Ukrainian enterprises and potential investors — international companies and banks.

Representatives of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], the International Financial Corporation, the Swiss Banks Corporation, and large German, British, and Austrian banks were among its participants. Industrial circles of the West and East were represented by Hitachi, ABB, Chrysler, Kleine, Nestle, Computer Associates, Class, Premag, and many other well-known companies. Perhaps the results can be summed up by the end of the year because this process is very slow.

Eight projects have been selected in Kharkov to be presented at the forum. Five out of them were drafted by the Malyshev plant. The "Khartron" joint-stock company, the "Polisvit" Special Design Office, and a group of enterprises and organizations headed by the Ukrainian Water Engineering Enterprise [Ukrhidroproekt] drafted the remaining three projects each.

Much work has been done. Investment projects were drafted in accordance with the UNIDO requirements and have been assessed and selected by national and international experts. Fred Nil [name as transliterated], a UNIDO leading expert, visited Kharkov twice as an international expert. Later, projects were assessed in the Vienna Headquarters, and only after that the International Investment Service network began to advertise them. The projects require foreign capital to the tune of \$110 million. As a UNIDO expert, I also participated in drafting three projects — worth \$200 million — from Lugansk Oblast.

So, the process which we knew only by hearsay was launched in Ukraine for the first time. Our industrial managers and business circles from the far abroad have begun to speak in one language — the language of investment projects.

I wish to stress that the most important issue is that the realization of this undertaking depends to a great extent on the presence of favorable conditions for production in Ukraine. These conditions have not yet been set up. If our rich people do not wish to invest in production, it is difficult to expect that someone from the outside is less concerned about his money. Given a market economy, capital moves freely — it is a good point of the market economy — to oblasts where maximum profits could be gained. Hence, I wish to draw a conclusion that if, in general, the state, for some reason, has not ensured conditions for the financially profitable, expanded reproduction of capital, then Kharkov Oblast itself must take care to establish such conditions, in particular, to organize a free trade zone [SEZ]. As is known, these issues are being discussed in Odessa, Mariupol, and Kharkov. Due to the fact that a considerable portion of Ukraine's scientific and industrial potential is located in Kharkov, I regard the opening of a SEZ specifically in our oblast as a matter of primary importance. I have conducted relevant negotiations in the UNIDO and this authoritative international organization is ready to participate in setting up an export-oriented SEZ in Kharkov Oblast.

There are forces on which the Kharkov State Oblast Administration can rely in carrying out technical and economic feasibility studies and drafting other documents. The Analytical Center of the Institute of Machines and Systems has drafted many relevant documents, including prognoses of a long-term development of demographic and production processes, the exhaustion of natural resources, environmental pollution, dynamics of the people's integral intellect [as published], and characteristics of people's lives. The center has submitted its recommendations on investment policy in Ukraine's agroindustrial complex to the Economics Ministry and on a strategy for the development of national production of tractors and automobiles to the Ministry of Machine Building, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion.

It is enough to say that, considering current conditions in Ukraine's rural areas, computers have proposed the most rational prototypes of tractors that will be competitive on our market. A system of methods to effectively assess targeted complex programs — the basis for the modern economy of the developed countries — has also been developed for the first time. These recommendations have been drafted by the most experienced system analysts. The collective of this center can carry out technical and economic feasibility studies for projects of any scale.

I am sure that the center will deal effectively with both drafting documents required to open a SEZ and organizational issues in this area, as it did before. We are waiting for specific proposals.

### Belarus

#### Belarus: Sharetskiy Comments on Visit to U.S.

WS0506122896 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian  
31 May 96 pp 1,3

[Report by Valeryy Lakinowski: "Syamon Sharetski About His Visit to the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 30 May, Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Syamon Sharetskiy told journalists about the results of his recent trips to the United States and Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, where he participated in the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. Naturally, he attached more attention to his first visit overseas, which, in his words, was quite fruitful.

During his working visit to the United States Syamon Sharetskiy had official meetings in the U.S. Congress, State Department, Pentagon, White House, and the State of North Carolina. He held talks with influential senators and members of the U.S. Congress Agriculture and Foreign Affairs Committees. The most important was the result of talks held with the Foreign Affairs Committee, during which Belarusian representatives managed to convince the American side not to introduce an amendment into the Nunn-Lugar bill depriving Belarus of about \$100 million in U.S. financial assistance for military reforms and conversion projects. This would affect 11 unique projects connected with ecology, retraining of servicemen, and others. During the negotiations, the issue of ratifying the agreement on preventing double taxation, signed by Belarus and the United States in 1993, was, in Sharetski's words, brought out of a standstill. This agreement will soon be submitted to the U.S. Congress for ratification. Also, an agreement was reached on technological and informational support of the U.S. Congress for the Belarusian Supreme Soviet. Financing will be provided for trips by two groups of Belarusian legislators to the United States this fall for educational purposes. U.S. lawmakers were also invited to visit Minsk.

At the State Department, Syamon Sharetskiy met with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who spoke on behalf of the U.S. President, as well as with Ambassador James Collins, special adviser for the Newly Independent States. Issues related to economic cooperation, security, technological aid for Belarus, Chernobyl clean-up, NATO's eastward expansion, and others were discussed. In his conversation with Ambassador Collins, Syamon Sharetskiy also discussed the fate of Yury Khadyka and Vyachaslav Sivchik. He presented his point of view on this matter, noting that he is against keeping these people in custody with the investigation still in progress. They do not pose any danger to soci-

ety, and it would be enough to have them sign a written obligation not to leave the city. During the meeting with Deputy Defense Secretary White, he discussed Belarusian participation in the Partnership for Peace program.

In North Carolina, the Supreme Soviet head met with leaders of the state's executive and legislative branches. He also made a speech at the Senate of North Carolina.

On 23 May, Syamon Sharetskiy was received by representatives of the Belarusian diaspora in America. In particular, he mentioned [his meetings with] Zaprudnik and Kipel. Our ethnic brothers expressed their concern over the 26 April events. They also supported the idea to organize another international congress of ethnic Belarusians.

Speaking on the visit's results, Syamon Sharetskiy noted that it took place in a fairly complicated time, when the April events in Belarus triggered a quite unequivocal reaction in the United States. "Most U.S. politicians started to develop a negative image towards our country in connection with the April events and the Belarusian-Russian treaty signed on 2 April 1996. They wondered whether Belarus would retain its independence and asked questions about human rights and the freedom of the press. From this point of view, the visit was absolutely necessary. Given the significant role of the executive branch in the U.S. system of government, it will influence the further development of Belarusian-U.S. relations, noted Syamon Sharetskiy. American politicians mainly asked the Belarusian politicians whether we had already lost our independence and sovereignty. They expressed their opinion that the treaty with Russia leads to a mechanical merger of the two countries into one. But when they read text of the treaty, especially Article 15, they said they did not oppose local integration, but wanted to see the right of our state to sovereignty respected."

As for his trip to Bishkek, Syamon Sharetskiy noted that at that summit issues connected with cooperation of CIS parliaments was discussed and an agreement on interaction among executive branch institutions of the "four" — Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan — signed.

The legislative speaker also touched upon some of our domestic issues. In particular, he said that the Supreme Soviet will soon discuss the holding of parliamentary by-elections. Syamon Sharetskiy has already familiarized himself with a relevant resolution draft. One of the commissions proposed that we go back to last year's resolution, made by the previous Supreme Soviet, which lowered the election validity threshold to 25 percent. As Sharetskiy noted, this resolution will most probably be approved, and such an attitude does not contradict

the Constitutional Court decision on this issue. Asked about his opinion on an initiative by deputy Uladzimir Nistsyuk to collect signatures demanding the resignation of the speaker, Syamyon Sharetzkiy stated that no one can deny deputy Nistsyuk this right. However, the deputy's initiative is, in the parliament head's opinion, based on unconfirmed information, or even a provocation staged by a dishonest person. But democracy gives every deputy the right to come up with initiatives. Syamyon Sharetzkiy refuted claims that he should be faulted for delays in paying salaries to the Supreme Soviet apparatus.

Interparliamentary contacts are becoming a tradition, so it is not surprising that deputy Nistsyuk is at present on a visit to Moldova.

Describing the general state of affairs in the Supreme Soviet, he noted that its work is becoming more stable and constructive.

The Supreme Soviet's most immediate plans include debating a report devoted to implementation of the budget, creating a commission that would refine and complete basic directions of Belarusian domestic and foreign policies, and examining a range of economic bills. In addition, the Supreme Soviet is going to consider cancellation of the official status of the white-red-white flag and the "Pahonya" national emblem. Several proposals have been received regarding this issue, and the parliamentary speaker did not rule out that these symbols may receive the status of former national symbols that could be legally displayed in public and will not be a reason for law enforcement agencies to detain Belarusian citizens.

**Belarus: Minsk Dismisses Moscow's Fears Over Missile Pullout**

**MK0506143096** *Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian*  
5 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Yuriy Golotyuk: "Russia Is Concerned Over the Evacuation of Nuclear Weapons From Belarus. The Defense Ministry Writes a Letter to Alyaksandr Lukashenka"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Belarusian Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Leonid Maltaev yesterday rebuffed claims by his Russian colleagues, saying that under the schedule approved by Belarus and Russia, the evacuation of the strategic nuclear missiles remaining on the republic's territory is to be completed by 31 December 1996, and therefore "there is still half a year to go. And so there can be no question of any disruption to the nuclear weapon evacuation schedule." The head of the Belarusian military department described as unethical the mere suggestion that the republic was not

honoring its obligations. He dismissed as "groundless" the charges by Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, chief of staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Force, that the Belarusian side is thwarting the schedule for the evacuation of the 18 nuclear missiles remaining on its territory.

True, certain quarters in Minsk voice their concern over the missile situation. Thus, Petr Kravchenko, head of the Belarus parliamentary commission on international affairs, shares the concern of the Russian military department over the implementation of the strategic nuclear missile evacuation schedule by the Belarusian side. In this connection he recalls that, in the course of last year's visit to Minsk by Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, an agreement was reached that the evacuation from Belarus of the 18 nuclear missiles as part of the Topol complex would be completed by 1 September. Mr. Kravchenko doubted that "members of the nuclear club, above all Russia, will remain indifferent to this strange situation." "Ratification of the START Treaty on 4 February 1993 by the Belarusian parliament resulted in the republic's acquiring a nuclear-free status," the parliamentarian said.

**Belarus: Official Says Belarus Has Disrupted Nuclear Withdrawal**

**LD0506124796** *Moscow INTERFAX in English*  
1227 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 5 (Interfax) — Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, chief of the main headquarters of Russia's strategic rocket forces, has said that Minsk has disrupted the schedule for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarusian territory to Russia.

The Russian and Belarusian defense ministers confirmed and coordinated the schedule for the withdrawal of rocket divisions temporarily stationed in the Belarusian cities of Lida and Mozyr to Russia with President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in December of 1995 in Minsk. The document provides for withdrawal of nuclear warheads from Belarus by May 1996 and withdrawal of the whole group of strategic rocket forces from the republic's territory to Russia by August 31, 1996.

Yesin expressed "concern due to the fact that fulfillment of the international commitments taken by Russia is under threat through Belarus' fault."

"Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Commander of the strategic rocket forces Igor Sergeyev addressed Belarus' government structures in order to avoid this, but there was no answer," Yesin said.

He voiced the hope that Minsk would define its position in the near future and would name an acceptable time



for the withdrawal of arms and military equipment from Belarus to Russia.

**Belarus: Russian Rocket Forces Delayed Withdrawal Causes 'Discord'**

WS0606091296 Minsk Radio Minsk Network  
in Belarusian 0300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Discord may emerge between Russia and Belarus on the issue of withdrawing the Mobile Rocket Forces regiments from the territory of Belarus. This has been reported to INTERFAX by a high-level representative of the main headquarters of the Strategic Rocket Forces. According to him, despite the agreements reached earlier, the Belarusian side is dodging the resolution of practical issues related to the withdrawal of mobile rocket regiments from its territory.

He underscored that following Pavel Grachev's instructions, the Russian Defense Ministry is currently drafting a letter to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka which will address the observance of Belarus's commitment to withdraw Russian rocket regiments by the end of the year.

**Belarus: President Views Closer Ties With Krasnodar Kray**

LD0506111396 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 0700 GMT 5 Jun 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Questions relating to integration with those who are now our closest neighbors have been discussed in Sochi. The Russo-Belarusian treaty signed this spring is starting to generate real action.

[Correspondent Shcherbal] Sochi. A business meeting has taken place at a state dacha between Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Yevgeniy Kharitonov, head of the administration of Krasnodar Kray. The meeting was held at the suggestion of the Belarusian side. During the 90-minute meeting, attention focused on the expansion of economic cooperation between Belarus and the Kuban, the large grain-growing area in southern Russia. [video shows Lukashenka talking to a man; caption reads "Krasnodar Kray"]

[Begin Kharitonov recording] External trade in 1995 amounted to over \$30 million, which really is not much. We exported \$7 million worth of goods to Belarus and imported goods worth \$23 million. I think that even in the immediately foreseeable future, even in the current year, we can triple these deliveries both to the Republic of Belarus and from there to us. [end recording] [video shows Lukashenka nodding in agreement]

[Shcherbal] The Kuban farmers, whose pool of farm machinery consists mainly of Belarusian-made tractors and seed drills, have a particular interest in close trade contacts. It was agreed to step up the supplies of spare parts of farm machinery.

It would seem possible to arrange mutually beneficial cooperation with regard to holiday accommodation too. The Belarus president suggested refurbishing one of the blocks of the well-known "Matsesta" sanatorium at the republic's expense, and the Sochi authorities promised, in return, to allocate preferential holiday vouchers to people from the republic.

**Belarus: Official on Ties With Foreign Organizations**

WS0506091496 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian  
29 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Andrey Sannikaw, Belarusian deputy foreign minister, by Leonid Lakhmanenka; place and date not given: "Andrey Sannikaw: International Organizations Are Unique Treasures of Experience and Expertise, But It Is Not So Easy To Use Them As It May Seem at First Glance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cooperation between Belarus and international organizations is the topic of our correspondent's conversation with the Belarusian deputy foreign minister. Andrey Sannikaw is a career diplomat who has worked for and at international organizations for a long time.

[Lakhmanenka] Why do states unite into international organizations?

[Sannikaw] The principal reason for this is to strengthen their security and peace in the world. Moreover, this is not only a matter of military security, but of economic, political, and environmental security, too.... This is the primary reason which forces national leaders or their representatives to gather together at a table and develop general rules of a game, the observance of which enables the maintaining of more or less stable order in the majority of regions of our planet.

Thus, this visible effectiveness of international organizations, regardless of many mistakes and shortcomings, made the idea of globalizing and managing international processes very popular in the 1970's and 1980's. At that time it was fashionable to talk about a world parliament and even a world government.

This interesting, however not undisputable, idea has not been implemented. The degree of the development of international relations at that time did not give any hope for such implementation. And it seems that we will

still have to wait a long time for that. It is possible that the EU's laboratory will practically contribute to the implementation of this wonderful idea if integration processes within the EU succeed.

However, it is necessary to point out that currently certain international organizations have partially acquired functions of supranational bodies. For instance, the World Health Organization is fully regarded as our planet's Ministry of Health. We might just as well call the International Labor Confederation a universal international labor department. There are grounds to regard such a renowned and respected organization as UNESCO an international ministry of education and culture. Obviously, I do not mean our understanding of a ministry as a body which exercises strict control over various spheres of activities.

I have deliberately made a conditional and simplified analogy with a sectoral ministry to give ZVYAZDA's readers a better idea about the functions of powerful specialized international organizations. Each of these organizations makes every effort to help all the countries use the world experience. These organizations are unique treasuries of experience which are opened to their members. Therefore, states tend to become members of various international organizations and this is the reason for the great number of these organizations.

However, I would like to point out that it is not that easy to use their experience as it may seem at first glance. It is necessary to know whom to turn to and how to obtain the necessary information; to select from an ocean of information the most useful information for your country; to manage to process this information; to creatively assess it and use it.

[Lakhmanenka] Before meeting with you I went through a capacious guide to international organizations. I was surprised by their large number and the unbelievable diversity of topical interests and problems which they embrace. We know that we should not strive to become a member of every organization. Taking into account our will, can we really expect that we will become a full-fledged member of the so-called "G-7" in the immediate future? In my opinion, we have a small chance to become a member of the International Maritime Organization, too. However, it is difficult to understand why our country, whose agricultural sector is quite well developed, ignores the FAO [UN Food and Agriculture Organization] which is a renowned, authoritative, international organization of agricultural producers? As far as I know, this organization is an extremely rich treasury of information. Hence, this question: What principles do we apply to choose membership in any international organizations?

[Sannikaw] Your irony with regard to maritime organizations has no point. We have no access to any sea. However, this does not necessarily mean that we are not interested in deposits of the sea bed, given that they belong to all the nations of the planet. Sea and ocean shelves hide a great wealth inside. And who knows, maybe in the 21st Century Belarus will begin to exploit its share of the sea bed. Namely, the appropriate international organizations through conventions and documents which have been issued at their initiative, may simplify the access to the seas' deposits for the non-maritime states.

As for FAO membership I fully agree with you. We should have become a member of this organization a long time ago, but this is not within the competence of the Foreign Ministry.

In general, we should approach the issue of membership in any international organization very carefully and be able to see and envision all the possible consequences. After becoming an independent state, Belarus faced the necessity of entering other organizations (and not only those within the United Nations). In addition, we have faced the need to examine our membership of all organizations in which we were represented only nominally and were used as a cover for the USSR's interests. There are two tasks to accomplish.

As for the first one, it would be very useful for Belarus to cooperate with the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. As a matter of fact, we already tried to join this organization when Belarus was part of the USSR. At that time this organization was called the CSCE. The OSCE has become the first powerful European organization which we joined as early as 1992. Currently the OSCE is going through a very hard time. This organization is painstakingly and stubbornly looking for the right place among other authoritative international organizations, particularly within the system of European security. I believe that the OSCE will have a say in the future.

Admission to the EU is very important to us.

A number of regional international structures recently appeared and it would be useful for Belarus to develop relations with them. For instance, the Central European Initiative is this kind of organization. At the moment we are at the stage of entering this organization. At the beginning it was established as an association of four states and currently it comprises 10 states and five associate members. Among the latter states are Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania.

For us, membership in this organization is useful due to the fact that it plays the role of a bridge

between Western and Eastern Europe and deals with the resolution of practical problems in the economic area, transborder trade, the development of small and medium enterprises, and the like.

We are also interested in the Council of the Baltic States, given that Belarus belongs to the Baltic Sea region and obviously would like to maintain good relations with this council. Generally speaking, cooperation with regional organizations looks very promising for us. They are less politicized than other world or European organizations.

[Lakhmanenka] Are the fees that we have to unavoidably pay for membership in any organization regarded as a negative "consequence?"

[Sannikaw] To pay or not to pay and if yes, then how much.... This should not be the principal criterion when determining the issue of a state's admission to an international organization. I reiterate: We have to learn how to make bigger profits from membership in any organization in comparison with our monetary contribution in the form of a fee. However, we should not regard international organizations as a "milk cow," given that the majority of them have no substantial funds which are necessary for the implementation of Belarus's profitable projects. However, they develop projects and motivate their importance and later on, funds are acquired from other sources.

[Lakhmanenka] To continue the issue of making profit from cooperation with the outside world, I cannot help asking another question. In addition to large international organizations, there is a number of small organizations, various funds, associations, and the like, through which it would be possible for Belarus to join profitable projects, initiatives, and obtain funds.

Unfortunately, we lose these opportunities very often. Sometimes, the reasons for that are elementary: We do not know about them, we do not know how to write an application and send it on time or to arouse interest for our participation in a project. As a result, we are losing hundreds of millions of dollars which could be used in Belarus.

[Sannikaw] These are our ministries' and departments' drawbacks. The Foreign Ministry will try to serve as a catalyst for our broad, full-fledged participation in international cooperation. However, the foreign affairs department is not the body that should deal with these kinds of activities. We have our own functions and tasks. Nevertheless, we have never refused to render diplomatic support for our economic entities.

However, I observed with bitterness when I was in Geneva how much energy gets wasted in Belarus.

This is a very important issue for Belarus. A number of projects to enhance the efficient use of energy exist within the framework of the European Economic Committee. There is even a specific program called the "Year 2000 Energy Saving."

Our Energy Ministry joined this program and quite actively participated in its activities at the beginning. I heard good opinions regarding our experts in Geneva. This cooperation promised Belarus access to the profitable energy saving projects. Representatives of our ministry were present in Geneva at one meeting only, given that there were no funds to participate in the second, third, and fourth sessions.

They [Energy Ministry officials] telephoned me from Minsk and begged me to engage in the resolution of their problem. Meanwhile, I am a professional diplomat and do not know anything about energy issues. In fact I managed to support specific political aspects, but I was not able to get to the core of the problem.

The expenditures on our experts' business trip would be — simply speaking — tiny in comparison with the results expected from the implementation of the aforementioned projects.

However, there are positive examples, too. Our cooperation with the International Labor Confederation is developing successfully. We have a number of projects with them on the protection of jobs in Belarus.

Belarus's Patent Department has successfully launched cooperation with the International Intellectual Property Organization. This organization — I will reveal a little secret — is a relatively rich organization. Our contribution to this organization is rather small, but we benefit a lot from it.

[Lakhmanenka] However, we can also name a number of international organizations that are very important for Belarus with which we have difficulties in finding mutual understanding, given that our approaches, assessments, and conclusions do not always coincide. In this case I refer to our relations with the World Bank and the IMF. What is the matter?

[Sannikaw] There are two popular opinions with regard to the activities of financial institutions. Some people regard the IMF's instructions as very useful, while others as unacceptable and harmful to the Belarusian economy. I do not accept any of these opinions. The tensions in our relations with the IMF are caused by the fact that the IMF's experts use their Western experience while assessing the economic situation and providing recommendations for lifting Belarus out of crisis. We cannot accept all their recommendations, given that in the West there is a system, confirmed by many years of



practice, for social protection of working people which enables them to more or less decently survive hard times.

The situation in Belarus is different. The majority of the population will not survive the full abolition of state subsidies for housing or municipal services, which is demanded by the IMF. These are the reasons behind all misunderstandings. However, this is what the negotiation process is for, during which it is necessary to prove our position. Many times we have spelled out our position and we are going to continue to explain our stance, since Belarus is interested in cooperation with financial organizations.

[Lakhmanenka] Soviet propaganda claimed during the Cold War years that all the international organizations were powerfully influenced by the Americans and were skillful instruments of U.S. imperialism. This war is over now. What has changed in the division of forces in the powerful international organizations? I believe that it was not accidental that Boris Yeltsin said during his recent official visit to Beijing that it is time we finished with the situation in which one country teaches all the rest how to live and work, what kind of foreign and domestic policy to pursue, and even whom to appoint to high posts. Undoubtedly, the Russian president had the United States in mind.

[Sannikaw] ...There is something to your words. However, the current situation is different and more complicated. After the World War II when the United Nations was created and many other specialized international organizations began to resume their activities, the sharp confrontation between the Soviet Union and its allies from the socialistic camp on the one side, and the West on the other side began.

Sometimes, there were odd situations. We joined the WHO in 1948. Afterwards, following Stalin's orders, we became for some time a so-called passive member, together with Ukraine and the USSR. Belarus renewed its membership in this organization as late as in 1991.

Then, at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's the situation somewhat changed after the collapse of the colonial system and the rapid appearance of a number of new independent states on the international arena, which brought about a number of extremely urgent problems. A considerable number of those "newcomers" was supported by the USSR. It should be admitted that this support was not always disinterested.

Currently, when ideology does not divide nations any longer, it is possible to cite many examples when, by using skillful and reasonable argumentation, we

convinced even former enemies from the "capitalist camp" in the objectiveness of our stance.

As for Belarus, thanks to the logical explanation to the UN Committee for Economic and Social Issues, it managed recently to have its status changed from the Group "B" to the Group "C," which enables us to decrease fivefold our contribution to peacekeeping operations all over the world (we are talking about tens of millions of dollars). This move, as well as the decrease in our contribution into the regular budget were very inconvenient for many principal donors from among developed wealthy countries of the world. However, they accepted this move, given that we managed to convince them that our former share was considerably overstated by the USSR for ideological reasons. At that time, the USSR wanted to look better in the eyes of the world community and deliberately overstated the actual per capita income, meanwhile every country's contribution is calculated on the basis of this indicator. It is terrible to say how much money we unnecessarily lost just for keeping the USSR's image as a country with a strong and healthy economy.

In my opinion, this was an ideological adventure for which we had to pay after the collapse of the USSR. The point is that the United Nations system for calculating every state's contribution does not allow for a quick review of data presented earlier by the states. Therefore, even now our economic indicators are being calculated in accordance with the previous unrealistic Soviet dollar exchange rate against the ruble and with fake figures indicating our economic development.

[Lakhmanenka] Of all the international organizations the most negative attitude toward all the former Soviet Union republics was on the part of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) which exercised control over the exports to the Soviet Union of contemporary technologies and products such as high-tech computers. After the proclamation of the CIS, the Cocom gradually ceased to exist. Is it true that a new organization has been established on its basis?

[Sannikaw] Yes, the Cocom does not exist any longer and the new organization has not started operating yet. The Cocom member states had a meeting in Holland in December 1995 and drafted the so-called Vaseanaar Agreements (after the name of the town where the session was held) which determines the post-Cocom regulations. Russia is among other states that participate in the activities of this organization.

As for Belarus, we are very interested in cooperation with this future organization, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes every effort to enable us to become a member. Membership in this organization

will open to us access to new technologies and with practically no limitations.

In the past, Cocom was a discriminatory organization and acted against the socialist countries. Meanwhile now, its successor will hamper the exports of high technologies solely to those countries that do not comply with international obligations on disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons. Meanwhile, Belarus, meeting all the obligations on disarmament and nonproliferation, has the right to be granted the very useful membership in this elite world organization of developed countries. Then we will be able to freely trade in our commodities on foreign markets.

[Lakhmanenka] Recently, the voice of nongovernmental organizations seems to sound in a more decisive and authoritarian manner in the world. Do we maintain contacts with them and can this kind of cooperation be of any use?

[Sannikaw] You should address this question to somebody else. We cooperate only with organizations that are created on the basis of international agreements. However, during our work we take into account opinions of nongovernmental public structures, too.

Those organizations are developing very rapidly which is a very interesting phenomenon. In foreign states these organizations embrace all the spheres of peoples' activities. Therefore, cooperation with them should be maintained. Particularly in the developed countries, nongovernmental organizations distinguish themselves by profound analysis of problems. As a matter of fact, in the United States their reports often become elements of big politics. Therefore, this is something we should learn. I, as one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leaders, would be very happy if the nongovernmental organizations of Belarus familiarize me with their analytical reports and information regarding various problems of the international political life. Unfortunately, so far it has not happened.

### Moldova

**Moldova: Snegur Interviewed on Ilascu, Romanian Relations**

AU0506165196 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 31 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, by Mihai Vicol; place and date not given: "I Pray to God That Ilascu Stays Healthy and Becomes My Adversary in the Electoral Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vicol] Mr. President, the Republic of Moldova has serious problems with its geography. The rayons in the eastern part of the Republic have

caused and will still cause problems for Chisinau. Do you really believe that Tiraspol will give in to Chisinau?

[Snegur] Given my current position, which I occupy thanks to the people's wishes, I must be optimistic. I do not believe that the Dniester leaders will give up everything, but I believe that our negotiations — so to say, as we must call things by their name — will shortly lead to our drawing closer to a common denominator. The population on the left bank of the Dniester River is faced with very many difficulties. Another distinct point in the discussions is solving the problem of the political detainees. We want them to be transferred to the legal and constitutional bodies of the Republic of Moldova. Still, I believe that the current situation will change.

[Vicol] The adherence of the Republic of Moldova to the CIS Economic Union has caused many headaches for the opposition and for a good part of the population of Romanian origin. The economic advantages have yet to be seen. How do you consider this state of dissatisfaction?

[Snegur] I believe that nobody need worry about that, as everyone is doing the best they can to improve the situation now and in the forthcoming future. I do not think I can be accused of not doing enough to find a reasonable solution for taking the country out of the present crisis. In the current stage, the participation of the Republic of Moldova in the CIS Economic Union is such a solution. I would like to conduct a dialogue with the opposition on the basis of the current reality in the country. The opposition need only fight through democratic means to come to power. Then they may proceed as they deem fit. The president of the Republic must only play the part of mediator, but he must also be a pillar of stability at this time. Stability does not mean only solving military conflicts, but also economic problems.

[Vicol] The situation in parliament is explosive. What will happen if the population revolts over the living standards?

[Snegur] I believe the situation is being kept under control by the presidency and the government. Explanatory work is being carried out on a large scale. The transition period is taking rather longer than anticipated, and the economic reforms are also rather slow in coming. Indeed, there is also the danger of a social explosion. I cannot say that such explosions will not occur before the elections, but should anything happen, all I can do is to talk to the people. I would like to strongly state here that I will do everything that can be done today to improve the people's well-being. I have great reservations about the activity of certain ministries, departments, and so forth.

[Vicol] What does Romania mean to you, as president of the second Romanian state?

[Snegur] The answer to this question evolves from the very way you formulated your question. Romania means a sister country and a brother people, with whom we can get along without the need for an interpreter. It also means a country with which we intend to integrate both spiritually and economically. I categorically reject the last-minute rumors to the extent that Moldovan-Romanian relations have cooled down. At least this is the case as far as the Moldovan presidency is concerned. I am doing all that I can to ensure that those rumors will never come true. The people who make such statements would be well advised to study the exchanges between Moldova and Romania, the business figures, and the scientific and cultural congresses. Exhibitions of plastic artists from Romania are opening in Chisinau, and exhibitions from Moldova are opening in Bucharest, and so forth. I bluntly maintain that, and I will always stick to my position!

[Vicol] The Ilie Ilascu trial has made the country, whose president you are, known throughout the world. Thanks to this unwanted trial, the Republic of Moldova is now geographically known in the world... There are rumors that Ilie Ilascu might become your counter-candidate for the presidency of the Republic of Moldova.

[Snegur] First of all, I would much rather have that the Republic of Moldova become known in the world for other reasons, and not because of the misfortune that has befallen such an outstanding man as Ilie Ilascu. Regarding the Ilascu trial, I have done my very best, from the very beginning, to have it transferred to the Republic of Moldova. I believe that Moldova is also known thanks to my appeals to the whole world and the international bodies for Ilie Ilascu's release. Regarding the idea of such a counter-candidate, I am not afraid of it. If I were to fear such a thing, I would have no business in occupying a leading position in the country. I consider myself a democrat and, in the last instance, it is the electorate that will have his say, not me. I pray to God that Ilie Ilascu stays healthy and becomes my adversary in the electoral campaign.

[Vicol] With what does President Mircea Snegur reproach the man Mircea Snegur? What did he do and not do? What can President Snegur further do to take the Republic of Moldova out of its present crisis?

[Snegur] It is very difficult to give a concrete answer to your question. As I want to always be true to the Romanian people, I would say that the man Snegur has still many reserves that have remained unused in his activities as president. As the first man in the Republic of Moldova, it has been very hard for him to lead

the country at such a difficult time, when so many events have taken place, such as the military conflict, the Ilascu trial, the Dniester problem, the economic crisis, and so forth. Every day I was confronted with new and unknown situations and developments. We do not have omniscient aides, and hence mistakes are also being made. Nevertheless, I would like to state here that we must mobilize all energies to redress the current situation, consolidate our state, and ensure that we are a united nation.

#### **Moldova: Parliament Head Views Economic Reform Acceleration**

AU0506162596 Chisinau INFOTAG in English  
2055 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, June 4 (INFOTAG) — Parliament Chairman Petru Lucinschi has spoken up for economic reform acceleration, as Moldova has created an appropriate legal framework for that.

In his interview published today by TRUD newspaper of Moscow, he pointed out that the Parliament has adopted over 500 laws during the past two years, with many of them being targeted on entrepreneurship promotion, and some envisage tax exemption at initial stages of economic activities.

"Certainly, many people are scared by unfamiliar, sometimes very extraordinary steps in reforming. They feel uncertain about their future. But I guess a much greater threat is a possible return to the communist past. Stability is not so easy to achieve. We are passing through a very complicated period of our modern history, but we hope for the better", Lucinschi said, and made a forecast that changes for the better may become apparent already this year.

In his words, there exist different variants of overcoming the economic crisis. He does not rule out a possibility of Moldova's becoming an offshore zone, as "according to European norms, Moldova is a small country, with limited market possibilities, and dependent on imported energy".

"The problem of foreign investment is of key importance for us, as only a well-balanced investment policy can underpin the reforms", he said.

"We are ready to surrender our control at such enterprises where we are unable to re-equip existing facilities or to build new ones. I see nothing dangerous in shifting the control over to foreign investors", the Speaker said. Lucinschi says he is an advocate of brave decisions in reforming, "otherwise everything will be spoiled... This year the country is having presidential elections, and,



naturally, nobody wants to take unpopular measures before the voting. But then we will have to raise prices not, say, by 40 percent as needs to be now, but by 100 percent...", Lucinschi said.

Answering TRUD's questions about corruption, he explained that "the Parliament has been considering this

urgent problem in a complex-like way. We need to arrest this ugly phenomenon. Regretfully, we have not yet reached the level of those civilized countries where not only the State but the society itself catches corruption by the throat".

## Tajikistan

### Tajikistan: Uzbekistan Offers Aid After Recent Floods

LD0506082196 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network  
in Tajik 0500 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Emomali Rakhmanov of Tajikistan had a telephone conversation with President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan yesterday.

During the conversation, Karimov lamented the damage caused by the recent natural disaster — torrential rains, flooding, and hail in some towns and districts of Tajikistan. He said that Uzbekistan was ready to render emergency humanitarian aid to the fraternal people of Tajikistan and to send food, building materials, fuel, and other things to help clear up the consequences of the disaster.

The heads of the two friendly countries exchanged views on the situation in Tajikistan and in the region and on the prospects for expanding cooperation. Regional, international, and other problems were also considered.

The conversation was held in an atmosphere of understanding, sincerity, and brotherhood in keeping with the relations between the two neighboring and independent countries.

A KHOVAR correspondent learned this from the press office of the president of the republic.

### Tajikistan: Official Rejects Opposition Claims of Russia's Involvement

LD0506115496 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 1000 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tajik President's Press Secretary Saidov categorically rejected allegations by leaders of the Tajik opposition about the participation of Russian aviation in military operations in Tavil Dara district. He called an appalling fabrication the statement that the Government of Tajikistan asked Russia to use chemical bombs against opposition fighters.

The government forces of Tajikistan were able to repel attacks by the fighters, which lasted for two days in this district near the administrative center Komsomolabad.

### Tajikistan: Government Troops Repulse Opposition Near Tavil Dara

LD0506083196 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0754 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, June 5 (Interfax) — Tajik government troops have repulsed opposition

attacks near the village of Kalay Hussein, 18 kilometers southeast of Tavil Dara.

Check points of the Tajik Defense Ministry were attacked from 8 p.m. on June 4 through midnight, spokesman for the Tajik president Zafar Saidov told Interfax Wednesday. The gunmen had to retreat. Their losses are being determined.

Check points of government troops near the town of Komsomolabad, some 180 kilometers east of Dushanbe, came under intensive fire Monday night, said Saidov.

Several days ago gunmen blasted a bridge which connects the Labidzhar town with Tavil Dara. Opposition snipers are laying a constant fire on the highway from Komsomolabad to the Khaburoabad mountain pass via Tavil Dara, which connects central Tajikistan with Gorno-Badakhshan, an autonomous district in east Tajikistan, a military source told Interfax in Dushanbe.

The government troops are forced to counteract the opposition, but "this is no violation of the temporary cease fire agreement," stressed the presidential spokesman.

Saidov refuted claims of opposition leader Sayed Abdullo Nuri that the Tajik government has requested military aid from the command of CIS peace-making troops or "Russian commanders."

"The government is strong enough to repulse any attack of the opposition, but the Tajik leadership still relies on political methods of inter-Tajik settlement," he said.

### Tajikistan: Most Police Chiefs Fired in Leninabad After Protests

LD0506110296 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan  
in Tajik 0300 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Saidamir Zuhurov, interior minister of the Dushanbe regime, has fired 90 percent of district police chiefs in Leninabad Region. This step has been taken to meet the demands of the people who took part in protest meetings in Khodzhen and other districts, because their leaders can bring them to the streets again.

The regime's administrators had to reconcile with those who took part in the meetings and have met the greater part of their demands. [passage omitted]

The head of the region has said that the main reason for the protest meetings was injustice in the localities.

### Uzbekistan

#### Uzbekistan: President Meets Yeltsin's Envoy for Tajikistan

LD0406160396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1534 GMT 4 Jun 96

[By Vilor Niyazmatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tashkent, June 4 (Itar-Tass) — Uzbek President Islam Karimov on Tuesday met the Russian president's envoy for Tajikistan, Yevgeniy Mikhaylov.

The talk centered on Russian-Uzbek cooperation in various fields and the situation in the Central Asian region.

Karimov stressed that the settlement of the intra-Tajik conflict was crucial to peace and stability in the region.

#### Uzbekistan: OSCE Says Uzbek Parliamentarians Promoting Stability

LD3105140996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1319 GMT 31 May 96

[By Vilor Niyazmatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TASHKENT, May 31 (Itar-Tass) — Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Frank Swalen described the work of Uzbekistan parliamentarians as a factor of stability in the entire of central Asia and an example to other countries of the region.

During his visit to Uzbekistan which concluded today, he familiarised himself with the activity of the multi-party parliament of Uzbekistan and its role in building rule-of-law democratic state in Uzbekistan.

OSCE will continue to strengthen ties with Uzbekistan in every area and to expand cooperation in international organisations, Swalen said during his meeting with Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov. Partnership in OSCE is needed not only to countries and peoples of the central Asian regions but also for a vast expanse adjoining them.

#### Uzbekistan: Uranium Mining Retooling Program Reported

MK0506122796 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Takhir Dzhalilov: "Tashkent's Strategic Resource"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the territory of Uzbekistan among the many facilities kept away from the gaze of

the curious are nearly 30 areas still accessible only to specially trusted or tested citizens. A militia cordon, a barrier and special security regulations are, without exception, in evidence at all the uranium deposits on the republic's territory. Over the last 40 years of Soviet rule the lion's share of uranium for the military-industrial complex, as well as for nuclear power stations, used to come from them. Beginning in the mid-1950's the Uzbek uranium mining industry was fully supported directly from Moscow, causing justifiable envy in the other raw material sectors.

According to IAEA data, the republic's uranium resources stand at 230,000 tonnes. During the last 40 years, and from the moment the surveys began, more than 440 deposits, which includes Central Asia's biggest — the Uchkuduk deposit — have been discovered. A third of the deposits are depleted at the moment [v nas-toyashchiy moment]. And in Soviet times some of them were turned into nuclear waste dumps. Nevertheless, as of 1 January 1996, the Republic of Uzbekistan rates third in the world for uranium sales and fifth for uranium mining.

Things took a bad turn in the year 1992 when the United States State Department set rigid quotas on the import of Uzbek uranium. Until recently, only a small fraction of mined and enriched uranium was sold to Ukraine under an intergovernmental agreement. The exclusive right to the sale of the products of the Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Combine (NGMK) belongs to the American Nukin Company [name as transliterated]. The long-term contract is far from being mutually advantageous, but it saves Uzbekistan some trouble and IAEA charges.

The first attempt to break out of the captivity of American quotas was made early this year. A rather lucrative contract for the supply of 500 tonnes of Uzbek uranium was signed when a big delegation of South Korean businessmen visited Tashkent. Considering the favorable tendency for growth in natural uranium prices on the world market, the republic's cabinet, together with NGMK management, elaborated a program for retooling the enterprise before the year 2030. It calls for investments worth \$100 million. As soon as mid-June a foreign company whose drilling equipment is the most suitable for the development of Uzbek uranium deposits will be chosen by competitive tender. The most efficient and reliable drilling rigs will be put through their paces for two months in an experiment. The company chosen by competitive tender will win the right to ship from 25 to 30 drilling rigs, worth \$30 million, to Uzbekistan.



### Armenia

#### Armenia: UN To Expand Aid to Armenia, Other CIS Countries

LD0506135796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1325 GMT 5 Jun 96

[By Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — "International aid to Armenia and the other CIS countries to wipe out poverty, protect the environment, and improve the living conditions of women will be substantially expanded this year," administrator of the U.N. Development Programme James Gustave Speth said after his visit to Yerevan, where he attended the opening of the U.N. office in the Armenian capital.

Henceforth, Speth said, the U.N. Development Programme will be able to render Armenia large-scale assistance in view of the new approaches to this aid. Priority aid will be given to small enterprises and businesses, contributing to the development of cities and their infrastructures. Speth stressed that U.N. aid was insignificant before 1996, but now the situation was changing radically and large sums were being allocated for this purpose.

After meeting Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan, Speth said that they were able to draw the conclusion that it was necessary to combine macroeconomics reforms with the social policy, with the creation of new jobs and with efforts to overcome poverty.

#### Armenia: Ararktsyan Sees Cooperation Whoever Wins Russian Elections

NC0406173996 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English  
1338 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, June 3 (NOYAN TAPAN)—France wants President Boris Yeltsin to be elected for the second term, French Senate Chairman Rene Monory announced at a news conference held Saturday [1 June] in Yerevan.

Monory stressed that both Eastern and Western Europe are looking forward to outcomes of presidential elections in Russia.

Armenia's Parliament Chairman Babken Ararktsyan voiced solidarity with the French top official, stressing that Armenia will cooperate with Russia independent of election returns. He reminded of the recent visit by Russia's State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev to Armenia and said that the fact that the State Duma's Chairman was a communist should not be viewed as an obstacle in relations between Armenian and Russian Parliaments.

#### Armenia: President Leaves for Georgia on Official Visit

NC0406142796 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1300 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] An Armenian delegation headed by President Levon Ter-Petrosyan left for Georgia this morning for a two-day official visit.

Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan; Gagik Shahbazyan, the minister for relations with the CIS, EU, and international economic organizations; Finance Minister Levon Barkhudaryan; Economy Minister Vahram Avanesyan; Justice Minister Marat Aleksanyan; Transportation Minister Henrik Kochinyan; Yerevan Mayor Ashot Mirzoyan; and other officials are included in the delegation.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan is expected to meet Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze today. Later, the leaders of the two neighboring countries will meet the representatives of the Armenian community.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan will meet Chairman of the Georgian Parliament Zurab Zhvania tomorrow. He will also visit the Armenian church and meet the representatives of the [Armenian] community of Javaghk [Armenian-inhabited region of Samtskhe-Javakheti].

The delegation will return to Yerevan in the evening of the same day.

The signing of joint documents are expected during the official visit.

### Azerbaijan

#### Azerbaijan: OSCE Delegation Arrives for Visit to Region

NC0506185796 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri  
1800 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] An OSCE delegation arrived in Baku today. The guests will also visit Khankendi [Stepanakert] and Yerevan. [Heikki] Talvitie and [Valentin] Lozinskiy, co-chairmen of OSCE Minsk Conference; and [name indistinct] and [Vladimir] Kazimirov, co-chairmen of OSCE Minsk Group, are included in the delegation.

#### Azerbaijan: Aliyev Receives Visiting U.S. Energy Department Official

NC0506185996 Baku TURAN in English  
1333 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/05.06.96/TURAN—Today President Aliyev received the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy, Mr. Charles Curtis.

President Aliyev said he hopes that Democrats will win the victory at the forthcoming Presidential elections in U.S. and Bill Clinton will not leave his office. President Aliyev noted that he closely watches over pre-election campaigns in U.S. as well as in Russia. President Aliyev expressed hope that Boris Yeltsin will win the victory at the elections in Russia. "There are forces, which wish to return us back to the past", he stressed.

Mr. Charles Curtis noted that the U.S. attach great importance to reforms in Azerbaijan and handed the message of the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, to President Aliyev.

"Any statements aimed against independence of Azerbaijan will be considered to be aimed against foreign policy of America", Mr. Charles Curtis said.

#### **Azerbaijan: Aliyev Receives Council of Europe Delegation**

*NC0506191096 Baku TURAN in English  
1333 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/05.06.96/TURAN—Last evening President Aliyev received the delegation of Parliamentary Assembly of CE [Council of Europe] headed by Mr. Jaques Setlenzhe [name as received].

The head of CE mission said visit of the delegation to Azerbaijan is timed to preparation of joining of Azerbaijan in CE. He noted that the delegation has met with the representatives of national minorities, religious confessions and political parties. "We have made sure that democratic legal state is building in Azerbaijan and there [is] neither national nor religious discrimination here", Mr. Setlenzhe said. He said late in June Azerbaijan can receive the status of the invited guest of CE and the issue related to membership of Azerbaijan in CE can be settled later. The guest has expressed hope that experience of European states will be wider used in Azerbaijan.

Touching upon the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, President Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan still comes out for peace political settlement of this issue. He has acknowledged Baku's intention to grant Nagorno-Karabakh the highest status within the framework of Azerbaijan.

#### **Azerbaijan: Government Refuses To Sign Simultaneous Multiple Oil Deals**

*NC0506190896 Baku TURAN in English  
1333 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/05.06.96/TURAN—The administration of Azerbaijan refused from the idea to sign several contracts on development of perspective structures in Azeri section of Caspian at the same time.

Although earlier it has been planned to sign the contracts on development of perspective structures "Ashrafi", "Dan Ulduzu", "Muradkhanli" and "Lenkoran Deniz" simultaneously with "Shah-Deniz" contract, SOCAR's [State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic] President, Natig Aliyev, told the journalists. He said the opinions on prompt signing of these contracts are groundless. "There is no necessity to settle such global issues in a hurry", he added.

SOCAR's vice president, Ilham Aliyev, told TURAN Agency that signing of the contract between SOCAR and British Ramco company concerning development of onshore "Muradkhanli" deposit is put off due to geological complication of the deposit. "The sides decided not to take the risk and make detailed analysis of the deposit", he mentioned. The source from "Ramco" acknowledged this information and added that the issues related to fiscal regime are yet to be settled in the future project.

Touching upon the projects on development of "Ashrafi" and "Dan Ulduzu", Ilham Aliyev, noted these projects are not ready to signing. Moreover, Azerbaijan wishes to attract Chevron, Shell and Mobil companies, which do not participate in Azerbaijan's oil projects, in development of these deposits.

Presently American companies "Amoco" and "Unocal" show the interest to "Ashrafi" and "Dan Ulduzu" deposits (according to preliminary information, they wish to have approximately 60 percent share in the project).

Regarding to project on "Lenkoran Deniz" deposit, Ilham Aliyev, said this issue is under preparation. When several details are elucidated, SOCAR intends to sign the protocol of basic principles of project with French ELF company.

#### **Azerbaijan: Aliyev, Signatories View Importance of Caspian Project**

*NC0506135796 Baku TURAN in English  
0745 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/04.06.96/TURAN—"Contract for the development of 'Shah-Deniz' has a special significance," the President Geydar Aliyev told today the guests and participants signing of the contract. It is very significant as the oil projects of Azerbaijan attract more and more new countries, Aliyev said. He pointed out traditional partnership between the Great Britain and Russia. Iran's and France's participation in the project is a new stage in mastering of oil treasures of the Caspian. "I consider Iran's participation in this project very important," Aliyev said.

The president expressed a hope that this project would bring Azerbaijan an economic gain and will promote stability in the region of the Caspian basin.

Minister of Energy of Great Britain Tim Eggar pointed out the role of the Ambassadors of the two countries, Mamedgulyev and Young, in case of strengthening of bilateral contacts. He was pleased by the fact that 43 British companies have delegations in Azerbaijan and are actively doing business in this country.

Mr. Eggar especially noted the role of consortium: "It is very good that there are three littoral and four neighbouring states in consortium. It is noteworthy that Iran was involved the project," Mr. Eggar noted.

"The politicians should adopt a balanced decisions and to do their best so that the businessmen were able to work for the benefit of their countries," Mr. Eggar said.

Russia's Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy Nikolay Kostyunin called the signing of the contract "a brilliant result." "If not a decisiveness of Azerbaijan it would be impossible to obtain such results," he said.

The president of the Iranian oil company 'Ali Hashemi called today's contract "an important agreement in which seven countries take part." He expressed gratitude to the government of Azerbaijan for creating of an opportunity for the Iranian company to take part in the project.

Vice President of the Russian company "LUKoil" Ravil Maganov noted in his address that only SOCAR [State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic] and "LUKoil" were participants of all three consortiums in Azerbaijan. He said that "LUKoil" was going both to receive gain in Azerbaijan and to make investments to the economy of the country.

In conclusion Geydar Aliyev said that all three contracts for the development of offshore fields in the Azeri sector of the Caspian sea would work and the main purpose of these contracts is to bring welfare to all countries involved in these projects.

### Georgia

**Georgia: Deputy Foreign Minister Denies Border Conflict With Armenia**

LD0506152596 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1455 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, June 5 (Interfax) — There are uncertain sections of the Georgian-Armenian border, but there is no conflict between the two countries over this problem, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Malkhaz Kakabadze told Interfax in Tbilisi on Wednes-

day, in comment on the statement by Levan Mamaladze, Georgian presidential envoy for the Kvemo Kartli region in southern Georgia, that there are disputed areas between Georgia and Armenia in the Georgian region of Marneuli. Mamaladze also said that Armenian troops had come further than 4 km into Georgian territory in one of the border sections.

The Georgian and Armenian Foreign ministries have created commissions to demarcate the border that will begin the demarcation soon, the Georgian deputy foreign minister said.

A high-ranking representative of the Georgian border guard command confirmed to Interfax on Wednesday that the Georgian-Armenian border had been "moved 4 km further into Georgian territory near the village of Kachagan in the Georgian region of Marneuli."

"This happened several months ago. The Armenian side explained its actions by the situation in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict," said the source, who requested anonymity.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani border lies several kilometers away from the Georgian area occupied by Armenian troops where Armenians "were conducting reinforcement operations," the same source said.

"This incident has provoked no broad response. It was decided to settle the problem during the demarcation of the Georgian-Armenian border," the Georgian border guard commander said.

### Georgia: Tbilisi Refutes Armenian Troops Violated Territory

LD0606114696 Tbilisi BGI in Russian  
1015 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [no dateline as received] — The press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry has refuted categorically a report alleging that Armenian armed units violated the Georgian-Armenian border and advanced four kilometers into the Georgian territory in the area of the town of Sadakhlo. The report was circulated by some of the Russian media yesterday. A BGI correspondent was told at the press center of the ministry that the information had been verified at the Kvemo Kartli [province bordering Armenia] regional police department. The chief of the police department, Col Aleksandre Bukia, said that nothing of that kind had occurred.

In the opinion of independent observers, the misinformation has been timed to coincide with the Armenian president's visit to Georgia and was intended to frustrate the shaping of the integration process among the Transcaucasian republics.



**Georgia: Spokesman Says Abkhazian Government  
Reshuffle Not 'Abnormal'**

*LD0506114996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1057 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 5 (Itar-Tass) — "The reshuffle in the Abkhazian government pursues the purpose of improving the work of the Interior and Defence Ministries and is not at all abnormal," the republic's representative in Russia Igor Akhba believes. Commenting for Itar-Tass today on the reported dismissal of the Abkhazian Interior and Defence Ministers, he said that the decision to relieve of his duties Major-General Givi Agrba, the Interior Minister, was not linked with any shortcomings in the work of the law

enforcement bodies. The General, Akhba said, resigned due to his age, and because he wanted to see a younger man in his place. Colonel Aleksandr Kchach, who had worked in the police for quite a time, was appointed to this post not without Agrba's recommendation.

Speaking about former Defence Minister General Sultan Sosnaliyev, Akhba noted that this far from young man had decided to return home in the Northern Caucasus. Experienced organiser Vladimir Mikanba, who enjoys great authority in the republic, has replaced him.

Akhba claims that, reporting on the reshuffle, the Georgian media sometimes interpret much too freely the reasons behind the personnel changes, which, it is pertinent to note, were made at the end of last month.

### **Estonia**

#### **Estonia: Meri Voices Concern Over CFE Changes, Baltic Security**

WS0506140196 Tallinn BNS in English  
1157 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, June 5, BNS — Estonian President Lennart Meri Tuesday expressed concern over the U.S.-Russian agreement in the framework of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

Meri said at a meeting with the United States Ambassador to Estonia, Lawrence Taylor, that he was concerned over the agreement, which failed to take into consideration the security of the Baltic Sea area, including that of Estonia and Latvia, the president's office press service informed BNS.

The United States and Russia came to an agreement in Vienna on June 1 on alterations to the CFE accord, permitting Russia to increase the number of its tanks in the Pskov military district from 180 to 600.

Meri analyzed the concessions made to Russia in the CFE treaty with the Estonian parliament's foreign affairs committee on Tuesday.

Other issues touched upon during the meeting, the press service said, were Estonian security policy and further steps to be taken in connection with the worrying development.

#### **Estonia: Joint Estonian, Russian, Finnish Rescue Exercises 'Successful'**

LD0506143496 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network  
in Estonian 1900 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Estonian, Finnish, and Russian border guard chiefs viewed the joint rescue exercise that had taken place in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland as having been successful. This is what Lieutenant Colonel Aare Evisalu, the Estonian border guard department's chief of staff, told the Baltic News Service. The Estonian border guard ships Kou and Pikker and the state flying squadron's Mi-8 helicopter with over 30 men took part in the two-day exercise held about 30 nautical miles east of Moshchnyy island. The exercise simulated fire breaking out on a Russian border guard ship with subsequent rescue of a person from the smoke-filled ship and of five persons from the water.

#### **Estonia: Chinese Deputy Premier Meets President, Other Officials**

LD0506143596 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network  
in Estonian 1200 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prime Minister Tiit Vahi met Li Lanqing, the deputy premier of the National Council

of the People's Republic of China, at Toompea [seat of government in Tallinn] on 5 June. Estonian-Chinese trade and economic relations were discussed, as well as the current state of Estonian-Chinese and Chinese-Russian relations and security issues.

The Chinese deputy premier concluded that the two countries' cooperation potential has not been utilized to the full extent. China expects Estonia to produce a complete list of goods Estonia would like to export. In addition to trade relations more focus should be placed on developing broader economic cooperation, both through the creation of joint ventures and through joint activity at the international, that is, at the EU market.

The visitor gave a news conference today and Mall Malberg went along:

[Malberg] [passage omitted] As Li Lanqing said Estonian-Chinese bilateral relations are good, with the visit is expected to develop them further, particularly in trade. The Chinese deputy premier saw his discussions with Prime Minister Tiit Vahi, President Lennart Meri, and Riigikogu speaker Toomas Savi as businesslike. In addition to the economy, they also touched upon politics and culture. We arrived at the same opinion on many issues, Li Lanqing said.

[Begin Li recording, in Chinese fading into Estonian report] A large group of Chinese businessmen accompanied me to Estonia and are looking into the possibilities of conducting business here. [passage omitted] In Li Lanqing's opinion, cooperation should be strengthened but this alone would not suffice. More joint ventures should be set up in Estonia, with the production sold in third countries in addition to the Estonian markets. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Li Lanqing said that he had handed over a modern telephone exchange with 2,000 lines and a digital program to the Estonian Government today as a gift on behalf of the Chinese Government. It is expected that this, too, will develop the two countries' cooperation, particularly in electronics. [passage omitted]

#### **Estonia: President Meri, Chinese Official Discuss Regional Issues**

LD0506173096 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network  
in Estonian 1600 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Lennart Meri received Chinese Deputy Premier Li Lanqing in Kadrioru [presidential residence in Tallinn] today. In addition to economic and trade issues between the two countries the parties voiced a conviction that economic links cannot be separated from politics and security. President Meri

voiced regret that for economic reasons it has not yet been possible for Estonia to open an embassy in Beijing, but there have been numerous opportunities to further economic links between the two countries. Meri highlighted Estonia's favorable position as a country for transit trade. Estonian ports would enable Chinese goods to gain direct access to the markets of the Nordic and Western European countries. The parties concluded that within Estonian-Chinese relations there must be cooperation also with third countries. Lennart Meri emphasized that Estonia's and China's common interest in ensuring stability and security in the world was of prime importance in this respect.

**Estonia: Latvian Fishermen Violate Border Despite Agreement**

LD0606110696 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network  
in Estonian 1000 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Latvian fishing boats entered Estonian waters to fish on 30 occasions in May despite the border agreement on the Gulf of Riga between the Estonian and Latvian governments. This was reported today by the Estonian border guard.

The border guard post on Ruhnu [island] recorded 30 border violations by Latvian fishing trawlers in May. According to a border guard, the border violations were revealed thanks to the radar which has been operational on Ruhnu from the beginning of May.

The border guard added that the ships would not have been seen with the naked eye. The Estonian border guards warned the Latvian ships which were ignoring the border and the Latvians left. There have been no major misunderstandings in the Gulf of Riga.

**Latvia**

**Latvia: Russian Build-Up on Northern Flank Counters NATO Expansion**

LD0406110296 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1019 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] RIGA, June 4 (Interfax-BNS) — Russia's efforts to strengthen its defense potential on its northern flank — the Leningrad military district — can be regarded as the promised resistance to the process of NATO enlargement, according to a Monday statement by the Latvian Foreign Ministry.

It was issued following the U.S.-Russian memorandum signed in Vienna on May 1 on the need to amend the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, in particular its part dealing with the size of personnel in flank areas — the Leningrad and North Caucasian military districts.

The ministry was alarmed by Russia's intentions to increase the number of tanks from 180 to 600 in Pskov region bordering on Latvia.

Commenting on the memorandum on Latvian television Monday Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs said the preservation of the CFE treaty is in question rather than Baltic countries. In his opinion "the treaty is very fragile and probably this is the explanation for the flirtation with Russia."

Birkavs admitted that Latvia is alarmed by the memorandum because it increases the threat to the security of Baltic countries to a certain degree.

He said he planned to discuss the memorandum with U.S. secretary of State Warren Christopher in Berlin June 3-5 meeting of foreign ministers of NATO countries and members of the Partnership for Peace program in Berlin.

In a Tuesday interview with the Baltic News Service Estonian senior foreign ministry official Sven Jurgenson said changes in the treaty can undermine the security of Estonia and Latvia.

In his opinion the memorandum was signed without taking into account the security requirements of the Baltic region.

**Latvia: Foreign Minister Worried Over Increase of Russian Forces**

WS0506140296 Tallinn BNS in English  
1157 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jun 5, BNS — The Baltics need to be compensated for possible Russian military forces increase in the Pskov region, Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs told BNS over the phone from Berlin.

Birkavs said he voiced the opinion also during a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

"We need compensation for our concern, and the United States understands us," said Birkavs.

Birkavs said he has reached an agreement with the Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas that both countries will work out a common position in the "Pskov issue."

He noted that Lithuania also is ready to take part in the position work-out, although it has no direct borders with the region of Pskov.

Birkavs reiterated that the U.S.-Russian memorandum of understanding is aimed at preserving the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.



"Unfortunately it is done on the account of the Northern Flank," noted Birkavs.

He added that several countries of the Northern Flank have expressed concern about this memo. Birkavs voiced his concern also at the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council countries' foreign ministers.

In the Latvian foreign minister's words, the memorandum makes stronger Latvia's fear for its security, and

at the same time makes the Baltic state to more consistently strive for its goal — NATO membership.

The U.S. and Russian officials agreed June 1 in Vienna that Russia will increase the number of tanks from 180 to 600 in the Pskov district, which borders with Latvia and Estonia.

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